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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the study of the role of information in elections and public 
policy formation. Its main focus is on information acquisition and voting behaviour. 
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation of this research and presents a survey of related 
literature. Chapter 2 focuses on electoral turnout, Chapter 3 on public policy, and 
Chapter 4 on mass media.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of information on electoral turnout. Since incentives to 
be informed are correlated with other incentives to participate in public life, a model 
of information acquisition and turnout is introduced to isolate potential instrumental 
variables and try to establish a causal relation. Results are tested on the 1997 General 
Election in Britain. It is shown that information, as well as ideology, matters for 
turnout. It also contributes to explain the systematic correlation of turnout with 
variables like education and income. Voters' knowledge of candidates and of other 
political issues is also substantially influenced by mass media.
Chapter 3 presents a model that links the distribution of political knowledge with 
redistributive policies. It argues that voters can have private incentives to be informed 
about politics and that such incentives are correlated with income. Therefore 
redistribution will be systematically lower than what the median voter theorem 
predicts. Moreover, more inequality does not necessarily lead to an increase in 
redistribution and constitutional restrictions might have unintended consequences. 
In Chapter 4 it is argued that instrumentally motivated voters should increase their 
demand for information when elections are close. In supplying news, mass media 
should take into account information demand, as well as the value of customers to 
advertisers and the cost of reaching marginal readers. Information supply should 
therefore be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be 
closer, the population is on average more valuable for advertisers, and the population 
density is higher. These conclusions are then tested with good results on data from the 
1997 General Election in Britain.
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Chapter 1
Information, Elections, and Public 
Policy
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an increasing attention in economic literature on the process 
that leads to public policy formation. There has been a growing consent on the view that 
to evaluate policies and their effectiveness it is necessary to open the black box that leads 
to policy choice.
An economy based on decentralised and voluntary exchange can only achieve Pareto- 
emciency if some restrictive assumptions are satisfied. When such conditions are not 
met, i.e. market failures or incompleteness occur, then government intervention can help 
reaching more desirable outcomes. Traditional public economics assumes that policy- 
makers are benevolent welfare-maximizers. Under this assumption, public policy-making, 
and its outcomes, will only be constrained by the range of policy instruments and by 
information availability. Thus, perfect governments could reach the same outcome as 
perfect markets.
However, these institutions are hardly perfect in reality and it has become clear that 
an important purpose of economic science should be to better understand the functioning 
of both. After devoting much effort to studying market imperfections and their conse- 
quences, economists seem to have turned their attention to government imperfections, 
thus substantially modifying both positive and normative analysis of government action.
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Opening the black box of politics is a complex task. Public policies are the outcome of 
a number of interactions between often conflicting agents. Most of this analysis has been 
focussed on the study of liberal democracies: here citizens express their preferences elect- 
ing their representatives, politicians compete for consensus, pressure groups and organized 
private interests try to affect public policy through their influence on public officials or 
public opinion, and bureaucrats and other non-elected officials are often responsible for 
policy implementation and have the opportunity to leave their mark on final outcomes. 
Research by political scientists and, more recently, by economists, has tried to understand 
the complex interactions between the agents involved in political processes, and the role 
of the rules of the game in determining policies.
In this picture, the election of public officials assumes a central and non-substitutable 
role: it is in the intention of any implicit or explicit democratic constitution to leave 
the ultimate power to citizens. Moreover, although many specific policies can probably 
be affected by organized interest groups better than by citizens, broad policy choices, 
concerning for example income taxation, pensions, health services, should ultimately rest 
on general consensus of, at least, a relative majority of the population. Thus, a central 
task has become understanding the functioning of electoral systems and their capability 
of representing and aggregating citizens' preferences.
Do elections actually serve the purpose of linking citizens' preferences and elected 
officials behaviour? The answer to this question depends on the functioning of electoral 
institutions. As proved by Arrow (1951), it is impossible to aggregate a given set of 
individual preferences into a collective decision using a decision-rule that satisfies some 
minimal consistency and procedural requirements. Thus, institutions matter. The same 
set of preferences can be aggregated in a number of different ways and the final outcome 
will inevitably depend on the rules of the game.
The formal literature on elections has therefore devoted most efforts to understand 
the impact on policy of both preferences and institutions, placing restrictions on either or 
both in order to gain predictive power. Most of this literature seems to take for granted 
that citizens have enough knowledge of political institutions, electoral platforms and the 
consequences of given policies, to be able to pursue their interest in the electoral process. 
The potential role of information is, in some cases, simply ignored. This is at odds with 
the fact that economists have long ago recognized the key role of information in decision-
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making. The link between preferences and behavior is mediated by beliefs about the 
external world and about other players. In the same way, the link between preferences 
and public policies is mediated not only by institutions, but also by the knowledge people 
have of political and economic matters.
In reality, citizens often appear to have little competence in political matters. Since 
the origins of democratic forms of governance, political theorists have often supposed that 
citizens lack adequate knowledge to govern themselves wisely. Plato, for example, claimed 
that in the "good republic" ultimate power should only be given to "philosophers", people 
with the competence to understand where the public good lies and how to reach it. Aris- 
totle was also skeptical about individuals' civic capabilities, but less so about democracy 
in itself: "There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be 
of a good quality; but when they come together it is possible that they may surpass - 
collectively and as a body - the quality of the few best" 1 . As it will be clearer later, 
the question of whether a group of poorly informed individuals can take good collective 
decisions is still one of the most intriguing and debated in political science.
Skepticism about the civic virtues of citizens have survived until very recently. Re- 
strictions to civil rights are common to all democracies, where for example people are not 
entitled to vote before a certain age. Less justifiably, restrictions have been in place until 
quite recently against women, some racial groups, or people with low income or educa- 
tional attainment. It is only during the XX century that universal suffrage has become 
accepted as one of the main features of proper democratic governance.
While very few today would express doubts that the ultimate power in a community 
should be with the whole body of its citizens, the question of the role of political infor- 
mation in elections has become more crucial than ever. An extensive body of empirical 
research conducted in the last fifty years confirms that the general public is often poorly 
informed about political issues. Moreover, there are systematic correlations between be- 
ing economically endowed and being politically informed. Also, the level of participation 
in democratic life shows a strong correlation with characteristics such as income or edu- 
cation.
Nevertheless, the role of information in the political market is the object of a very 
open debate. On the one side, it is possible to argue that information is essential to good
'Aristotle (1946), p.123.
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decision-making and that therefore the levels and distribution of political knowledge will 
affect both the accountability of public officials and the distribution of political influence. 
On the other side, little information could be irrelevant or almost so. This has been 
argued along two lines: the "behavior irrelevance" advocates claim that, for a variety 
of reasons, uninformed voters manage to vote as if they were informed; the "outcome 
irrelevance" champions, instead, argue that uninformed voters do behave differently, but 
that the final electoral outcome is the same that a perfectly informed electorate would 
choose. Each of these views clearly carries its own policy and normative implications2 .
The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the deter- 
minants and consequences of citizens' knowledge of political issues. Our methodological 
starting point is rational choice theory. Thus, our interpretation of observed levels of 
political knowledge is that it is the outcome of individual decision-making within a given 
choice set. However, knowledge or ignorance are purely the consequence of individual 
choice when people face the same opportunities to learn. In this sense, preferences mat- 
ter. In reality, individuals face different choice sets for a number of reasons. This can be 
due to individual as well as environmental circumstances. At the individual level, factors 
like income, time, and personal connections, provide the means to become informed. Fur- 
thermore, some personal circumstances can influence the capability to acquire, process 
and retain information: innate skills, formal education, experience and so on. Some char- 
acteristics of the environment also determine how much and what people know. Factors 
like news availability, independence of the mass media, competition among different in- 
formation sources, all provide more opportunities to get more and better information. 
Moreover, the relevance, the closeness or even just the symbolic importance of an election 
(like for the recent second round presidential election in France) provide environmental 
motivations to become better informed.
This thesis will present a model of information acquisition that determines citizens' 
political knowledge as an equilibrium choice that depends on preferences, prior beliefs, 
and external and internal constraints. We will show that political knowledge matters 
for public policy and that the asymmetry in incentives to be informed faced by different 
citizens is especially important for redistributive policies. We will also consider the role 
of information supply by mass media and the potential distortions that they introduce.
2 The contributions to this debate will receive the due attention later in this chapter.
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Whenever possible, theoretical predictions are tested using data from the 1997 General 
Election in Britain (England, Wales and Scotland). A more detailed overview of the thesis 
is given at the end of this chapter.
We will now try to put this work in the appropriate context by discussing some of the 
related literature. Like for all reviews, some choices are in order. Given the exponential 
growth of this field in the last twenty years, we will discuss only few economic models 
of elections, and the main results they deliver, with special attention for redistributive 
policies. We will then turn to voters' knowledge of political matters. Economists' research 
in this case is still quite limited, whereas the issue has long been debated in political 
science and communication studies, where a vast empirical literature has established a 
large number of stylized facts. Finally we will discuss the main themes concerning the 
consequences of citizens' political knowledge or ignorance for voting behaviour and public 
policy-making. Here the debate seems very open and very different views have been 
expressed along the centuries, as well as in the last ten years.
1.2 Elections and public policy-making
Elections affect public policies. This should be true in any country that can be defined as 
democratic. However, the causal links between the two can take several different paths, 
with different implications for public policy. The first step is to recognize that public 
officials have their own motivations and policy preferences. Schumpeter's Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1942) is among the first works in economic literature to criticise 
the naive view of democracy of early welfare economics. For Schumpeter, policies are not 
the expression of the common will and politicians do not necessarily seek the common 
good. Instead "the democratic method is that* institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote".
However, the truly devastating result for traditional views of democracy comes a few 
years later in Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), which explores the 
logical possibility of aggregating individuals' preferences into a common will and reaches 
the conclusion that "if we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparison of utility, 
then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will
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be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings 
are either imposed or dictatorial". Thus, Arrow leaves us with a big question mark in 
place of commonly used expressions like "common good" or "common will". Hence, not 
only public officials do not necessarily represent the common will: the common will in its 
most abstract and absolute meaning does not even exist.
1.2.1 The Downsian model
This impossibility result stimulated research in the area of social choice and many at- 
tempts have been made to overcome the problem, mainly by weakening one or the other 
of Arrow's requirements. Among these several paths of study the so-called public choice 
approach is characterized by a quite pragmatic view of the problem: restrictions are im- 
posed on the institutional setting (majority rule), on the policy space (single issue), and 
on preferences (single-peakness); this leads to formulate models with sharp predictions. 
Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy is probably the first attempt to an- 
alyze real world's elections using the tools provided by economic theory. This pioneering 
work in 1957 starts what could be called an economic theory of politics. The notion of 
homo oeconomicus, rationally acting for her selfish ends, is introduced in the world of pol- 
itics: politicians are defined as acting "solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and 
power which come from being in office. (...) Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental 
hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than 
win elections in order to formulate policies" 3 .
The striking feature of the Downsian model is that it deals with politics as economists 
deal with markets, seeing the political process as an exchange: consent and policies are 
exchanged in a specific institutional setting in the same way as commodities are exchanged 
on markets. Downs' work was able to provide arr explanation, by using a unified theory, 
of political phenomena like party convergence, voter turnout, or disinformation on public 
issues. Since these issues had been puzzling political scientists for a long time, Downs's 
theory could either be accepted with enthusiasm or harshly criticized, but surely not 
ignored.
A central result of the Downsian model is that, if all citizens' preferences are single-
3 Downs (1957).
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peaked on a single dimension, then the median ideal preference is a Condorcet winner4 . 
Two main requirements are crucial: 1) a Condorcet winner exists; 2) there is competition 
among parties to reach it. In this case two competing parties, able to pre-commit to their 
proposed platforms, will converge on the policy preferred by the median voter. Thus, 
although under quite restrictive assumptions, Downs delivers a clear prediction about the 
impact of electoral competition on public policy.
It is not our purpose here to discuss all the limitations of the Downsian model. It 
cannot be overlooked that, probably because of easiness of interpretation and of its clear- 
cut predictions, Downs' model has been the most influential work on electoral competition.
1.2.2 Redistributive policies
Applications of the median voter theorem have been used to explain virtually every di- 
mension of public policy-making. A vast body of research has used the Downsian model 
to explain income redistribution through fiscal policy: when the poor are a majority and 
gross income is fixed, then we should expect "slavery of the rich" (Foley, 1967), i.e. the 
poor will redistribute all available income in their favour by voting the highest possible 
tax rate. Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) generalize this model introducing the pos- 
sibility that rich agents react to taxation by reducing labour supply. This implies that 
governments can only use distortionary taxation. Roberts (1977) shows that if voters re- 
distributive preferences are monotonically related to their productivity then a Condorcet 
winner exists and it is the redistributive tax preferred by the voter with median produc- 
tivity5 . In Roberts' model, equilibrium income redistribution (linear tax rate and lump 
sum benefit with balanced budget) depends on the distance between the median voters' 
income and the mean income in society. Since real income distributions are right skewed, 
this implies positive tax rates in equilibrium. At the same time, the median voter is 
aware that there is a negative link between the tax rate and total gross income and finds 
optimal to vote for a tax rate below 100%. Roberts' analysis has been used by Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) to provide an explanation of the rapid growth of the public sector
4 See also Hotelling (1929) and Black (1948). A Condorcet winner is defined as an alternative that can 
beat any other alternative in the policy space in pairwise comparison and by using majority voting.
5 Roberts calls this monotonicity condition "hierarchical adherence". Recently, Cans and Smart (1996) 
have shown that Robert's condition is substantially equivalent to the Spence-Mirrlees condition of indif- 
ference curves single-crossing.
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observed for most of the last century. They use the idea, first developed by de Tocqeville 
(1835), that the size of a government, measured by tax revenue and expenditure, depends 
essentially on the spread of the franchise and the distribution of wealth: the "extension of 
the franchise to include more voters below mean income increase votes for redistribution 
and, thus, increase this measure of the size of government".
In a static framework like the one considered by Roberts, the productive input is 
usually identified with labour supply. However, it is possible that the disincentives intro- 
duced by redistribution lasts over time by affecting investment decisions and ultimately 
growth rates. This possibility has been scrutinized by Bertola (1993) and Alesina and 
Rodrick (1994) within the Downsian framework. They consider a population in which 
agents are alike in all respects except for their initial ownership shares in the economy's 
aggregate stocks of capital and labour. Taxes are levied on capital income and revenue 
is used either for pure redistribution (Bertola) or to enhance the productive capability 
of the economic system (Alesina and Rodrick). These papers show that the poorer the 
median voter's income relative to the mean income, the higher the capital tax rate and 
the lower the growth rate. Persson and Tabellini (1994) reach similar conclusions in an 
overlapping generations model in which personal (and not factor) income distribution is 
considered.
These papers share a common limit in that they assume myopic behavior by agents. 
When voting or investing, agents are not taking into account the effects of their choices on 
future political equilibria6 . The problem is that, by requiring the existence of a Condorcet 
winner, the Downsian model finds limited application in dynamic frameworks, where the 
probability of finding a Condorcet winner is much reduced.
The Downsian analysis of redistributive policies delivers two sets of testable predic- 
tions: 1) input supply decreases when government transfers and distortionary taxes in- 
crease; 2) government transfers increase with the distance between the mean and the 
median income.
6 As Alesina and Rodrick themselves recognize "in our model the distribution of assets is predetermined 
and remains constant. In reality growth itself affects income distribution. The serious technical problem 
introduced in this case is that when income distribution varies over time, as a function of growth, one 
cannot look at each voting decision in isolation. Voting decisions in each period affect growth in subsequent 
periods, which, in turn affects distribution and future voting decisions. Thus, the outcome of future social 
choices depends on the voting decisions taken today. Therefore, when voting today, rational voters should 
internalize the dynamic problem of social choice". See Alesina and Rodrick (1994).
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Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrick (1994) test a reduced form 
relation between inequality and growth, and find this relationship significantly negative. 
The use of a reduced form, however, casts some doubts about the intermediate steps, 
namely the positive relationship between inequality and redistribution and the negative 
relationship between redistribution and investment. Indeed, Perotti (1994), estimates a 
cross-country structural form of this class of models and finds that the "results concerning 
the two mechanisms examined here are conspicuously inconsistent (indeed, opposite to) 
the theory and conventional wisdom". The first result is that government transfers have 
a positive and significant effect on investment. The second is that a "higher share of the 
third quintile increases the share of government transfers in GDP". Of course for many 
countries considered in Perotti's analysis the process that leads to policy-making cannot 
properly be defined as democratic, so we cannot expect the median voter theorem to 
hold. However, what is surprising is that the positive effect of the third quintile share on 
transfers is even stronger in democracies. The t-statistics of the variables involved, even 
though not brilliant, can be considered enough to "cast some doubts on the empirical 
validity of the endogenous fiscal policy explanation of the relation between income and 
investment".
An analysis using panel data for OECD countries from 1960 to 1981 by Lindert (1996) 
finds that "wider inequality in pre-fisc incomes significantly reduces total government 
spending as a share of GDP (...). The anti-spending effect of inequality is spread across 
all (...) spending categories except unemployment compensation, which tends to be the 
smallest of these spending categories".
There is a different theory linking income inequality and public spending that, accord- 
ing to Lindert's findings, receives better support from the data. This is the social-affinity 
theory which predicts more redistribution the closer middle-income voters feel they are to 
the poor and the further they feel they are from the rich7 . This theory shares similarities 
with a model proposed by St.Paul (1994) where it is shown that more inequality is even 
compatible with less distance between the median and the average income. If the lowest
7 Even though apparently this concept is similar to that of Roberts, it involves a different specification 
of the explicative variables. Here we don't consider the mean/median ratio, but two gap variables: income 
of the top quintile over income of middle quintile (upper income gap) and middle over bottom quintiles 
(lower income gap). As stressed by Lindert "the social affinity hypothesis could, but need not, be narrowed 
to predict a positive effect of income skewness (...) on progressive social spending. It makes no prediction 
about the effect of inequality on social spending".
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income levels below the median become poorer this does not affect the median income, 
though reducing mean income and, therefore, the desire for redistribution of the decisive 
voter. This dynamics leads to a situation of social exclusion, in which the poor may 
become poorer, but this does not lead the middle classes to support more redistributive 
programs.
Lindert's analysis shows that the social-affinity hypothesis receives support from the 
data. "The coefficient of the upper gap is positive, and that of the lower gap is negative, 
for clearly progressive redistributions". However, this result does not hold for pensions 
and health. Hence "all of the results would be consistent with the social affinity hypothesis 
if the progressivity ranking of the different clusters of tax-based social spending were, and 
were perceived to be, [total-social, welfare, unemployment, and education]>[pensions and 
health]. Yet it is not clear that education belongs in that more progressive category, nor 
is it clear that the pension and health programs are much less progressive. With this 
disclaimer, the overall pattern of social spending results appears to support the social- 
affinity hypothesis".
However by no means conclusive, it is clear from current empirical analysis that the 
Downsian models of income redistribution receive little support from empirical analysis. 
This could be explained in many ways; for example, lobbies' influence on policy-making 
can make politicians more independent of public opinion than what postulated by electoral 
models. Another possibility is that the rich have more power and influence on policy8 . 
This solution, however, is just assumed and the type of power the richer groups have is 
not well specified. In the third chapter of this thesis we will provide an information-based 
rationale for this asymmetry of power in elections.
1.2.3 Beyond Downs
The main problem with the Downsian model is that even small complications in the basic 
framework can destroy its predictive power, as the existence of a Condorcet winner is 
ensured only under restrictive conditions. For example, distortionary taxation in Roberts' 
model is a technically necessary assumption for a Condorcet winner to be found. Although 
assuming that taxes are distortionary is not particularly disturbing, things get more 
serious if we want to study multiple policy dimensions: in this case very strong restrictions
8 This possibility is for example considered in Benabou (2000) and Saint Paul and Verdier (1997).
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are required on the distribution of preferences in order to have an equilibrium (Plott, 1967; 
Grandmont, 1978). Nevertheless, many problems of interest for an economist involve 
such multiplicity: for example, the case of a government that decides on both public 
good provision and progressive taxation. Dynamic settings pose further problems for the 
existence of a Condorcet winner and restrictions on voters' rationality are in this case 
required to ensure the existence of an equilibrium.
Several solutions have been proposed to overcome these limits. Voting on different 
issues one by one is a possibility. This makes possible to find a "structure induced equi- 
librium" when there is no Condorcet winner. Kramer (1972) proves that, with separable 
preferences, the issue-by-issue stable point is the issue-by-issue median preference. How- 
ever, if preferences are not separable, the final equilibrium will inevitably depend on 
the sequence in which the different issues are voted. Even the existence or not of an 
equilibrium may depend on the voting agenda. Thus, whoever sets the agenda has a 
disproportionate influence on the final collective decision. Miller (1980) shows that this 
influence can, to a certain extent, be counterbalanced by voters' sophistication. Indepen- 
dently of the agenda, voters can always manage to choose options within a specific subset 
of the policy space (uncovered set): in a two party competition this forces candidates 
to propose platforms within the uncovered set (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984; McKelvey, 
1986). This result provides a characterization of the complex interaction between rational 
behaviour and institutions.
Another way to look at the problem of the existence of a Condorcet winner is to focus 
on the discontinuities in the payoff functions of the parties. This discontinuity derives 
from the fact that small changes in the platform proposed can lead a loser candidate to 
become a winner and vice-versa. Transforming this discontinuous deterministic payoff 
function into a continuous probability of victory aan help in finding an equilibrium. This 
consideration led to the development of the so-called probabilistic voting model (Hinich, 
1977; Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981), that has found applications in a number of works9 .
Nevertheless, there are important features of real elections that are not captured by
9 Of course, the reason for introducing this class of models is not just a technical one. Calvert (1986) 
justifies the use of probabilistic voting models on the ground that assuming that "candidates cannot 
perfectly predict the response of the electorate to their platforms is appealing for its realism". To use the 
words of Coughlin (1992), "because of their importance to candidates' decisions, the candidates' beliefs 
about how their choices relate to the voters' choices provide a natural dividing line for the economic 
models of elections that have been developed".
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any of the models presented above. The issue-by-issue voting, for example, is mostly 
typical of legislative or other bodies, but in political elections citizens have to choose 
between candidates, and do not have the possibility of unbundling different issues. This 
brings us to an assumption which is crucial both for the Downsian and the probabilis- 
tic voting models: that candidates can credibly pre-commit to their proposed platforms. 
This is a plausible assumption only if candidates are merely office-seeking. In this case 
they would be indifferent to any specific policy and may well implement the promised 
one (provided such implementation has no additional costs as compared to other possible 
policies). However, political actors, as well as the voters, may care about policies. A 
different class of models explores this alternative interpretation of candidates' motiva- 
tion. In these models, candidates are assumed to be partisan: they care about winning 
in order to be able to implement their preferred policy, rather than the reverse. Never- 
theless, in a majoritarian system preferences can be translated into policies only in case 
of victory, which gives candidates an incentive to move toward the median voter. This 
tension between policy preferences and the incentive to win provides new insights in the 
understanding of electoral competition10 .
The problem with this approach is that the political platform proposed by each can- 
didate is not time-consistent. As stressed by Alesina (1988), the incentives faced by the 
candidate change after the election: there will be no need to target the median voter and 
the policy preferred by the candidate rather than the one proposed during the campaign 
will be implemented. If voters anticipate this process, there is no way for a candidate to 
make a credible commitment to any policy different from her preferred one. This credi- 
bility problem may lead to non-convergence. Repeated interactions can help to overcome 
this credibility problem through reputation. This also provides an explanation for the 
presence of long-lived actors like parties in the political arena. As in all applications of 
the folk theorem, for reputation to be effective the discount rate must be sufficiently high, 
in the sense that parties should care enough about the future. Parties are faced by a trade
10 Calvert (1985) shows that if the median voter preference is known and candidates' policy preferences 
are on opposite sides with respect to the median voter, then there is perfect convergence to the median 
voter's preferred policy even with completely partisan candidates. The reason for this is that a candidate 
can win elections being slightly closer to the median voter than its opponent. Then, for any given platform 
of the opponent, the policy outcome will be closer to the preferred one when closer than the opponent 
to the median voter. This eventually leads both candidates to target the median voter: candidates' 
motivation changes but the political implication is the same as in the Downsian model.
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off between acting unconstrained and enjoying immediately all the benefits of victory or 
instead "spreading" the benefits of victory over time. Enjoying a high initial reputation 
among the public gives candidates (Alesina, 1988) or incumbent public officials (Coate 
and Morris, 1995) the possibility to have more immediate returns. This indirectly points 
to the role of information as a disciplining device.
The need to introduce more features of real electoral processes is also recognized in 
the so-called citizen-candidates approach. In two separate papers Osborne and Slivinsky 
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) propose a new model of electoral competition which 
explicitly recognizes the fact that most policy decisions are taken in a context of repre- 
sentative democracy11 . One important feature of this model is that candidates run for 
office with their own preferences about policies: this means that they will not be able to 
pre-commit to anything else than their preferred policy outcome. The role of the platform 
announcement in the Downsian model is thus replaced by an entry stage in which each 
citizen may enter the political competition at a given cost.
In the citizen-candidate model we can expect to find equilibria in many situations in 
which there is no Condorcet winner and therefore the Downsian model would not provide 
any prediction. On the contrary, this model gives "too many" equilibria. This is because 
it gives only a minimal institutional structure to the electoral process, unveiling the possi- 
bility of having many potential equilibria, where people's beliefs and further institutional 
constraints are then essential to understand where the electoral process leads in terms of 
policies. "For those who would like a clean empirical prediction, our multiple equilibria 
will raise a sense of dissatisfaction. However, this findings squares with the more familiar 
problem of game theoretic models: that rationality alone does not typically pin down 
equilibrium with complete precision (...). This suggests the need to understand better 
the role of political institutions as coordinating devices, giving some greater determinacy 
to equilibrium outcomes".
Being able to derive predictions from multidimensional models has relevant implica- 
tions for the study of redistributive policy. Roemer (1999), for example, explains progres- 
sive taxation (without complete expropriation) in a model with exogenous income. This is
11 In the words of Besley and Coate "the primitives of the approach are the citizens of a polity, their 
policy alternatives, and a constitution which specifies the rules of the political process. (...) No pre-existing 
political actors are assumed, and no restrictions are made on the number or type of policy issues to be 
decided. Political outcomes are thus derived directly from the underlying tastes and policy technology".
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done by modelling internal party conflict among groups with different objective functions. 
Besley and Coate (1997 and 1998) show how the interaction between redistribution and 
other policy dimensions can lead to outcomes that are substantially different from the 
Downsian predictions. Using the citizen-candidate framework, Besley and Coate (1998) 
also analise dynamic models of redistribution without posing restrictions on the rational- 
ity of voters. In this context, they show that the lack of commitment to redistribute can 
generate inefficiencies, as Kaldor-Pareto improving policies could not receive the support 
of the majority.
1.3 Perfect information?
One characteristic most models of electoral competition have in common is that they 
assume that citizens are perfectly informed 12 . They are assumed to be aware either of 
announced platforms or of candidates' tastes and competence, depending on which model 
we consider. Moreover, voters are capable of perfectly predicting the effects of different 
policies, a capability any economist would be very happy to share with them! In the 
probabilistic voting model candidates' uncertainty on people' preferences is recognized but 
not voters' uncertainty on platforms or candidates characteristics. In reality, information 
seems to play a key role in elections. A clear sign of this is that politicians are extremely 
concerned with the amount and the quality of the coverage they get from mass media; 
they often seem to struggle for media attention using all available means.
Although the standard Downsian model assumes that everyone is perfectly informed 
and votes, Downs himself was aware that putting together rational behaviour and political 
participation is a challenging task. In a sizable electorate "the returns from voting are 
usually so low that even small costs may cause many voters to abstain" 13 . This tendency 
should be reinforced by parties' convergence. If the probability to be a pivotal voter 
is extremely low (for example the electorate is very large) then even small voting costs 
should induce massive abstention. Even if observed abstention sometimes may be very 
high 14 , it is nevertheless difficult to explain the behaviour of millions of voters in this way.
12 For exceptions see Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey & Rosenthal (1985). 
13 Downs (1957).
M Some evidence has also been found that in "close" elections (for example when polls are very uncertain, 
implying an higher probability to be pivotal) the turnout has been higher (Morton, 1991)
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Another manifestation of political interest is to become informed about political issues. 
Also in this case, citizens have low incentives: "a rational man can become well informed 
for four reasons: 1) he may enjoy being well informed for its own sake, so that information 
as such provides him with utility; 2) he may believe the election is going to be so close 
that the probability of his casting the decisive vote is relatively high; 3) he may need 
information to influence the votes of others (...); 4) he may need information to influence 
the formation of government policy as a lobbyist. Nevertheless, since the odds are that 
no election will be close enough to render decisive the vote of any one person, or the votes 
of all those he can persuade to agree with him, the rational course of action for most 
citizens is to remain politically uninformed" (Downs, 1957).
That people are substantially ignorant on most political issues is supported by ex- 
tensive empirical evidence, mainly conducted on the United States. The first systematic 
evidence on this came from the public opinion studies conducted between the 1940s and 
the 1960s. From their study on the 1952 and 1956 elections, Campbell et al. conclude 
that the electorate "knows little about what government has done (...) or what the parties 
propose to do. (...) The mass electorate is not able to appraise either its goals or the 
appropriateness of the means chosen to serve these goals" (Campbell et al., 1960, 543). 
Converse (1964) found that only 10 per cent of the interviewed could define the meaning 
of words like "liberal" or "conservative". More recent studies do not change substantially 
the picture. According to Neuman (1986) "even the most vivid concepts of political life 
(...) are recognized by only a little over half the electorate".
Evidence on what voters know is not more encouraging. Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996) report that during the 1992 presidential campaign "86 per cent of the public knew 
that the Bushes' dog was named Millie, yet only 15 per cent knew that both presidential 
candidates supported the death penalty". Going beyond anecdotic evidence, they report 
that "only 13 per cent of the more than 2000 political questions examined could be 
answered correctly by 75 per cent or more of those asked, and only 41 per cent could 
be answered correctly by more than half the public". Political knowledge also shows a 
remarkable stability over time: "in spite of an unprecedent expansion in public education, 
a communication revolution that has shattered national and international boundaries, and 
the increasing relevance of national and international events and policies to the daily lives 
of Americans, citizens appear no more informed about politics" (Delli Carpini and Keeter,
25
1996).
However, the evidence about people's little knowledge of politics is not evidence per 
se of a lack of motivation (as Downs' theory would suggest). Key (1966) suggested that 
voters are as informed as the political context allows them to be, in the sense that often 
candidates are vague and not neatly distinguishable on specific issues. For example, a 
number of studies conducted during the 1960s and the 1970s show an increase in political 
knowledge compared to previous decades, probably related to the events occurred at the 
time and the consequent radicalisation of electoral platforms (Pomper, 1972; Nie, Verba, 
Petrocik, 1976).
When the context, as well as other factors, is taken into account, it is not clear if 
this evidence should be regarded as people having "too little" information or "too much". 
Indeed, according to Downs, we should expect the electorate to know even less than they 
seem to know. In general, learning requires motivation, ability, and opportunity. When 
we observe a given level of knowledge, still little can be said about its determinants: a 
limited knowledge of politics can be due to a lack of individual interest, or to poor ability, 
or rather to environmental circumstances that affect the opportunity to learn.
One very important component in this picture is the role of electoral campaigning 
and of the mass media. Research in this direction started in the period between the two 
World Wars, under a general presumption that mass communication was an extraordi- 
narily powerful device: "it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to 
create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise" 
(Lippman, 1922). These theories go now under the name of "theories of mass propa- 
ganda" : use of the media for political propaganda was quite common at the time both 
by authoritarian regimes and by the Allies during the war. However, the first systematic 
study conducted on survey data by a group of researchers at Columbia University seemed 
rather disappointing. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944) studied the Eire county 
during the 1940-44 American elections, finding little evidence in favour of the theories 
of mass propaganda: "The people who did most of the reading and listening not only 
read and heard most of their own partisan propaganda but were also most resistant to 
conversion because of strong predisposition. And the people most opened to conversion - 
the ones the campaign manager most wanted to reach - read and listened least" (Lazars- 
feld et al. 1944). The influence of the Columbia school (also through a subsequent work
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by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954) was such that since then the dominant view 
has been that campaigning and the media have only "minimal effects" on voters. Until 
quite recently, most studies continued to find little evidence of persuasion by mass media 
(Finkel, 1993).
A radical shift in communication studies has been induced by a new cognitive theory 
that goes under the name of "uses and gratifications" 15 . Rather then asking what are 
the effects of the media on people's opinions, this theory starts by asking why the people 
use the media in the first place. Only understanding individual motivations it will then 
be possible to recognize the possible effects. It is immediate that this theory should be 
of particular interest to rational choice theorists as it basically starts from individual 
preferences.
The shift in the focus of attention produced new empirical evidence that seemed 
in contrast with the minimal effects found by the Columbia school. In particular "the 
news can be expected to influence public opinion directly through three main avenues: 
enabling people to keep up with what is happening in the world and mobilizing them to 
vote (civic engagement), defining the priority of major political issues (agenda setting), 
and shaping people's political preferences (persuasion). In turn, these attitudes can be 
expected to influence reasoned voting choices" (Norris et ai, 1999). lyengar and Kinder 
(1987) examine evidence from electoral campaigns and television news and conclude that 
their effects have not much to do with persuasion but rather with "commanding the 
public's attention (agenda-setting) and defining criteria underlying the public's judgement 
(priming)" 16 . Bartels (1993) shows how apparent "minimal effects" can be, at least 
partially, a consequence of measurement errors. Zaller (1992 and 1996) puts forward one 
further argument against the "minimal effects" evidence by arguing that tangible effects 
are only due to the "reception gap", the difference between the amount of information 
received about different candidates. According to Zaller, most studies were conducted on 
presidential elections, where the campaign is normally quite intense on both sides, with 
plenty of information on both candidates: this generates a minimal reception gap and 
therefore minimal effects, which is not the same as saying that the campaigns had no 
effect. In local elections, where the reception gap between incumbents and challengers is
15 See Blumler and McQuail (1968).
16 Bartels (1988), Zaller (1989), Popkin (1991), and Franklin (1991) find similar results.
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normally much larger, the impact of the media appears instead sizeable.
It is useful at this stage to try to be more precise about what we intend for political 
knowledge. "Everything is politics" was a successful slogan in the seventies: this would 
imply that any knowledge is political knowledge. Even if our idea of electoral politics is 
that, luckily, not everything is politics, nevertheless the range of issues and facts that are 
relevant to politics is extremely large. How can we gauge political knowledge? What is 
relevant and what is not? Is there any risk to bias our assessment with our priorities? 
Belli Carpini and Keeter (1996), in presenting evidence on political knowledge of American 
voters, based their analysis on nearly 3700 questions collected in various surveys. They 
concluded that "researchers developing national or general political knowledge scales need 
not be overly concerned with the mix of specific topics covered by individual items. Scales 
made up of items tapping only knowledge of institutions and processes, substantive issues, 
or public figures are likely to serve as reasonable measures of the overarching construct" 17 . 
This is extremely important to us. The empirical analysis on information acquisition 
presented in this thesis is based on a much more limited set of questions and we rely on 
the assumption that correct answers to such questions are likely to be correlated with 
knowledge of other issues too. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some voters tend to 
be "specialists": instead of being broadly informed about the main political issues, they 
learn only about issues that are of direct relevance to them. More generally, the greater 
relevance of some issues to specific sub-population groups makes such groups more likely 
to be aware of them. Belli Carpini and Keeter report that blacks were more informed 
than whites on racial issues and females more informed on gender-related issues (in spite 
of both blacks and females being less informed than average on other issues).
Another very important fact about the distribution of political knowledge is its clear 
relation with a number of observable individual characteristics like education, gender, 
and race. A number of possible explanations can be given to such a relation; these range 
from resource availability (to buy and process information) to historical exclusion of some 
groups from political life, which results in a lack of civic capacity 18 . To understand the 
causes of this unbalanced distribution represents the first step towards finding the way 
to promote more effective political equality. This is especially important if we think, as
17 Page 174.
l8 For further evidence and discussion of this phenomenon see Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996; 135-177).
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will be argued in this thesis, that the consequences of such unbalances are likely to be 
transferred into the area of public policy-making, where some groups could find more 
adequate representation than (and even at the expense of) others.
1.4 Information and voting behaviour
To be able to discuss the relationship between information and public policy we first need 
to understand what the impact of information on voting behaviour is. Recent literature 
in both economics and political science has contributed towards this aim. A number 
of theoretical studies have focussed on political participation, showing that having more 
detailed knowledge of candidates' characteristics and proposals could increase the chances 
of participating in political life by increasing the utility associated with electoral choices. 
In the context of elections, participation has mainly been identified with turnout. At 
the same time, it has also been argued that information might increase the "quality" 
of participation, and a second stream of studies has tried to understand whether better 
informed citizens are more responsive to electoral platforms, can be expected to take 
better decisions, and therefore to extract better outcomes out of the political process. It 
is clear that these two aspects of the influence of information on voting are not disjoint. 
Participation has to do with responsiveness, and it is an aspect of voters' response to 
candidates' proposals. We make such distinction mainly for exposition purposes, and 
because most literature seems to have dealt with the two quite separately.
1.4.1 Information and participation
"Government by the people" is the meaning of the Greek word "democracy": thus, the 
definition of democracy in itself implies people's participation in public decision-making. 
Although not many scholars would contest this definition, opinions about the type of 
participation that democracy requires are quite diverse. Two broad attitudes towards 
participation can be found in contemporary democratic theory19 . On one side, champions 
of participatory democracy like Russeau or John Stuart Mill tend to associate the quality
'See Pateman (1970).
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of democratic governance in a polity with the degree of participation of its members 
in the decision-making process20 . In ancient Greek towns this was achieved via direct 
democracy. In modern systems, where direct democracy seems unfeasible, this would 
require a population that is well informed, participates in electoral meetings, stimulates 
and criticizes public officials, and turns out to vote in elections in large numbers. On 
the other side, proponents of a more limited notion of participation, like Schumpeter and 
Sartori, see citizens better placed as "controllers" of public officials than as directly taking 
part in decision-making21 . Thus, high turnout rates are not necessary: the success of the 
system is only judged by its policy outputs.
One question however remains crucial, even for advocates of the second model: whether 
high participation might actually increase the quality of control imposed on elected rep- 
resentatives. This is an empirical question, and as such needs to be studied by linking 
positive models of elections and electoral behaviour with data analysis. Any attempt 
to answer this question cannot avoid considering the role of information in elections. If 
participation comes out of misunderstanding, propaganda or legal obligation then there 
is no need for it to improve the quality of governments. Indeed, both sides in the debate 
would agree that there is the need for at least "some" citizens to be informed, although 
they may disagree on the size of the "some".
A number of empirical studies has established a strong correlation between electoral 
turnout and a number of individual and systemic characteristics. Wolfinger and Rosen- 
stone (1980) show that turnout is strongly predicted by a number of individual demo- 
graphic variables. Education typically displays the highest influence, followed by income, 
age, marital status, and occupation. These results have been systematically confirmed by 
most subsequent studies, independently of the particular election examined. In addition, 
a number of studies have also shown that disposition variables such as party identification, 
sense of civic duty, and so on, affect the level of participation. Systemic characteristics also 
play a role: in particular, election closeness, registration laws, and local socioeconomic 
conditions22 (average income, unemployment rate etc.).
Most empirical studies tend to show that costs and expected benefits of voting matter.
20 See Russeau (1762) and Mill (1835 and 1861). 
2l See Schumpeter (1942) and Sartori (1987).
22 See for example Patterson and Caldeira (1983), Cox and Munger (1989) and Leighley and Nagler 
(1992).
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These could be regarded as good evidence in favour of the rational behaviour hypothe- 
sis. On the other hand, the negligible probability of being decisive that a rational and 
instrumental voter should recognize, should actually lead her not to vote at all (Downs, 
1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). As Aldrich (1993) argues, the costs and benefits of 
voting are low and this makes it possible that changes in expected election closeness, 
registration laws, weather conditions etc. have an effect on individual behaviour, in spite 
of not changing her expected utility by a great deal. If this is the case then comparative 
static analysis can be insightful in spite of the paradox of voting. Moreover, a large body 
of research clearly shows that, even in very simple situations, perceived probabilities are 
not necessarily those that correct estimations would deliver23 . As will become clear, this 
is quite important for the methodology adopted in this thesis.
Is it possible to link stylized facts about turnout in a coherent theory grounded on 
rational use of information? In spite of the frequent allusions in the literature on voting 
behaviour about the possible role of information in driving turnout, there are still very 
few attempts to formalize this causal link. Ledyard (1984) presents a model of spatial 
electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the preferences and the cost of 
voting of other voters, and where abstention is admitted. Voters play a Bayesian game 
taking as given the two candidates' positions. Turnout would be positive for differentiated 
candidates' positions; electoral competition, however, leads candidates to convergence and 
this drives the equilibrium turnout to zero. Although Ledyard introduces turnout and 
asymmetric information in spatial models, his purpose was not really to explain how 
information affects turnout.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) consider a population where the level of information 
about relevant states of the world is exogenously determined. They consider two fixed 
alternatives (A and B) and two states of the world 1 and 2. Some voters always prefer 
A and some B independently of the state of the world (partisans), while others (indepen- 
dents) prefer A in state 1 and B in state 2. Some agents receive (costless and randomly) a 
message about the state of the world and this exogenously divides the population between 
informed and uninformed voters. At this point a decision on whether to implement A or B 
is taken by majority voting. In this model agents understand that their vote only matters 
if it is pivotal, therefore voting choice is conditional on the event of being decisive in the
23 See for example Uhlaner and Grofman (1986).
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election. Non-informed independent voters have an incentive to delegate their vote to the 
better informed to increase the chances of an informed aggregate decision: delegation is 
via abstention, which increases the probability of any informed independent voter to be 
pivotal. It is worth noting that a crucial assumption of this model is that all indepen- 
dent voters share the same objective function: thus, in delegating the decision to other 
independent voters no one incurs the risk of leaving the decision to people with different 
tastes. Moreover, partisans play a merely passive role: what matters in the model is only 
their (uncertain) number.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) generalize this model in several directions: first, 
agents are spread continuously across the political spectrum rather than sharing common 
values within groups; the candidate's quality index is not limited to two possibilities, so 
that partisanship can be (to a certain extent) traded off with quality; finally, the level 
of information held by voters can also vary and there is no presumption that a subset of 
voters is perfectly informed. However, some agents get noisy signals about the candidates' 
quality and this divides the population between those that have updated information 
and those who know only the ex ante probability of various quality realizations. This 
model finds again that more informed voters are more likely to vote than less informed 
ones. However, and quite surprisingly, increasing the fraction of informed voters in the 
population results in increased abstention.
Direct evidence24 on the link between information and turnout is still very limited. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), using data from the 1988 NES Survey, show that political 
knowledge is a good predictor of electoral turnout, controlling for a number of individual 
characteristics. Sanders (2001) presents evidence on the 1996 US presidential election and 
shows the importance for turnout of perceived uncertainty about candidates. This effect 
is also linked to preference intensity.
Taking information as given in a model of turnout neglects the incentives that people 
face in acquiring information. In theoretical terms, if we think it is appropriate to use 
rational choice theory to explain voting behaviour, then it is legitimate to expect voters to 
apply rational calculus in the phase of information acquisition. This means that citizens 
are not just randomly informed and that, as an abundant empirical literature makes clear,
24 I.e. evidence not based on variables that are just correlated with information, like education and the 
like.
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political knowledge is correlated with a number of other individual characteristics that 
ultimately affect political preferences (e.g. income).
On empirical grounds such limits are not less serious: when estimating a turnout 
equation having indicators or proxies of political knowledge on the right hand side there 
is a serious possibility of capturing a spurious correlation25 . A number of unobservable 
variables might affect both information acquisition and political participation and simple 
regression could deliver biased coefficients. Thus, a theory of information acquisition is 
also necessary in order to overcome this problem, as it can provide the appropriate instru- 
mental variables for political knowledge. An analysis in this direction will be presented 
in chapter 2.
Endogenous information is introduced in Matsusaka (1995), that presents a decision- 
theoretical model of costly information acquisition and turnout. The utility from changing 
the election outcome is higher when the voter is more confident that she is voting for the 
candidate she actually prefers. Information, through Bayesian updating, increases such 
confidence and therefore also makes citizens more likely to vote. Matsusaka goes further 
by relating his results to a number of empirical regularities found in previous studies. 
Education and age, for example, reduce the cost of acquiring information and are therefore 
positively correlated with turnout; so does campaign spending or being contacted by a 
campaign worker before an election.
Disposition variables like party affiliation and other measures of ideological motivation 
are normally good predictors of turnout. There are, however, some good reasons to be 
cautious about their usage in empirical investigation. In answering questions about their 
preferences, attitudes and sense of efficacy it can be the case that respondents simply 
rationalize their behaviour, thus not providing any real insight on the link between such 
variables and behaviour in itself. It has been observed, for example, that responses can 
vary substantially with the order in which questions are posed (see for example Bishop, 
Oldendick, and Tuchfarber, 1984, and Abramson, Silver, and Anderson, 1987). Never- 
theless, it is reasonable to expect that ideology plays an important role in determining 
turnout. Palfrey and Poole (1987) present an empirical study of the relationship be-
25 Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), for example, suggest that "the existence of a strong interdependence 
between knowledge and participation has an important practical implication: efforts made to boost one 
of these will, in all likelihood, benefit the other". This is a potentially wrong conclusion derived by 
interpreting correlation as causality.
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tween information, ideology, and voting behaviour. Using ICPSR survey data from the 
1980 presidential election in the US, their analysis shows that information is significantly 
related to both political extremism and turnout. Voter information is positively cor- 
related with ideological extremism and negatively correlated with indifference between 
candidates. Moreover, not only are more informed citizens more likely to vote, but their 
vote is also more predictable, in the sense that they exhibit less randomness when voting 
behaviour is predicted using political preferences26 .
One element in this picture has so far been neglected, namely the role of ideology in 
determining information acquisition. There are a number of reasons, for example, for why 
people might tend to expose themselves to information sources they trust, thus with their 
same ideological bias. Berelson et al. (1954) and a number of subsequent studies found 
that voters practice selective exposure to information, for example simply paying more 
attention to information that is favorable to their own views. A theory of information 
acquisition should take into account that prior beliefs matter and that people do not 
share common priors on candidates. Thus, ideology should affect voters' knowledge of 
political matters and influence participation twice: directly, as it affects the perceived 
difference between candidates, but also indirectly, through its effect on the acquisition of 
political information. In chapter 2 we will introduce ideology in our model of information 
acquisition and provide evidence on its effects on both political knowledge and turnout.
1.4.2 Information and responsiveness
Are better informed voters more responsive to electoral platforms than less informed 
ones? The answer to this question is of extreme importance for our comprehension of the 
functioning of electoral systems. If the answer is "yes then electoral competition should 
tend to deliver policies that are more favorable to the informed; this is especially relevant 
as political awareness is often correlated to a number of variables that also tend to be 
related to policy preferences.
Another possibility is that uninformed voters manage to behave as if they were in- 
formed, thus again making information not too relevant in terms of electoral outcome. A
26 Preferences are recovered either by respondents' self-placement on a liberal-conservative scale, relative 
to their placement of candidates, or from self-placement on a number of issues like defense spending, 
inflation or government aid to minority groups.
34
vast literature, using different arguments and models, argues that citizens use heuristics 
that are both sufficient to make reasoned choices and cost effective. Sniderman, Brody 
and Tetlock (1991) define heuristics as "judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize 
and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively little 
information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of 
choice".
Using spatial models of elections, a number of papers27 show that it is possible for 
imperfectly informed voters to emulate the behaviour of the better informed ones when 
they receive a credible signal from a source whose preferences are known. Sobel (1985) 
shows how informative equilibria may arise from repeated interactions when the infor- 
mation provider is initially not perfectly credible. It is then clear that if party platforms 
tend to be consistently tied to the interests of specific socioeconomic groups, then party 
identification can provide a simple and effective way to vote instrumentally.
In the context of heuristic decision-making, parties, pressure groups, opinion leaders 
etc. have a crucial role in transmitting simple and effective information to voters. Popkin 
(1991) argues that candidates' positions on most issues are correlated between them or 
to other variables. Therefore, it is only necessary to be aware of candidates' stands on 
few variables to make accurate inferences on the whole spectrum of issues and correctly 
estimate expected utility of voting for each candidate. Wittman (1995) argues that voters' 
costs of becoming informed have been vastly exaggerated; in particular, the returns to 
political entrepreneurs and lobbyists give them enough incentives to make information 
available to voters, leaving these with little or no cost to bear. Moreover, following an 
analogy with markets, Wittman stresses that competition among these advisers, ensures 
that voters get enough information to take the right decision.
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) focus on the role of institutions as "informational 
crutches": "it is not enough, for the success of democratic delegation, that institutions 
alter the incentives of democratic agents. Rather, it is also necessary that the incentive- 
altering effects of institutions make agents and speakers trustworthy and that democratic 
principals perceive institutions to have this effect. (...) Democratic institutions can, in 
this way, establish the conditions for persuasion, enlightenment, and reasoned choice". If
"See Calvert (1985), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984), Grofman and Norrander (1990) and Lupia 
(1992).
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clarity of interests, threat of verification of signals, penalties for lying and costly effort are 
all elements that the literature on signalling and cheap talking has identified as important 
for signals to be informative, then institutions that increase them will also increase the 
amount of information that citizens can extract from simple cues like party affiliation, 
endorsements, campaign spending.
Evidence on the use of shortcuts by voters has been provided by Brady and Snider- 
man (1985): using the US National Election Study, they show that voters tend to infer 
the relationship between what candidates prefer and their own preferences from infor- 
mation provided by particular trusted groups. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984) provide 
experimental evidence on the use of polls about the opinions of groups whose interests 
are known. Lupia (1994) analyzes a survey of five complex insurance reform initiatives 
in California to conclude that "access to a particular class of widely available informa- 
tion shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the behaviour of relatively well 
informed voters".
Other scholars, however, are less optimistic about the capability of badly informed 
voters to act instrumentally. Mondak (1994) points to experimental evidence on the 
higher likelihood of mistakes by agents that use simple heuristics. More direct evidence 
against the "equivalent behaviour" hypothesis is provided by Bartels (1996): using the 
National Election Study surveys conducted for six US presidential elections, he finds that 
uninformed voters "do significantly better than they would by chance, but significantly less 
than they would with complete information, despite the availability of cues and shortcuts". 
In general, it is still possible to argue that more information is better even in the context 
of simple heuristic decision making . This point is made clear by Belli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996): "The distinction between the 'civic knowledge' and the 'heuristic' schools is less 
sharp than often supposed. (...) The use of shortcuts describes a human condition rather 
than a particular form of decision-making. The issue then, for both schools of thought, 
is not whether we use partial information to make political decisions, but the reliability 
and validity of the specific information we do use".
In short we can say that the heuristic decision-making argument shows that observed 
levels of political knowledge are not necessarily alarmingly low, as many scholars tend 
to assume: people acquire only the information they need and, under appropriate cir- 
cumstances, this is enough to allow "ordinary citizens" to make "extraordinary choices".
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Nevertheless, this does not imply that having more information gives no advantages in 
the political arena or allows better control over delegates. In particular, the argument 
that democracy works well with little information seems better applied in cases where 
accountability is at stake: but if different principals have different preferences then the 
issue is not just one of control over delegates but also one of redistribution. Other things 
equal (i.e. verifiability conditions, penalty for lies etc.) it is likely that more information 
can be extracted from the same environment by certain groups rather than others. Given 
that knowledge of others' preferences, interests, and competence is necessarily imperfect, 
political knowledge and its distribution is very likely to affect final electoral outcomes.
1.5 Consequences for public policy
Concluding this survey, we come back to the original question: does political information 
affect public policy-making through its impact in elections? As we have tried to clarify 
so far, the answer to this question depends on the answers we give to a number of re- 
lated questions. Are voters capable of understanding electoral platforms and selecting 
the candidates that would better serve their interests? Are they capable of monitor- 
ing elected representatives? What do they know about the link between public policies 
and final outcomes? Do candidates try to learn about their constituents' preferences? 
Do they translate voters' preferences into implemented policies? This involves, among 
other things, the functioning of election mechanisms, the effects of information on voting 
behaviour, and the relationship between electoral politics and public policy.
One first obvious implication of what has been said so far is that if information does 
not affect voting behaviour then it should have no impact on public policy. However, it 
is also possible to argue that information has no effect on policies in spite of having an 
effect on voting behaviour. Formal models of elections have identified ways for the lack of 
detailed information by some (and even many) voters to have limited impact on aggregate 
choice. The simplest possible way is to assume that uninformed voters make mistakes, but 
that mistakes are just white noise in the election process. In other terms, if uninformed 
voters have equal probability to make mistakes in any direction, then this should not affect 
majority voting outcomes. This is a simple way to obtain "full information equivalence", 
i.e. the possibility for a majoritarian system to aggregate individual pieces of information
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into the same final outcome that a perfectly informed population would choose. As we 
have already discussed, this idea can be dated back to Aristotle; Condorcet (1785) and 
recent formal models of collective decision-making have clarified the conditions required 
for this to happen28 . Problems with this argument, however, arise if errors are correlated: 
if, for example, there is systematic bias in press coverage, then it seems more likely for 
voters' mistakes to be concentrated on some specific options. In this case, differently from 
Condorcet, the population size does not help in canceling out errors29 .
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997 and 1999) have been extremely influential in 
supporting full information equivalence. Conditioning on the event of being decisive re- 
veals a lot of information to uninformed voters. Hence, although behaving differently 
from the informed30 , the uninformed manage to get their preferred policy by being ad- 
equately sophisticated. The relevance of these conclusions to actual elections have been 
seriously questioned. Margolis (2001 and 2002), for example, is very skeptical on this 
point: "results are contingent on a combination of very specific common knowledge inter- 
acting with an effectively leak-proof arrangement of socially relevant but strictly private 
information" 31 .
As noted previously, it should not be overlooked that, even if people use the little 
information they have in the best possible way, this does not imply that, in comparative 
terms, more information would not be better. In the case of Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 
their logic can be pushed to cases where only one informed voter would be enough, in a 
symmetric equilibrium, to deliver the right choice. However, for information aggregation 
to occur, at least some information must be available: to be able to act strategically, 
the "uninformed" voters need accurate prior knowledge about other agents' preferences 
and distribution, which is more than one could expect from voters in an election. On 
top of this, at least some voters (the informed) should receive informative signals. Thus,
28 Condorcet (1785) considers a population of imperfectly informed agents with a common objective 
function having to choose the best of two outcomes by majority rule. He shows that the probability of 
a correct choice increases with the population size. See also Young (1988) and Austen-Smith and Banks 
(1996). Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show how the possibility of having full information equivalence 
depends on the decision rule: unanimity, for example, decreases the chance of having an informed collective 
choice.
29 Berg (1993).
30 As seen in the previous section, for example, uninformed voters are more likely to strategically abstain 
to increase the probability of an aggregate informed decisions. Also, the uninformed are more likely to 
vote against their signal if they cannot abstain.
31 Margolis (2002).
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even in a world of extremely sophisticated agents, electoral systems can work with little 
information, but not without information at all. Finally, in this literature the reliability 
of signals is not questioned. In real elections voters have virtually never the possibility 
to get first hand information as everything is filtered by opinion leaders, organizations, 
and, above all, the media; in real elections we definitely lack an objective and univer- 
sally trusted signal. When signalling can be strategic, cheap talk games clearly show 
how a commonality of interests with the signaller (and therefore some knowledge of her 
preferences) is a condition to get informative equilibria.
The impact of citizens' political knowledge on public policy depends not only on how 
it affects their voting behaviour. Asymmetric information changes the incentives faced 
by politicians in designing electoral platforms and in delivering the promised policies. It 
can be useful on this point to distinguish between two dimensions that concern the link 
between elections and policies.
The first, which can be called "vertical delegation", concerns the capability of electoral 
processes to select the best candidates and then make elected representatives accountable 
to other citizens. The centre of attention is on the conflict between the interest of decision- 
makers and that of the polity. Elections, in this case, serve as screening and disciplining 
mechanisms; the perspective of future elections should provide incentives for decision- 
makers not to abuse of their power for private purposes.
The second dimension is one of "horizontal conflict". Citizens have different prefer- 
ences for public policies and, unlike for goods allocated by markets, voluntary exchange 
and the price mechanism cannot help in this case. Therefore, if and when a public decision 
is reached, it is binding for everyone. The conflict among different preferences must be 
solved by centralized decisions that inevitably involve some form of (implicit or explicit) 
redistribution.
A good framework for examining accountability of public officials is the agency model. 
Since Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), agency models have been used to study the 
incentives faced by an incumbent (agent) to provide the policies preferred by citizens 
(principals). This is natural since an agency relation is concerned with some idea of 
performance. Examples of applications of agency models to politics include policy ma- 
nipulation for re-election purposes (Harrington, 1993), political business cycle (Rogoff, 
1990), yardstick competition in tax setting (Besley and Case, 1995a), and the form of
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transfers to special interest groups (Coate and Morris, 1995).
The main conclusion in this class of models is that the perspective of being re-elected 
reduces the rent extracted by incumbents in equilibrium. This is what Banks and Sun- 
daram (1999) call the "performance effect". There is also a "selection effect", in the sense 
that not all agents will be equally likely to be re-elected: good types (more competent or 
with motivations more similar to those of citizens) will have generally a better chance to 
be confirmed in office. Thus, the perspective for the incumbent of facing re-election gives 
a double advantage to citizens: it delivers both better policy-making by the incumbent 
in office (independently of his type) and a higher probability to have a better type of 
policy-maker in service in the following period. Besley and Case (1995b) use data on gu- 
bernatorial administrations in the US to provide evidence in support of the first claim32 . 
Hence, one first important conclusion is that elections are, at least to a certain extent, 
a good device to affect public policy in the direction desired by the majority of citizens. 
The perspective of facing a re-election works as a commitment device.
Information plays a key role in all agency relations: thus, when decision-making power 
is delegated to governments, information availability is crucial for accountability and 
therefore for public policy. Voters can be badly informed about the incumbent's com- 
petence, her implemented policy, or the link between policy and outcome. In each of 
these cases voters will implement a different re-election strategy, either based on past 
policy if this is observable (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990), or on past outcome 
(Ferejohn, 1986; Alesina and Cukierman, 1990). Harrington (1993) takes up the issue of 
voters' uncertainty about the efficacy of different economic policies. He finds that the 
more uncertain voters are about the efficacy of policies the bigger the impact of perfor- 
mance on the electoral outcome and the larger the possibility of policy-manipulation open 
to incumbents.
One special characteristic of the political market is that almost all the information 
available does not come from direct observation or knowledge of facts, but rather from 
what the few informed people say. Claims are sometime non-verifiable and many other 
times the verification is too costly for any single citizen to pursue, considering also the 
well known collective action problems of large elections. If, however, for any reason (e.g.
J2 Governors face a term limit of two mandates. Therefore, in each given moment there are governors 
facing the perspective of elections and "lame ducks" that will terminate their service anyway. Besley and 
Case find evidence of different behaviors in the two cases.
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instrumental voting, expressive benefit, pure entertainment, or else) there is a demand 
for such information then special firms, the mass media, should emerge to "produce" and 
sell it to interested customers. It is indeed not surprising to observe that the historical 
development of the newspaper industry has proceeded hand in hand with the development 
of democratic institutions.
Recent theoretical and empirical research, mostly still unpublished, has tried to dis- 
entangle the role of information supply in making public officials accountable to citizens. 
In Besley and Prat (2001) the media (a number of competing outlets) can derive their 
revenue from two sources: audience (and therefore advertising) and a transfer from gov- 
ernment (in the form, for example, of favourable regulation) in exchange for silence on 
possible bad news about the incumbent. The higher the number of outlets accepting the 
deal with the government, the larger the potential audience from breaking news for the 
non-captured outlets. Therefore, to keep every outlet silent, the government must pay 
each of them as if it was the only one that could break news. Hence, a rise in the num- 
ber of outlets makes it more expensive for the government to capture the media. Since 
in equilibrium the government can only either pay everyone or nobody (just one outlet 
breaking news is enough for the citizenship to be informed), increasing the number of 
outlets renders less likely the possibility of media capture. Media pluralism is, therefore, 
good for information availability. Besley and Prat also provide cross-country evidence 
by linking foreign media ownership with corruption indices. A foreign owner can be less 
prone to be captured because, for example, has less economic interests under govern- 
ment's regulation: this increases the transaction cost of transfers. Djankov et al. (2001) 
find that the number of state owned newspapers is also a good predictor of corruption. 
Besley and Burgess (2002) provide evidence on Indian states responsiveness to calamities 
and find that this is associated with the circulation of newspapers and electoral turnout. 
This idea dates back to Sen (1981, 1984) who pointed out the role that newspapers can 
play in preventing famines, by increasing citizens' awareness and therefore government 
activity in prevention.
All this seems to suggest quite clearly that information and mass media matter for 
policy outcomes. It is interesting to note that even advocates of "limited information 
politics", like Lupia and McCubbins, agree on the role of the media, and include them 
among the "informational crutches" that allow ordinarily (i.e. little) informed citizens
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to make the right choices: "the existence of a free press increases the likelihood that 
campaign statements will be verified. While competition can create multiple potential 
verifiers, freedom of the press provides these verifiers with an avenue whereby they can 
provide public verification of political statements. (...) These institutional features can 
increase the threat of verification and can thus increase the likelihood that voters will be 
capable of reasoned choice" 33 .
Coming to the horizontal dimension, the link between information and policy is driven 
by voters' responsiveness to electoral platforms, which implies both to be able to distin- 
guish the most favorable proposal and to turn out to vote for it. "The very groups who 
are disadvantaged economically and socially are also less politically informed and, thus, 
disadvantaged in the struggle over the political allocation of scarce goods, services, and 
values. (...) The more informed one is, the more likely one is to send clear, policy-oriented 
messages to political elites (...). To the extent that political elites respond to such signals 
- a central tenet of any theory of representative democracy - informed citizens are likely 
to have their concerns taken more seriously" 34 . Empirical evidence tends to show that 
turnout is often the transmission chain of this mechanism. First, voters and non-voters 
systematically differ in their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and there- 
fore in their needs and policy preferences35 . Second, most evidence suggests that "low 
voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout" 36 . Thus, if we expect 
voters' preferences to be represented in policies, turnout levels should determine policy 
outcomes.
Empirical evidence that aggregate turnout is a predictor of welfare spending has been 
provided by Peterson and Rom (1989) for US states and Hicks and Swank (1992) for 
industrialized countries. Lindert (1996), analysing a panel of OECD countries, finds 
that "a stronger voter turnout seems to have raised spending on every kind of social 
program, as one would expect if one assumed that the social programs cater to the lower 
income groups whose voter turnout differs most over time and across countries". Hill 
and Leighley (1992) and Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson (1995) use US survey data 
to derive aggregate measures of turnout by social class and combine them with state-
33 Lupia and McCubbins (1998).
3 "Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
35 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Verba et al. (1993).
36 See Lijphart (1997).
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level data to provide direct evidence of the effect of lower-class mobilization on welfare 
spending. Using US state-level data for the years 1950-1988, Husted and Kenny (1997) 
show how the extension of the voting franchise (thus favouring participation by the poor 
and the minorities) has caused an increase in welfare spending, leaving all other spending 
unaffected. If turnout can be explained also by information, as we have seen in the 
previous section and as Chapter 2 will make clearer, then we are facing more than a 
presumption of the impact that information could have of public policy. Chapter 3 of 
this thesis will present an information-based model of electoral competition and voters' 
responsiveness that provides a possible explanation for these findings.
Another source of differentiated influence on the electoral process can be the mass 
media. This mechanism is studied by Stromberg (2002): mass media derive their revenue 
from advertising and some people are more valuable than others to advertisers (those who 
tend to consume more, like the richer, better educated, younger etc.). Hence, these people 
will be targeted by the media and office-seeking politicians will also design policies more 
favorable to media users, as those are more likely to be informed on platform proposals. 
Equilibrium policies can therefore be substantially altered by the functioning of the media 
market, independently of any ideological bias that the media could possibly throw into 
the electoral battlefield. Stromberg (2001) also provides evidence of this effect from the 
New Deal relief programme implemented in a period of rapid expansion in the use of the 
radio. He finds, controlling for variables that account for the needs of different counties, 
that the radio had a large and significant impact on funds allocation. Chapter 4 of this 
thesis will offer some theoretical foundations and evidence of instrumental behaviour by 
voters in acquiring information and, in doing so, will also provide evidence of newspapers' 
discrimination in information supply.
In conclusion, new research is increasingly providing both theoretical rationales and 
empirical evidence on the effects of the information market on public policy-making: it 
seems then clear that if we think it is worth opening the black box of policy formation 
then information cannot be left out of the picture. Although much is still to be done to 
gauge the impact of information on policies, it seems worth exploring the incentives faced 
by agents in the information market and their interactions with electoral institutions and 
the incentives provided by democratic political competition. This should lead to a better 
understanding of public policy and, in perspective, to new normative implications.
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1.6 Thesis overview
This chapter has discussed the main motivations that stimulated this thesis. It also aimed 
at presenting the intellectual framework of this research, underlying some of the many 
unclear facets in our understanding of the determinants and the consequences of voters' 
political knowledge. The next three chapters aim at contributing to this research agenda 
by mainly focussing on the information demand side.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of information on electoral turnout. First of all, it in- 
troduces a model of political information acquisition that will be used, in different ways, 
across the whole thesis. Information acquisition is modelled as an individual production 
activity. Voters are endowed with a personal information production technology whose 
inputs are mass media and time. Exogenous individual characteristics and news availabil- 
ity determine the productivity of different agents, i.e. their capability to acquire, process 
and retain relevant political information: optimal individual media usage depends on 
such exogenous parameters, consistently with a number of stylized facts. We also in- 
troduce ideology, in the form of prior beliefs about candidates, and assume agents are 
heterogeneous in such beliefs. Our theoretical model predicts that information increases 
the likelihood of turnout for voters who are sufficiently independent, in the sense of not 
having a strong prior preference for one of the candidates. Information demand turns 
out to be a non-monotonic function of ideology: the voters with the lowest incentives to 
acquire information are those with the weakest (indifferent) and the strongest (partisan) 
prior beliefs. Our model predicts instead that the best informed citizens are those who 
moderately support one of the candidates. It is also shown that people with strong prior 
beliefs should reduce their likelihood of voting when informed. Thus, having extreme 
ideological priors affects turnout twice: first, directly, by increasing the preference for one 
of the candidates; second, via information, by reducing the probability of learning about 
candidates.
These theoretical results are tested using survey data on the 1997 general election 
in the U.K. The information acquisition model performs very well when confronted with 
data. A number of variables affecting the benefits and costs of acquiring information 
are good predictors of political knowledge: some of those have been traditionally used 
in empirical political science research, others have been added thanks to our theoretical
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investigation. Education and news availability on the media emerge as good predictors of 
knowledge. Information is then shown to be a very good explanatory variable for turnout. 
By using appropriate instrumental variables, it is possible to show that this is not just a 
spurious correlation driven by unobserved heterogeneity: political information affects the 
probability of turnout in a very precise sense. Predictions on the impact of ideology on 
both information acquisition and turnout also receive good support from data, especially 
when ideology is measured by party identification.
This chapter leads us to conclude that information matters for turnout. It also matters 
for good collective decision-making. The model presented has only a "vertical" dimension 
of candidates: these can therefore be unanimously ranked. Information increases the 
chance of an enlightened choice by increasing the likelihood of turnout of independent 
informed voters. Also, agents with strong priors are those more likely to vote in the 
"wrong" way: thus, information increases the chances of an aggregate informed choice 
by increasing the probability of abstention of the extremists. Although derived within a 
different modelling frame, it is clear that our results may have some relevance for the 
literature on information aggregation.
Our empirical investigation shows quite neatly that political knowledge is increasing 
in income. Chapter 3 studies the implications of this fact for redistributive public policy. 
The focus is on individual incentives to acquire information. We argue that, even when the 
probability to cast a decisive vote is virtually negligible, voters have still private incentives 
to be informed about politics. Monitoring of current policy and expectations over future 
policies can be very useful for a number of private decisions like financial investments, 
choosing between public and private education, or the choice of a pension scheme. Thus, 
political information has also purely private returns. Under quite mild assumptions it is 
possible to show that information demand for private purposes is increasing in income. 
Office-seeking politicians should take this into account when competing for office. We 
study these effects within a unidimensional model of Downsian political competition. 
Our analysis carries three main implications for redistribution: 1) equilibrium policy does 
not converge to the median voter in the population but to the median informed voter; this 
means that redistribution is always less than predicted by traditional (i.e. with perfect 
information) Downsian models; 2) greater inequality in gross income distribution is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for more redistribution; inequality increases the redistributive
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desire of the median voter but also the political weight of the rich, leaving the net effect 
undetermined; 3) restrictions on the policy space can have perverse consequences as they 
change the incentives of different segments of the population to be aware of public policy- 
making; for example, if the poor are not taxed and do not receive benefits they have less 
instruments and less incentives to monitor public policy-making.
Chapter 4 studies the political information market, by explicitly introducing mass 
media. It takes up two issues: voters' instrumental behaviour and the mass media bias 
on public policy. If voters act instrument ally on the political market, then they should 
be responsive to a number of incentives that can be picked up by observable variables. 
In particular, a close election increases the probability for each voter to be pivotal and 
should therefore increase the incentives to be informed. At the same time, the mass 
media can increase their profits by discriminating between areas with lower and higher 
political information demand: since price discrimination is not normally practised, they 
will discriminate in the supply of news. We will provide evidence on both voters' and 
mass media behaviour by focussing on electoral constituencies in Britain during the elec- 
toral campaign of 1997. We find evidence of voters' higher demand for information in 
marginal constituencies. At the same time, the mass media tend to supply more news to 
marginal constituencies but also take into account a number of other local characteristics 
that make readers more or less valuable to advertisers. Thus, they introduce a bias in 
information supply that is completely independent of potential ideological biases. This 
opens the possibility that policy-makers, following the information flows, will themselves 
discriminate between different constituencies and different population segments.
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Chapter 2
Information Acquisition, Ideology, 
and Turnout: Theory and 
Evidence from Britain
2.1 Introduction
In an idealized vision of democracy, public decisions are the expression of preferences and 
opinions of all the members of a polity. In reality, modern democracies simply delegate 
decision-making power to one or some representatives. Elections represent the cornerstone 
of delegation and control. Thus, a modern version of participatory democracy would re- 
quire a population that is well informed, participates in electoral meetings, stimulates 
and criticizes public officials, and turns out to vote in large numbers. This consideration 
leads many people, from political scientists to journalists, professional politicians, and 
simple citizens, to attach a special value to electoral turnout as reflecting how represen- 
tative public decisions are of citizens' interests. Low electoral turnout is often seen as a 
symptom of little attachment to public matters and even to democracy in itself and is 
therefore associated with the danger of a self-referential political class.
Nevertheless, high participation rates are not necessarily symptoms of healthy demo- 
cratic institutions, and it is possible to dismiss the danger of low turnout on a number of 
grounds. Abstention could simply be a sign of consensus to others' choices; abstainers in 
this case are not passive and disinterested, and low turnout would not signal anything else
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than happiness with the status quo. Proponents of a more limited notion of participation, 
like Schumpeter and, more recently, Sartori, see citizens better placed as "controllers" of 
public officials than as directly taking part in decision-making 1 . In this case high turnout 
rates are not necessary: the success of the system is only judged by its policy outputs. 
Endorsing either vision of participation can lead to substantially different conclusions 
about the quality of our democracies and the possible steps to take.
Understanding the determinants of turnout is central to this debate and would give 
us substantial insights on the formation of public policy through the political process. 
An important step in this direction is to correctly evaluate individual motivations; in this 
sense, a long tradition of empirical studies that has mainly focused on aggregate data can 
give us only a partial picture. More recently, a number of empirical studies has established 
a strong correlation between electoral turnout and a number of individual and systemic 
characteristics2 .
Independently of which model of democracy one endorses, a crucial question remains 
whether high participation rates might actually increase the quality of control posed on 
elected representatives. Any attempt to answer this question cannot escape considering 
the role that political information plays in elections. Recent theoretical and empirical 
research seem to show that the circulation of political information increases elected public 
officials' responsiveness and accountability3 . In general, as information plays a key role 
in agency relations, it is reasonable to expect information availability to be important for 
accountability (and therefore for public policy) when decision-making power is delegated 
to governments. On a different ground, the distribution of political information may have 
an impact on redistributive policy as office-seeking politicians will target their platforms 
at voters that are more likely to be aware of them4 .
Either implicitly or explicitly this literature assumes that information matters for vot- 
ing behaviour. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Chapter 1, some authors argue that sub- 
stantially uninformed voters manage to behave as if they were informed by using heuristics 
that are both sufficient to make reasoned choice and cost effective5 . In brief, these theo-
'See Schumpeter (1942) and Sartori (1987).
2 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) has been the seminal work in this direction.
3 See for example Besley and Burgess (2002) and Besley and Prat (2002).
4 See Stromberg (2001 and 2002) and Chapter 3 in this thesis.
5 See in particular Popkin (1991), Wittman (1995) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998).
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ries tend to argue that knowledge of political matters is "behaviour irrelevant". Another 
stream of theoretical research argues instead in favour of "full information equivalence": 
a polity of substantially uninformed citizens can manage to reach the same outcome that 
a perfectly informed population would choose6 . In this case uninformed voters behave 
differently from the informed as they tend to abstain in order to increase the probability 
of an informed collective choice.
The current debate suffers of at least two important limitations. First of all there is 
still no evidence of a causal link between information and turnout: some empirical research 
shows that there is correlation between the two, yet this is still far from implying that 
information determines participation7 . Second, one important question has yet to receive 
the attention it deserves: what determines the extent of citizens' political knowledge? If 
we approach voting behaviour using the methodology of rational choice theory then there 
is no reason to leave political information acquisition out of our investigation. It will be 
immediately clear that the two questions are related.
This chapter will therefore try to address both questions, starting with the second. We 
will therefore introduce a model where the demand for political information is the outcome 
of a rational process, with its costs and benefits. This does not imply that we want or can 
"explain", in a strict sense, information acquisition: this would be a very difficult task, as 
it is hard to explain voting itself in large elections, given the negligible probability of each 
voter being decisive. However, as for most economic theory, our purpose is not much to 
explain why people desire something or why certain commodities are preferred to others, 
but rather how their demand and supply vary in accordance with relevant observables 
like prices, costs and institutional arrangements. Although we will try to spell out the 
basic motivations driving information acquisition, this agnostic approach constitutes the 
starting point of this work.
The first purpose of this chapter will be therefore to model information acquisition 
from a decision-theoretical perspective and to propose a theory of electoral turnout based 
on endogenous political information. Information acquisition will be modelled as an 
individual production a la Becker, where inputs are represented by mass media and time 
devoted to their usage. Different agents are endowed with different "technologies" to
6 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996 and 1999). 
7 See Belli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
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acquire and process information and are therefore able to grasp more or less information 
from the same exposure to media: in this sense we should expect a number of observable 
individual characteristics to be positively related to the capability to be informed. We 
will then proceed linking information with turnout and testing our results on British data. 
Modelling information acquisition turns out to be quite important for the strategy 
of the empirical investigation. To see why, suppose we want to estimate the effect of 
information on turnout and let us consider the following simple model. A theory of 
instrumental voting starts from the idea that people vote in elections because they are 
interested in policies; in the classical formulation of Riker and Ordeshook (1968), a citizen 
votes if
PB + D>C (2.1)
where P is the probability to cast a decisive vote, B is the gain in policy benefit 
derived from the victory of the preferred candidate as compared with the opponent, D is 
a psychic benefit to voting and C is its cost. Unfortunately, as it stands, this expression 
represents just a small progress from the tautological proposition that people vote if they 
like to do so. This consideration extends to information acquisition.
Political information helps the decision-maker to form a more precise idea about B, 
the difference in utility between, for example, two candidates. Other elements in the 
(2.1) can be influenced by information: the perception of P can for example be affected 
by published polls during the electoral campaign. We will focus on B, as the element 
that reflects the policy platforms, and can therefore be related to ideology and political 
information in a stricter sense.
We now assume that B depends on some decision to be taken by the elected candidate 
and that, in turn, this depends on a parameter 6; .abbreviating we can write B = B(6). 
The optimal decision for our voter should then take into account the value of S. We can 
indicate with W(8) the utility derived from the maximization of the equation PB + D-C: 
this is an indirect utility function. Now suppose that 8 is unknown and has to be estimated 
for decision-making purposes. If 8 is a more precise estimator than 8 of the true <5, then 
we can say that the value of using 8 instead of 8 is given by
E6 W@;6)-E6 W(6;6) (2.2)
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where E$ represents the expected value operator. If the cost of passing from the 
estimator 6 to the estimator 6 is c (for example to acquire a larger sample of observations) , 
then such acquisition will take place if
EsW(6;6)-E6W(H;6)>c (2.3)
However, political information can be acquired also for non-instrumental reasons. As 
in the voting equation, we can add a personal benefit b which represents some psychic 
enjoyment of political information, orthogonal to political preferences and observable 
relevant variables. The (2.3) becomes
6) - E6 W(6- 8) + b>c (2.4)
The problem in testing the effect of information on turnout arises as in practice D 
and b are likely to be correlated, both being driven by some sense of civic duty or pure 
enjoyment of politics. Finding a positive relation between information and turnout could 
therefore just be the consequence of omitting some relevant variables; this correlation 
does not reveal anything about the impact of information in itself on turnout.
A theory of information acquisition is therefore necessary if we want to identify the 
turnout model. This theory will provide the necessary instrumental variables to overcome 
this endogeneity problem and assess the impact of information per se on turnout. As a 
by-product of the empirical investigation we will also get a number of results about British 
citizens' political knowledge.
It should be noted that the value of information depends on the possibility (ex ante) 
that new observations induce a change in behaviour. This, in turn, implies that prior 
beliefs about the distribution of 6 will affect our results. People have different beliefs 
about parties and candidates and we will call such beliefs "ideology" . In general, apart 
from gathering information from mass media (or other sources), most people have their 
own prior opinions on political issues: these are reflected on both policy preferences and 
beliefs about how to reach given targets. These priors can be shaped by the influence of 
other people (e.g. parents), by personal knowledge and competence in political matters, 
by personal experiences etc. Such opinions or, in other terms, such ideological motiva-
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tions, however formed, play an important role in voting decisions and on turnout itself8 . 
Moreover, and more interestingly from our perspective, they can have an influence on the 
decision to acquire political information; thus, when we introduce endogenous informa- 
tion, ideology can influence voting both directly and indirectly via information. Another 
objective of this chapter is therefore to study such influences: the interaction between ide- 
ological motivations and information acquisition will lead us to new results on electoral 
turnout and will have implications for the way elections shape public policy. Differently 
from previous works, good collective choices may be favoured not only by abstention of 
uninformed voters but by abstention of informed voters as well.
This is admittedly a minimalist interpretation of the word ideology, that is instead 
often referred to broad theoretical constructions and general visions about politics and 
beyond it. For our purposes it will just be important that, in elections, these broad visions 
of the world will translate into different prior opinions about candidates. Although not 
pretending to have a theory of ideology, nevertheless we hope to provide new insights on 
the role of ideology in elections.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section will introduce the main features 
of the theoretical model while section 2.3 will analyse the case of a non-polarized polity, 
when each decision-maker has prior beliefs that make her substantially indifferent (ex 
ante) about the candidates. In section 2.4 we turn to the role of ideology, thus consider- 
ing the possibility of prior beliefs that attach different values to the various candidates. 
Section 2.5 gives some information about the 1997 general election in Britain, on which 
the theory is tested, and presents the datasets that are used in the empirical investigation. 
Section 2.6 outlines the estimation strategy, the links between the theory and the empirics 
and the way to solve potential endogeneity problems. Section 2.7 illustrates the results of 
the empirical analysis and Section 2.8 concludes th'e chapter. Further details about both 
the theory and the data can be found in the Appendices.
8 Palfrey and Poole (1987) present an empirical study of the relationship between information, ideology, 
and voting behaviour.
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2.2 The model
We consider a polity with two political parties / (incumbent) and O (opponent) and a set fi 
of citizens who vote to elect a public decision-maker. The incumbent politician decides the 
value of a public policy parameter a 6 [0,a]. We assume a one-to-one relationship between 
politicians and policies: in other terms (abusing the notation) candidate a delivers policy 
a. The incumbent policy-maker a/ faces an opponent selected by party O. The opponent 
candidate selection process is unknown to citizens and will be represented by a probability 
distribution function Fo(a),with corresponding density function fo(a). On the other side, 
when the politician in office implements her preferred policy o/ she reveals her type to 
citizens: therefore, while a/ is common knowledge, citizens do not know the opponent's 
type a0 .
Citizens' preferences over policies are represented by a utility function V(a). We as- 
sume that all citizens have the same preferences over a and that V (a) > 0. This is 
admittedly a strong assumption: people generally differ in their preferences over public 
policies. However, it is possible to regard a not as a specific policy dimension but rather 
as a more general measure of "good government". Indeed, it seems very often the case 
that citizens, rather than differing on their final aims, have different opinions on the most 
appropriate ways to reach those aims. Let us take the example of health care: not many 
politicians would claim they don't care about people's health. However, different strate- 
gies to reach good health services are rationalizable and are indeed rationalized during 
electoral campaigns. Another good example is gun control: both the supporters and the 
opposers of increasing gun regulation claim that their advocate policy would decrease 
criminality and increase the average citizen's safety. Both cases are logically possible and 
evidence is often not clear or easily manipulable. ],t turns out that in many cases hetero- 
geneity is not as much a matter of preferences on final goods as it is in beliefs about the 
effectiveness of different policies. In this sense V(a) can be taken as representing meta- 
preferences on good government. This is just a convenient simplification: heterogeneous 
preferences can be introduced at the cost of extra technical complications and little new 
insights compared with the present analysis.
Heterogeneity is instead introduced on prior beliefs. We assume that citizens have 
different prior distributions Fo(a) about the opponent's type. This formulation is admit-
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tedly non-orthodox, though, as discussed in the first chapter, heterogeneous prior beliefs 
are inevitably part of political life9 . The set of admittable prior distribution functions is 
indicated with F.
During the electoral campaign, citizens can gather information on candidates. In our 
case this is limited to the opponent, as the incumbent's type is common knowledge. 
Citizens are endowed with an information gathering technology that is representable 
by the probability q(t,k\E,M) to learn the realization a. The inputs of this personal 
production function of information are an information source of quality k €. K. C 9ft+ (this 
includes newspapers, television, radio etc.), and time t   T C 3?_|_ devoted to extract 
information from this source 10 . The opportunity cost of time t is represented by w, the 
marginal cost of quality of the information source is r.
This technology also depends on a vector of parameters E that affect the ability to 
extract and process information or the capability to use more sophisticated information 
sources. In empirical applications E will include variables such as education and age.
The probability to learn ao depends on the concentration of news about ao on the 
information sources with quality /c; thus, q will also depend on a parameter M, that reflects 
information supply, typically via the mass media. There is however a difference between k 
(the source's quality) and M (information supply). The first can be individually chosen, 
according to each individual's interests and capabilities. M instead reflects the salience 
of given issues or constituencies on the media and is therefore independent of citizens' 
willingness to acquire information. We will assume that q(t, k\-) is always increasing in E 
and M.
At election time citizens compare the benefits of the two candidates: informed citi- 
zens will compare V(a/) with V(ao), the utility they derive from the realized opponent 
candidate; uninformed citizens will instead use their prior beliefs on the opponent's type. 
The benefit from voting is defined as the (expected) difference in utility from the two 
candidates, taking into account the probability that each voter has to be decisive. In the 
current analysis we will not consider any non-instrumental motivation for voting. This, 
however, is normally represented just as a constant, and therefore would not change our
9 For a discussion of this assumption, see Harrington (1993).
10 Note that k is just a quality index and does not represent in itself specific sources. We only assume 
that each specific newspaper, magazine, television channel or radio station can be mapped into the space 
K..
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Figure 2-1: Time Line
Oa Ob la ib l c
0 = Incumbent implements a/ and reveals her type
Oa = Opponent selection from distribution F(a)
la = Choice of t* and k*
Ib = realization of q —> q
lc = election
2 = winning candidate implements her preferred policy:utility is realized
results.
Finally, voting is costly: we represent the cost of voting with C   C C 5R+. We will 
consider a fixed C but nothing would change if instead we assumed that C was distrib- 
uted across the population according to any given distribution function, as long as the 
distribution of C is independent of the distribution of prior beliefs about the opponent. 
Each agent knows his own C.
After the election, the elected politician implements her preferred policy a*. The 
sequence of events is represented in Figure 2-1.
2.3 Information acquisition and voting
In this section we will first characterize the value of and demand for information. Then we 
will restrict our attention to the case of a non-polarized polity by introducing restrictions 
on prior beliefs and cost of voting.
We start by solving the model backward to characterize the information acquisition 
process.
At time 2 the winning candidate implements her preferred policy: that will be a/ if the 
incumbent is confirmed in office and O,Q if the opponent candidate wins. For brevity we 
will indicate V(a/) with Vf and eliminate the subscript from the functions F(-) and /( );
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where there is no risk of confusion we will also use a for the opponent's type, eliminating 
the subscript. Abusing the notation we will also indicate with / the decision to cast a vote 
for the incumbent, with O a vote for the opponent and with A the decision to abstain. 
Focusing on turnout, we will also indicate with T = 1 the decision to vote and T = 0 the 
decision to abstain.
The decision problem of an uninformed citizen at the election stage is then
maxT(P| l{V(a] - VI]dF(a}\ -C} = W (2.5)
where P is the (exogenous) probability to be a decisive voter.
For a citizen who knows the type of the incumbent the problem is instead
mxx.T(P\V(a) - Vf \ - C) = W*(a] (2.6) 
The ex ante value of an informed versus an uninformed decision is then given by
A = /[W* (a) - W]dF(a) (2.7)
At the beginning of period 1 citizens decide about information acquisition. As men- 
tioned, we assume they are endowed with an information gathering technology repre- 
sentable as the probability q(t,k\E,M} to learn the realization a. We make the following 
assumption on q(t,k\E,M}.
Assumption 2.1 qt > 0, qk > 0, qt£ > 0, qtM > 0,QkE > 0,gfc Af > 0,qtt < 0, qtt
- (<?tfc) 2 > 0
This is just a simple assumption on the relationships between inputs and output. 
Indeed, we treat <?( ) not differently from any standard production function. 
Now we can state period 1 optimization problem for a generic citizen as:
maxg(i,A;|£',M)A - wt - rk (2.8)
s.t. t   T 
k e 1C
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In Lemma 1 we prove that the expected value of information is positive. 
Lemma 2.1 A > 0
Proof: See Appendix 2A.
It is then straightforward to prove the following:
Proposition 2.1 The optimal functions t*(E,M,w,r) and k*(E,M,w,r) are both in­ 
creasing in E,M and decreasing in w,r.
The demand for information, expressed as demand for mass media and time devoted 
to their usage, is then increasing in the technology parameter E and in the supply of 
relevant information by the media M. The same will be true for the probability Q to 
know a :
In the rest of this section we will analyse the case in which prior beliefs are such that 
agents would not vote for any of the candidates if uninformed. In other words, ideologies 
are weak in terms of their effects in elections; we will also say that the polity is not 
polarized.
Assumption 2.2 P\ f[V(a) - VI}dF(a)\ < C, VF   F, VC 6 C.
Uninformed agents will therefore always abstain.
We can now prove some results on electoral turnout, starting by linking the probability 
to be informed to the ex ante probability to vote, i.e. the probability of voting before 
the actual type of the opponent is revealed. This ex ante perspective is indeed the only 
allowed for an external observer, at least if we want to maintain an agnostic view about 
the actual quality of candidates and their political distance.
In the following we will always assume that P[V(a) -Vi\>C and P[V/ - 1/(0)] > C.
Proposition 2.2 > 0.
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Proof. See Appendix 2A.
The probability of voting for any candidate is increasing in information, i.e. on the 
probability to know the opponent's type. It is also clear that our theory links the proba- 
bility of voting to a number of individual and environmental characteristics. This provides 
a theoretical foundation for a number of well established stylized facts on turnout.
Proposition 2.3
aPr(r=l|£,JW>,r) > Q dPr(T=l\E,M,w,r) > Q dPr(T=l\E,M,w,r) <   dPr(T=l\E,M,w,r) < Q
Proof. See Appendix 2A.
The capability to acquire information (as measured for example by income or educa- 
tion), as well as the amount of information supplied, both increase the probability that 
a citizen, ceteris paribus, will vote. Thus our theory can explain some of the common 
findings of most empirical research, like the positive correlation between education and 
turnout. At the same time we have new testable results linking the probability of turnout 
with the cost of acquiring information.
2.4 Ideology
In the following we will introduce ideological prior beliefs. The purpose of this section 
is to analyse how information demand and turnout depend on ideology. This will be 
accomplished by performing comparative static analysis under different hypotheses on 
citizens' prior beliefs. Although the word "ideology" has a much broader meaning and 
can be subject to various interpretations, it is natural to think of ideology in our model 
as deriving from prior beliefs about the opponent candidate. It is clear that, in the real 
world, ideology concerns beliefs about all candidates: however what really matters for 
voting decisions is the perceived position of one candidate relative to the other and to the 
cost of voting.
We will start by defining ideology according to citizens' beliefs.
Definition 2.1 (Weak Ideology) A weak I-ideology (0-ideology) consists of prior be­ 
liefs F(a) s.t.
/{V(a)~Vr}dF(a) <0 (> 0)
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It should be noted that, according to this definition, a citizen is weakly ideological 
only in relation to beliefs. This, however, does not guarantee that an ideological citizen 
will vote if uninformed: a more stringent definition of ideology would require prior beliefs 
to be such that the ex ante distance between candidates is sufficient to overcome the cost 
of voting. We introduce therefore the following definition:
Definition 2.2 (Strong Ideology) A strong I-ideology (0-ideology) consists, for given 
P and C, of prior beliefs F(a) s.t.
P l(VI -V(a}\dF(a) > C 
(pJ[V(a)-VI}dF(a) > C}
It is then possible to divide the set of prior beliefs J- into three groups:
= {F(a):P !{VI -V(a)\dF(a)>C}
= {F(a):P J(V(a)-Vr}dF(a)>C}
= {F(a):\pJ[V(a)-VI}dF(a)\<C}.
Accordingly, we can divide the citizens' population fi into fi/, QQ, ^A, depending on 
their priors. If uninformed about the true opponent's type, citizens in the set fi/ will vote 
for the incumbent, citizens in Q.Q will vote for the opponent and finally those in fi^ will 
abstain. If informed about the opponent's type then prior beliefs clearly do not matter.
For our purposes it is important to distinguish group QA from the rest. We can 
define citizens in this group as strongly non-ideological (although they can still be weakly 
ideological).
To compare different degrees of ideology we need a further simple definition:
Definition 2.3 Assume citizens i and j have the same C and prior beliefs represented 
respectively by the distribution functions F(a) and G(a). Then we say that citizen 
i is more 0-ideological (I-ideological) than citizen j if
f[V(a) - Vr}dF(a) > (<) l[V(a) - VI]dG(a)
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When we don't want to distinguish between /-ideology and 0-ideology we will simply 
say that agent i is more ideological than agent j.
It should be noted that in all the definitions of this section we consider a generic 
utility function V(a), imposing on it no restriction other than that of being monotonic 
nondecreasing. The purpose of such definitions is to impose restrictions on the distribution 
functions rather than on the utility function. Given that we only want to characterize 
beliefs, independently of preferences, what is required on the functions F(a) and G(a) 
must be true for any nondecreasing utility function V(a). Now notice that
[V(a] - Vi]dF(a) = I V(a)dF(a) -
If we pose a further restriction and require Definition 2.3 to be valid for every non- 
decreasing function V(a) then it is clear that the comparison of alternative distribution 
functions based on our definition of ideology is equivalent to using first order stochastic 
dominance.
f[V(a) - VI]dF(a) > (<) f(V(a) - VI]dG(a]
J J
Under this more restrictive requirement we can introduce an indicator of ideology that 
will be useful in the rest of this section 11 .
Definition 2.4 Define TT as an indicator of ideology s.t. an increase in TT indicates an 
increase of O-ideology.
Assumption 2.3 Consider two distribution functions F^F (d) and GVG (a). Then -np > 
•KG if and only if F^F (a] < GTTG (O} Va.
Thus, as TT increases, agents become more (^-ideological or, alternatively, less /- 
ideological. Also, as TT increases we will say that agents become more ideological (without
11 Defining ideological beliefs using first order stochastic dominance seems to make clearer the distinction 
between private interest and ideology. In a sense, an ideological belief must be independent of preferences 
(at least as long as we all agree on some basic premise, like that a is a valuable thing). If an individual 
believes that F(a) stochastically dominates G(a) then he would recommend F(a) to every person with a 
nondecreasing utility function V(a). This captures the difference between the fact that F(a) is better for 
the ideological person and the fact that such person believes F(a) to be better for everyone.
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specifying). If we now define vr_i,7To, and TT+I such that
f[VI -V(a)]dFv_ l (a) = C
J
J[VI -V(a)}dF7To (a} = 0 
J(V(a)-Vi}dF7r+1 (a) = C
then agents are defined as strongly /-ideological when they have TT < TT_I, weakly 
/-ideological when 7r_! < TT < TTQ, weakly 0-ideological when TTQ < TT < TT+I, and strongly 
(9-ideological when TT > 7r+1 . We will also refer to citizens for which TT_I < vr < TT + I as 
"abstainers".
Finally, it is useful to define the following sets, corresponding to possible realizations 
of the opponent's type:
Ai = {a:P[V(a}-VI}<-C}
AA = {a:-C< P(V(a) - Vj] < C} (2.9)
Ao = {a : P[V(a) - Vf ] > C}
Figure 2-2 shows the partitioning of the opponent's type support in the case in which 
V(a) is a linear function, and reports the critical values of TT.
The value of information depends on the decision the citizen would make following only 
her priors. In particular, information is valuable in that it might change the decision taken 
when uninformed. Consider a strongly O-ideological agent. As TT increases, the probability 
of realizations in AI or AA decreases, thus rendering the possibility of uninformed mistakes 
less likely. Therefore the value of information should decrease as TT increases.
Things are more complex for weakly ideological agents and we need to introduce a 
further assumption in this case.
Assumption 2.4 TT Z > TT; =* P fA{UAo \V(a) - Vi\[fi(a) - fj(a)]da > C^^(a) - 
fj(a)]da.
It is important to note that this assumption is at the same time both a restriction 
on the distribution functions considered, and a restriction on the possible partitions of
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Figure 2-2: Partitioning the ,4-space
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the space A. Now consider a weakly 0-ideological agent, an agent that would abstain if 
uninformed. In this case an increase in TT will clearly decrease the probability of events 
in AI\ on the other side now the probability of events in AQ increases. We are left 
therefore with two opposite effects whose overall impact cannot be determined. Then 
Assumption 2.4 basically says that when an agent is O-ideological, as TT increases we 
expect the increase of likelihood of events in AQ to dominate the corresponding reduction 
of likelihood of events in Aj.
We can now state the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.4 Let us indicate with Ap and AG the value of information correspond­ 
ing respectively to TTp and KG. Under Assumption 2.4 and for given E, M, w, r, 
C, we have that
1 TTG < KF < TT_I =>
2) TT_I < -no < TTF < TI"O =>  AG >
3) 7T0 < 7TG < 7T F < 7T +1 => A G
4) TT + i < 7TG < 7T F => AG >
Proof. See Appendix 2A.
Following the foregoing discussion, the intuition for this result should be quite clear 
and has a simple representation in Fig. 2-3. Citizens that believe there is very little 
difference between the candidates (compared to the cost of voting) have little benefit from 
acquiring information: the expected utility from an informed versus an uninformed choice 
is very limited as not much difference is expected. Citizens who are extremely independent 
in their evaluation of candidates can therefore be better classified as indifferent: they 
will tend to attach little value to politics in general and therefore will remain generally 
uninformed. As priors become more and more ideological, the demand for information 
will increase, as the value of an informed decision increases too. The value of information 
reaches its maximum for those citizens that are exactly indifferent between voting or 
not: for such agents observing the realization of a carries a probability 1 of breaking 
the indifference. If we assume that indifferent 12 agents will abstain, there is a very high 
probability of a realization occurring in, for example, AO , thus making information 
extremely valuable. We will call the agents in a neighbourhood of this point independent. 
Starting from this maximum, the value of information will instead decrease monotonically 
for further increases in ideology. This happens when citizens's prior are strong enough to 
induce them to vote if uninformed: holding very strong priors means also to believe that 
it is not worth to acquire new information. We will refer to those agents as partisan.
It should be noted that Proposition 2.4 is stated for a given C. However, as C increases
12 Note that the word "indifferent" here is used with a different meaning (indifference between voting 
and abstaining) with respect to the previously mentioned indifference between candidates.
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Figure 2-3: The Value of Information
, s.t./P[VrV(a)]dF^(a)=C
A
s. t./P[V(a)- VJdF+] (a)=C
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we should expect the number of uninformed agents to increase: citizens that, in spite of 
being sufficiently ideological, have a very high cost of voting (think for example of citizens 
living outside their home country) can be expected to remain rationally ignorant. 
It is now possible to proceed, linking information and turnout.
Proposition 2.5
Pr f)O 
  0 for abstainers and — an < 0 for strongly ideological citizens.dQ
Proof. See Appendix 2A.
For abstainers the situation is analogous to that presented for a non-partisan polity in 
Proposition 2.2: information can only increase the probability of voting for citizens that 
would otherwise abstain with certainty. Things are just the opposite for partisans: infor- 
mation could lead them to discover that candidates are not as distant as they perceived, 
thus inducing them not to incur the cost of voting. Thus, the impact of information on 
turnout depends on ideology.
It is important, at this point, to understand what is the effect of ideology on turnout. 
A number of empirical studies tend to show that ideology matters for voting decisions13 . 
This is quite intuitive and in line with what most political scientists would argue. Here, 
however, we found that ideology matters also for information acquisition and, in turn,
3 See for example Palfrey and Poole (1987).
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that information matters for turnout. What is the final effect of ideology on turnout then? 
Proposition 2.6 provides a result that takes into account the existence of both a direct 
and an indirect (via information acquisition) effect. Our conclusion is that the indirect 
effect is not enough to contradict the basic intuition that more ideological citizens are 
more prone to vote.
Proposition 2.6 TT F > TT G > TT O =>  Pr(O\F] > Pr(O\G); TT F < TT G < TT O => Pr(I\F] > 
Pr(I\G). If the function \V(a) — V/| is symmetric around 0 then for any two prior 
distributions F(-) and G(-) |TTF | > |TT G | => Pr(T = l\F] > Pr(T = l\G]
Proof. See Appendix 2A.
All the results presented in this and the previous section are given for a fixed cost of 
voting. The extensions of these results considering that C could be not constant across 
the population is straightforward and will be omitted. As long as C is independent of 
other characteristics, results for the whole population will not be affected.
Before moving to the empirical analysis, we can now spend a few words on the im- 
pact of information on collective choice. We proved that weakly non-ideological citizens 
increase their likelihood to vote when informed, while strongly ideological ones increase 
their likelihood to abstain. It is then clear that more information increases the chances to 
win of the better politician. It is therefore also worth attempting to spell out the implica- 
tions of our results, although derived in a decision-theoretical context, for the literature 
on information aggregation that associates better information with an higher likelihood 
of turnout. Our model delivers such a link but also makes it conditional on voters' prior 
beliefs. Information is good also because it can induce abstention of otherwise uninformed 
extremists: this, clearly, makes no harm (and is actually beneficial) to the possibility of 
information aggregation to occur. At the same time, we can argue that the possibility of 
information aggregation in elections should be related to a number of individual (often 
observable) characteristics as well as to specific characteristics of the environment, mainly 
related to information supply by the mass media.
We are now ready to move to empirical investigation and test the predictions of our 
theoretical analysis for what concerns turnout. As a by-product, and although this is not 
the main task of this work, we will also be able to test most of the theoretical conclusions 
we reached about information acquisition.
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2.5 The data
We will now proceed to verify the compatibility of our theoretical results with data. Em- 
pirical investigation will concern the 1997 general election in the United Kingdom 14 . Data 
on England, Scotland and Wales will be used; the political situation in Northern Ireland 
is substantially different from the rest of the country as the main cleavage is between the 
Catholic and Protestant populations rather than on the usual left-right dimension.
In the U.K. members of parliament (MPs) are elected one in each electoral con- 
stituency in a first past the post system. Since the executive needs the support of the 
parliament, the election is won by the party which obtains the larger number of MPs. 
Party leaders are candidates to become prime ministers; nevertheless, they need to win 
in their own constituency to be elected MP.
There are two major parties, Conservative and Labour, although other parties manage 
to win in some constituencies. In particular, the Liberal-Democratic party is well estab- 
lished nationally as the third force in the political arena. In Scotland, the independentist 
Scottish National Party is more than a third force, winning normally even more con- 
stituencies than the Conservatives. In the election we consider, the 1997 general election, 
the Labour party obtained a neat victory after 17 years of Conservative governments.
Our main source of data is the British General Election Study (BGES); this is a survey 
consisting of 3615 individual observations about voters who were interviewed a short time 
after the election took place. We had to drop a certain number of observations because 
some respondents did not answer all of the questions we used. For our purposes we will 
use in most cases a sample of 2769 observations.
The qualifying date for electoral registration expired several months before the election 
day 15 . We are interested in information acquisition and turnout of potential voters; clearly 
the motivations of non-registered voters are not captured in our model, at least if we think 
of the electoral campaign as the central moment to acquire information about candidates. 
Thus, only registered voters will be considered 16 .
The first hurdle is to find a way to measure information. How can we measure political
H The election was held on the 1st of May 1997. 
15 That was 10th October 1996.
16 This implies dropping a very limited number of observations. All estimations have been replicated 
including those observations and no relevant changes have been noticed.
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knowledge? What is relevant for voting decisions? Is there any risk to bias the assessment 
with our priorities? Fortunately, as we noticed in Chapter 1, there is evidence of high 
correlations in the probabilities to be informed on any relevant political issues17 , and we 
can exploit the limited information we have with some confidence.
The BGES is particularly suited for the purpose of our analysis. Among other ques- 
tions concerning the election, respondents received two sets of questions that can be used 
to establish how much they know about politics. In a first set of questions they were asked 
to write down as many candidates' names in their constituency as they could remember 
(with a maximum of 6). These names have then been checked and a point has been given 
for each correct answer. In a second set of questions, respondents received 7 statements 
on the British political and institutional system and were asked to say if they were true 
or false 18 . For each correct answer to these questions a score of 0.66 has been attributed 
to the agent 19 . The scores in the two set of questions have then been added up into a 
variable (INFO] that will be used as a measure of how much people know about British 
politics. This ranges from 0 to 10.62. An approximate graphical representation of the 
distribution of INFO is reported in fig. 2-4. The continuous density function reported 
is normal with mean and variance of the observed INFO (see tab. 1 in Appendix 2B) 20 .
Another problem arises when measuring ideology. Disposition variables such as a 
person's interest in politics, sense of political efficacy etc. have been found to be quite 
important explanatory variables for electoral turnout. However, there are some reasons 
to be cautious about their usage. It is possible for example that the answer to these 
questions are respondents' rationalizations of their behaviour; also, it has been shown 
that responses sometimes are quite sensitive to the order of questions, which casts doubts 
on the validity of such indicators21 . Nevertheless, to test some of our conclusions we need 
to rely on this type of information.
Two possible measures of partisanship are considered. One is the classical left-right 
self-placement, with zero being the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. We will trans-
I7 Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
I8 Statements are reported in Appendix B.
19 The different weight is derived by Bayes rule: see Appendix B for details.
20 It is possible to combine questions in different ways or to use only one of the two sets of questions to 
derive different indicators of political awareness. Such variations have limited impact on our results.
21 See for example Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1984) and Abramson, Silver, and Anderson 
(1987)
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form this variable by pulling together corresponding levels of extremism on both sides. 
This leads to a variable (Left — Rightl] that assumes a value of zero if the original vari- 
able was 5, 1 if it was 4 and 6 etc. As a large number of respondents could not or did 
not want to place themselves in such scale, we end up with a smaller sample size. Some 
observations can be recovered by including at least a part of the non-respondents among 
the least ideological: this variable is then called Left - Rightl. Further details can be 
found in Appendix 2B.
The second indicator (Party) measures instead how close respondents feel to their 
preferred party (if any) and has been built up by combining three questions. A full 
description of the variable Party can be found in Appendix 2B.
The survey also includes information on a number of individual and household char- 
acteristics that can be used both as control variables or to test some specific predictions 
of our theory, and in particular those concerning information acquisition.
Household income is grouped, with 1 being the lowest and 16 the highest category. A 
few hundred of the interviewed refused to disclose information on income and this is the 
main reason for dropping part of the observations. The dataset does not contain instead 
any information on wage rates, that could be taken as a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
information gathering. We can use instead the number of hours spent on work (Hours). 
In spite of the common anecdotal evidence about reading newspapers at work (or, more 
recently, surfing the net), political information acquisition and time spent at work should 
not normally be considered as competitive ways of allocating time, at least for most 
people. If economic theory induces to think in those terms is probably because most of 
the literature on time allocation has concerned labour supply. In our case choosing how 
to allocate a given leisure time is probably a more appropriate description of the choice 
faced by agents: thus, the number of hours spent at work gives enough information in this 
sense. It should be clear that in this way we are not capturing a substitution effect but 
rather an endowment (of leisure) effect. Although it does not seem to appear in empirical 
literature on turnout, Hours has also been used as an explanatory variable in the turnout 
equation to take into account the opportunity cost of voting on the day of the election, 
as this took place in a normal working day (Thursday).
The survey contains information on a number of socioeconomic characteristics that, 
in terms of our model, represent the parameters on each agent's production function of
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information. These are education, sex, age, marital status and many more; while for some 
variables their link with the capability to acquire, process, and retain information seems 
quite obvious, other will mainly reflect the different networking possibilities of the various 
agents. Moreover they will be used as control variables in the turnout equation.
Information on the use of mass media has also been used. We know if the respondent 
regularly reads a newspaper and which one. In particular it is possible to distinguish 
between the regular readers of quality newspapers and the rest of the population. Details 
are reported in Appendix 2B. Information on canvassing and phone contacts between the 
interviewed and party representatives has also been used both to know whether respon- 
dents had information provided directly by parties and to infer about the effort of parties 
in different constituencies.
The BGES reports the electoral constituency of each observation. It is then possible 
to match this dataset with electoral results to measure the effect of election closeness 
on turnout probability22 . Closeness is measured using the percentage difference between 
the winning candidate and the runner up in the constituency. This requires some kind 
of rational expectations assumption or, simply, the fact that people know about pre- 
electoral polls and that those polls are substantially correct. Other possibilities23 have 
been considered instead, all giving the same results.
Information on the provenance of each observation has been used to match the BGES 
data with the Census (1991) data, to check for possible effects due to some relevant 
characteristics of the local environment, like unemployment rates, average education levels 
etc24 .
In general, our attempt will be to include all the variables that, for different reasons, 
have been considered by the empirical literature on turnout (see for example Matsusaka 
and Palda, 1999). For this reason the list of variables is quite long, and the standard 
errors are often high because of multicollinearity. However, this strategy should lead to 
robust results for what concerns our variables of interest.
22 Data on electoral results are taken from Boothroyd (2002).
"Instead of using the results of the current election (using then a rational expectation argument), it 
is possible in principle to use past elections. One serious limitation is in this case represented by the 
fact that the boundaries of most constituencies were changed between 1992 (the year of the previous 
general election) and 1997. Also, it can be argued that constituencies' size matters for the probability 
to be pivotal and therefore absolute and not percentage differences should be used. We have tried these 
different alternatives and the results are not sensitive to the changes.
24 Data from the Census are at the level of Districts, local administration units reported in the BGES.
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Finally, to test for potential endogeneity of information in the turnout equation, we 
will use four instrumental variables that are assumed to affect information acquisition but 
not turnout directly. We will introduce them in the next section.
Data description and summary statistics are reported in Appendix 2B.
2.6 Estimation strategy and empirical specification
2.6.1 Information and turnout without ideology
A number of testable predictions were derived in section 2.3, concerning information 
acquisition and the positive link between information and turnout. This sub-section il- 
lustrates the estimation strategy to test those results, with a special focus on the role of 
information as an explanatory variable for turnout; we would like to be able to estab- 
lish a causal link between the two, and for this purpose we need to deal with potential 
endogeneity problems.
We can start by defining a citizens' utility from voting as P\ f[V(a) — Vi]f(a)da\ — C, 
where /(a) can be a degenerate distribution in the case of an informed voter. For the 
purpose of empirical investigation we will also consider non-instrumental voting, including 
the benefit derived from fulfilling a civic duty D to define the variable
#0 = p\ l(V(a) - Vi]f(a)da\ + D-C. (2.10) 
BQ is a latent (unobservable) variable and turnout T is a binary indicator such that
T = 1 if BQ > 0 
T = 0 if B0 < 0
We can approximate BQ by using a linear random utility model:
£0 = /3'X + e (2.11) 
where X is a vector of characteristics of the individual considered and of the environment25
25 This includes a vector of Is, and therefore (3 includes a constant term.
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(including P] and e is a white noise disturbance including the non-instrumental benefit 
D (some imperfect indicators of the sense of civic duty can however be included in X). 
We can then say that
Pr[T = 1|X] = Pr[50 > 0|X] (2.12)
= Pr[e < /3'X] = F(/3'X)
Appropriate assumptions over the distribution F(-) will allow estimation of the (2.12) 
by maximum likelihood. We will assume F(-) is the logistic distribution function and 
therefore we will estimate Pr[T = 1|X] by maximum likelihood logit.
In most empirical literature turnout is estimated using some analogous procedure. We 
will start by using our data to estimate equation (2.12), including all the variables that 
have traditionally been identified as relevant. Results are reported in tab. 2.3 and will 
be discussed in the next section.
Let us now introduce political information and indicate by q the realization of the 
random variable q after t and k have been acquired and before voting We can then say 
that
T = 1 if B0 > 0 and q = 1
T = 0 if (50 >0and q = 0}orB0 <0
For simplicity we will define a new latent variable BI(BQ, q) and choose a linear represen- 
tation of the form
e (2.13)
We then have that
Pr[T = l\INFO,X] = F^INFO+faX) (2.14)
where we replaced q with its observable counterpart INFO. Estimating the (2.14) is 
a correct procedure only if information acquisition is orthogonal to turnout. In Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer (1996), for example, people are randomly informed or uninformed about 
the true state of the world. However, the benefit D in equation (2.1) can be an important
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motivation for voting, in the same way b in (2.4) is for information acquisition. The two 
types of psychic benefit are very likely to be correlated.
Therefore information could be an endogenous explanatory variable and the coefficient 
estimates of (2.14) biased. To overcome this potential problem we will then estimate the 
following triangular system, where i refers to a generic observation (citizen) in our sample:
INFOi = aiXi + QaZj + uu (2.15)
Bl = (3l INFOl +f3'2Xl +u2i (2.16)
Ti = 1 if Bi > 0
Tz = 0 if Bl < 0
where X is again a vector of covariates representing both individual and constituency 
characteristics and assumed to affect both turnout and information. Our identifying 
covariates are represented by the vector Z: these explanatory variables are assumed to 
affect political knowledge but not directly the turnout decision.
It is clear that if this is the structural model, then simple probit estimates of (2.16) 
will suffer of endogeneity bias as the two error terms uu and u-a are correlated . By using 
instrumental variables we should also be able to assess the relevance of this bias.
Treating INFO as & continuous variable, the system is estimated in two steps. Equa- 
tion (2.15) is a reduced form containing all the exogenous covariates of our model. The 
first step consists of estimating the reduced form (2.15) by OLS and get the residuals 
un = INFOi - SjXi - a'2 Z,.
We can then estimate the equation
(2.17)
by logit maximum likelihood. This provides both consistent (though not efficient) 
estimates of O^,/?^), as well as an endogeneity test: if /33 is insignificant we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that INFO is weakly exogenous in the turnout equation.
The vector Z is composed of four variables that are assumed to influence information 
acquisition but not directly turnout. The variable Salience attempts at capturing the
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salience on media of each constituency during the electoral campaign26 . For this purpose 
information from a major national newspaper, The Guardian, has been used. Salience 
consists of a dummy equal to 1 if an article focusing on the electoral contest of a specific 
constituency appeared on this newspaper during the campaign. There is no specific 
reason for using The Guardian apart from the fact that it is a national quality newspaper 
and its archive is easily accessible: any newspaper with the same characteristics could 
be used instead, the only purpose being to capture salience (not just on newspapers). 
Our assumption is that people living in more salient constituencies are more exposed to 
political information and therefore, for a given effort in news-gathering, will know more 
about politics in the day of the election.
A second instrument is bbclOO. This is a dummy equal to 1 for citizens living in 
constituencies on which the BBC decided to focus its attention on the night of the election 
(these are listed on the BBC web page): they were the expected closest 100 Consevative- 
held constituencies (and therefore the decisive ones as the Conservative were commonly 
expected to loose constituencies). They were described on the BBC web-page as "the 
battleground" of the election: we expect these constituencies to get larger media coverage 
during the electoral campaign.
A third instrument is represented by a dummy variable (big-shot) equal to 1 when a 
nationally relevant politician was candidate in the constituency. We define as big-shots all 
the current and past members of cabinet, the members of the Labour "shadow-cabinet" 
and the leader of the third major party (Liberal-Democratic), Paddy Ashdown27 . Finally, 
we include an instrument on media usage: a dummy equal to 1 if the agent reads regularly 
a quality newspaper.
It is known that the estimated standard errors from this method are not correct. 
However, Monte Carlo evidence tend to show that the asymptotically correct standard 
errors are no more effective in large finite samples than the conditional standard errors 
(see Guilkey, Mroz, and Taylor, 1992). Nevertheless, to overcome any potential prob- 
lems, standard errors of relevant variables have been estimated by bootstrap (with 1000
26 This is defined as the last 30 days before the election day.
27 A "shadow-cabinet" is put in place by the opposition party and is composed by those who, in case of 
victory, most likely will become ministers. A shadow foreign secretary, for example, follows very closely 
the government foreign policy and is supposed to be able to control and propose alternatives. This makes 
shadow-cabinet members quite popular on the media.
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repetitions).
Associated with this two-step logit regression model there is an endogeneity test to 
determine whether there is overlapping between the set of unobservables affecting equa- 
tions (2.15) and (2.16). It consists of a simple t-test for significance of the coefficient (33 
of the estimated error term.
Finally we will test the validity of the instruments. This can be done in several 
different ways. One possibility is to compare a logit regression of turnout on all exogenous 
variables and instruments (unrestricted model, first column of Tab. 2.6) with the same 
regression where instruments are excluded but fitted values from the first stage regression 
are included (restricted model, fourth column of Tab. 2.4); ideally, we would like the two 
to be not "too different": we can then perform a chi-square test based on the likelihood 
function. Another possible method will be discussed later, when results are presented.
2.6.2 Information, turnout, and ideology
The first step in analysing the role of ideology is to estimate the information function 
in order to test proposition 2.4. As noticed in the previous sub-section, estimating the 
(2.15) is interesting for the sake of understanding the determinants of political knowledge 
and testing our proposition 2.1. Ideology is considered by estimating the equation
INFOl = a\Xi + a'2 Z, + a3IDz + u, (2.18)
where ID represents one of the three measures of ideology introduced in the previous 
section (Left — rightl, Left — right?,, and Party). Suppose there are K types of citizens 
ranked according to their degree of ideological motivation. Then ID is a categorical 
variable and we will introduce K — I dummies in the regression. We expect to find a non- 
monotonic pattern in such dummies, where estimated parameters should first increase 
with ideology and then decrease. Estimation is by OLS.
We can finally turn to the impact of ideology on turnout, and in particular to how 
the effects of information on turnout differ according to ideology. This will be done by
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estimating the equation
J52 = PJNFOi + /JjXi + /33 /A + 04/A x INFOi + u2i (2.19)
TI = 1 if 52 > 0
TJ = Oif B2 <0, i = 1,...,W.
Differently from the (2.18), now ID is treated as a continuous variable, in order
to interact it with INFO. Indicating with INFO the average of INFO, we expect
/33 + /34 x INFO > 0 (from proposition 2.6), and /34 < 0 (from proposition 2.5).
2.7 Results
We start by running a logit regression of turnout on a set of variables that both theoretical 
and empirical literature have identified as relevant. Estimations of (2.12) are reported in 
Table 2.3. In column 2 income, education and churchgoer are considered as categorical 
variables, in column 1 they are numerical variables (thus we impose a linear restriction). 
Although we can accept such a restriction for any of these variables in isolation, this is not 
true for the three together, as a comparison of the log-likelihood scores would formally 
show. Therefore in the subsequent analysis we will only consider the case where fixed 
effects for all three variables are included. However, all results do not change in any 
substantial respect.
As previously explained, our list of explanatory variables is as comprehensive as pos- 
sible. This means most variables are correlated, implying relatively high standard errors. 
The sign of coefficients show some surprises if compared with most previous findings. The 
most significant explanatory variables (at 5% significance level and above in both columns) 
are voted92, married, hours, canvasser, churchgoer, and income. Education significance 
level is just below 5%. More surprisingly, age and sex seem to be completely irrelevant. 
The fact that past voting behaviour is an extremely important explanatory variable rein- 
forces the idea that there are relevant individual-specific unobservables in driving turnout 
behaviour. However, this variable is also correlated with other explanatory variables. 
Column 3 in Table 2.3 presents results for a slightly more parsimonious model where 
voted92 and hours (a variable not normally considered in the voting literature) have been
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excluded: these estimates have a decidedly more "traditional" flavour with age below the 
5% significance level and sex much closer to it. Our data show therefore no real surprises 
in this sense.
It should also be noted the result on the marginality of the electoral constituency, 
an issue that has received careful attention in the literature, with quite controversial 
results. We find that the closeness of the election has the expected sign but also that its 
significance is definitely too low to be considered of any relevance28 . Other socioeconomic 
characteristics of constituencies also do not have any significant impact; once again, most 
of the effect at the constituency level is captured by aggregate turnout. The weekly 
number of hours spent at work proves to be an important explanatory variable, although 
being neglected so far by empirical research.
In table 2.4 we report estimates of the turnout equation when we include information. 
Looking at the first two columns29 , it is clear that INFO is a good predictor of turnout; 
both its magnitude and significance level seem to suggest that information is amongst the 
most important explanatory variables for voters' electoral participation. This result is 
very robust to variations in the specification adopted. Education now becomes completely 
insignificant, because of an obviously high correlation with INFO and suggesting that 
the effect of education on turnout is mainly driven by information. Age has a negative 
and convex effect (although still not significant at 5% level). This could suggest that the 
positive effect of age that some studies seem to find could be due to the larger experience 
and knowledge of political matters that older people might have accumulated during their 
lives: apart from this (and remembering that we also control for the number of hours spent 
at work) age tends to have a negative impact on voting, as one would expect considering 
that the elderly are on average less fit and therefore have an higher cost of going to the 
poll station.
We still need to address the potential endogeneity problem that might occur when 
regressing turnout on information. Results of the first stage regressions (2.15) are shown 
in Table 2.5. These regressions are also of interest for their own sake, as they can be seen as 
estimates of a political-knowledge function. Since our main equation is the (2.16), we are
28 Although its significance raises considerably when we drop the aggregate turnout variable. 
29 As before, the only difference between the two is that in the second some variables are treated as 
categorical.
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not making any attempt to have a correct specification of the demand for information. 
Equation (2.15) is then just a reduced form that makes use of all available exogenous 
variables: this can affect efficiency but not consistency of estimates.
The first thing to note is that our instruments are significant and show the expected 
sign. They are clearly correlated as they try to capture similar effects and this makes 
their individual significance even more remarkable. Among other exogenous variables, 
both education and income are very strong predictors of political knowledge; it should 
not be overlooked the fact that we get this result in spite of controlling for the most 
important covariates that are normally used to explain income in itself. It is then possible 
to conclude quite safely that political information can be treated as a normal good.
Age and sex have very strong effects; the first probably because, as we said, more 
experienced citizens have attained a larger "stock" of political knowledge, the second re- 
flecting different networking possibilities some time faced by members of the two sexes, 
as well as different forms of socialising in general. The length of residence in a given con- 
stituency and union membership could also capture experience and networking effects; in 
the case of trade unions, they often spend a remarkable effort in informing their members 
about political matters, especially related to labour policy.
There is significant correlation between information and the number of hours devoted 
to work. Following the discussion on this point in the previous section, it is reasonable to 
assume that, being the leisure time of full time workers lower, the opportunity cost of time 
devoted to information gathering is higher, as confirmed by the sign of the coefficient.
As a general comment on individual-level variables, it is possible to conclude that the 
personal technology used in receiving, processing and retaining news plays a crucial role 
in information acquisition. These are the parameters that in the model we indicated by 
E and whose signs are very well predicted by our theory: they all appear to be significant 
predictors of political knowledge.
Constituency-level variables, differently from what happens in the turnout equation, 
matter for information. First of all voters are substantially more informed in constituen- 
cies with closer competitions. The effect of closeness on political knowledge is definitely 
stronger than that on turnout (compare Tab. 2.5 with Tab. 2.3). This could simply be 
due to the fact that politicians and parties put more effort in marginal constituencies (as 
suggested for example in Aldrich, 1993, and Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). However, we
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control for this by using a measure of party effort in each constituency. As an alternative 
interpretation, it is possible that the individual demand for political information increases 
when the probability to be a pivotal voter is higher: this would provide evidence of an- 
other form of voters' rational behaviour. Such conjecture will be then investigated more 
closely in Chapter 4.
The effect of education at the constituency level is rather unclear, with the percentage 
of higher degrees having a positive effect and that of degrees a negative one (although less 
sizeable and less significant). Quite surprisingly unemployment rate increases political 
awareness.
Voters are also better informed in constituencies that received a more extensive news- 
paper coverage during the electoral campaign, as shown by salience; mass media seem 
to be quite effective in improving the knowledge citizens have about political matters, as 
shown also by the sizeable effect of being a quality-paper reader as well as by bbclOO.
Let us turn to the endogeneity issue now. For this purpose we run a logit regression 
of turnout including among the covariates both observed information and fitted residuals 
from the first stage regression. In the third column of Tab. 2.4 it is possible to see that 
the sign of INFO is unchanged and its magnitude much larger. Although the z-statistic 
is now substantially lower, information is still comfortably significant at the 5% level. 
However, even more importantly, residuals are not significant; thus, on the basis of this 
evidence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that information is weakly exogenous in 
the turnout equation. The overidentification test presented in the previous section is 
easily passed by our instruments: twice the difference between the log-likelihood of the 
equation in the first column of Table 2.6 and the equation in the fourth column of Table 
2.4 is 1 and a chi-test is passed very comfortably. To this we can add a further test, 
reported in the second column of Table 2.6. If INFO is exogenous then the validity of 
instruments can be checked by including in the turnout equation both INFO and the four 
instrumental variables. If instruments are valid then the log-likelihood of this equation 
should be not too different from the restricted model when the four instruments are 
excluded. Comparing column two in Table 2.6 with column two in Table 2.4, we find that 
the log-likelihood ratio statistic for this restriction is equal to 4.18. With four degrees of 
freedom this test statistic is not significant at the 30% level.
Thus, from Table 2.6 we can conclude that the endogeneity test reported in the third
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column of Tab. 2.4 is valid. Although, as one would expect, it is clear from the first 
stage regression that there are several variables driving both information and turnout, 
nevertheless we can safely assume that none of them has been omitted and therefore we 
can refer to the estimates of Tab. 2.4 as substantially correct. This will also allow us to 
proceed in further estimations ignoring the endogeneity issue.
We can now analyse the impact of ideology on information acquisition. Estimates of 
the (2.18) are reported in table 2.7. They support the predictions of our model. In the case 
of left-right self-placement, both Left-rightl and Left-rightS deliver similar conclusions. 
As compared with the omitted types (the least ideological), political knowledge first 
increases, reaching its peak (both in parameter size and significance) at the third category, 
then decreases and becomes insignificant for the last category: thus, the most ideological 
types are not significantly different from the least ones. When using party identification 
results are very similar. The peak is now in the fourth (out of five) category and both 
the second and the fifth ones are not significantly different from the first one.
Coming to turnout, our theory shows overall a good compatibility with data analysis. 
Both INFO and all our measures of ideology have the expected signs and are significant.
First of all, the sign of /33 -t-/34 x INFO is positive in all cases, which confirms once more 
the important role of ideology in fostering turnout . Remarkably, the interaction term has 
always a negative sign, although it is significant only when we use party identification as 
an indicator of ideology. Party identification, however, is also the variable that shows a 
larger added value to our regression, as shown by the Pseudo-R2 statistic. It seems clear 
that our theory of the role of ideology in elections fits the case of party identification much 
better than that of left-right self-placement. This, overall, seems to provide evidence of 
an indirect effect of ideology (in the form of party identification) that, as we have seen 
in theory, can push towards a reduced turnout when information in received. The role 
of information is clearly more subtle here than before. Other things equal, information 
increases turnout on average even when we control for ideology (the sign of /3 2 + /?4 x ID 
is always positive); this, however, is not true any more for extremists. Take for example 
an agent with Party Identification = 5. In this case the marginal effect of information 
is 0.609   0.129 x 5 =  0.045. More in general, it seems clear that the positive impact of 
information on turnout tends to vanish (and, in the limit, to be reverted) with increasing 
ideology, accordingly with our theoretical predictions.
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the interactions between ideology, political information acquisition 
and electoral turnout and provides empirical evidence about their links. Information ac- 
quisition is modelled as an individual production function: citizens "produce" their own 
information by using mass media and time. Voters are endowed with different technolo- 
gies, reflecting their ability to acquire, process and retain information. The parameters 
that determine different productivities are then represented by a series of individual char- 
acteristics like education, income, age etc. as well as by the supply of information, in the 
form of mass media coverage of political issues. This theoretical analysis leads to testable 
propositions about the links between individual and environmental characteristics and 
political knowledge.
The demand for political information also depends on ideological prior beliefs on 
candidates. In particular, it is possible to show that the least informed citizens are those 
with the weakest and the strongest ideological beliefs. In the first case, agents are so 
indifferent between candidates that the expected benefit of acquiring information does 
not cover its costs: contrarily to common wisdom, extremely "independent" citizens can 
be far from the ideal that a participative vision of democracy would require. At the same 
time, people with extreme prior beliefs will be confident enough in their opinions and 
again will not (ex ante) find useful to acquire information. Thus, we expect the most 
informed citizens to be slightly partizan: a moderate amount of ideology can therefore be 
useful to the functioning of democratic systems.
We then link ideology and information to turnout. While information has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of voting of non-ideological agents, it has instead a negative effect 
on the ideologized. Since those with strong priors are more likely to vote in the "wrong" 
way, this result confirms the importance of information for good collective decision-making 
and public officials accountability.
Our theory is capable of explaining most typical results of empirical research, like the 
positive effect of education on turnout. Moreover, through the interaction between ideol- 
ogy and information acquisition, we can derive new predictions: of particular relevance is 
the fact that information should have a positive impact on turnout only for non-partisan 
voters.
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Empirical evidence on the 1997 general election in the United Kingdom is provided. 
Using a number of questions about candidate names and British politics in general, we can 
build up a measure of political knowledge that can be used to analyse the information- 
turnout relationship. Information is one of the most relevant and robust predictors of 
turnout. We estimate this relationship using both a simple logit and a two-step instru- 
mental variables logit: in both cases the idea that political information is relevant for 
turnout seems well supported. More generally, we can safely conclude that our theoreti- 
cal model shows a high degree of compatibility with data. As a by-product of this analysis 
we are also able to assess the role of individual and environmental characteristics on po- 
litical awareness. From our estimates it is also clear that mass media are very important 
in determining political knowledge and, through this channel, electoral turnout.
This analysis has consequences for the way to think of the role of information and 
mass media in democratic systems. Overall, our findings show that information matters 
for electoral behaviour, thus contradicting the "behaviour irrelevance" hypothesis. There 
is instead some compatibility with the "outcome irrelevance" hypothesis. However, by 
taking information as exogenous, models leading to full information equivalence neglect 
incentives to acquire information. We show that, instead, in a very polarized polity, little 
information acquisition will occur, and ideology rather than information could determine 
policy outcomes. The same can happen to an extremely non-polarized population.
A consolidated research shows the importance of information in agency relations; a 
more recent and fast growing literature consistently finds evidence of a link between public 
officials' performance and information availability. By unveiling the impact of information 
on turnout, this chapter shows a possible rationale for politicians' responsiveness to an 
informed public opinion. We can conclude that mass media and voters' personal resources 
play a crucial role in democratic decision-making: fermally democratic institutions might 
be emptied of their substantial content if good political information is either unavailable 
or beyond most voters' reach.
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2.9 Appendix 2A: proof of results
Proof of Lemma 2.1 A = f[W*(a) - W\f(a)da. 
Remember that
and define
Also
which means
W*(a) = maxT(P|F(a) - V/| - C)
W* = max{0,P / \V(a) - VI \f(a)da - C}
W = maxTPl [V(a) - VI\f(a}da - C)
W = max{0,P| f(V(a) - VI]f(a)da - C} 
For A to be positive it is sufficient to prove that
max{0, f \V(a) - VI \f(a)da - C,0} > max{0, | f[V(a) - Vf]f(a}da\ - C}
J J
If we define
A- = {a: [V(a] - Vj] < 0} 
A+ = {a: (V(a) - Vj] > 0}
then it is clear that
l\V(a)-VI \f(a}da = f (V(a) - VI}f(a}da + f [Vr - V(a)]f(a}daJ JA+ JA-
\ I V(a) - VIf(a}da = \ f [V(a] - VI}f(a}da - f (Vj - V(a)\f(a)da\J JA+ JA-
from which
j\V(a)-VI \f(a}da-C> f[V(a) - VI}f(a)da\ - C
*/ J
If Pf \V(a) - y/|/(a)da < C then W* = 0. But then 2A.1 implies that | f[V(a) 
VI}f(a)da < C and therefore W = O.I
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Proof of Proposition 2.2 Let us indicate with q   {0, 1} the fact of being ex post 
informed (q = 1) or not (q = 0). For an uninformed citizen we have
Pr(T = 1 :g = 0) = 0 
while for an (ex post) informed citizen, the probability to vote (ex ante) is
Pr(T = l:g = l)
= I dF(a) + I dF(a) > 0 
JA, JA0
where AI and AQ are the sets denned in (2.9).
If P[V(a) -VI]>C and P[Vt - V(0)} > C then Pr(T = l|g = 1) > 0. 
The probability to vote is then given by the probability to be informed multiplied by 
the probability to vote when informed, i.e.
= QPr(T=l|g=l) (2A.2) 
from which the result follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 From the 2A.2 we have that
Pr(T= l\E,M,w,r) = Q(E, M>,r)Pr(T = l\q = 1)
We also know from Proposition 2.1 that
' ' ' ; >0
dE
from which it follows that
Pr(T= l\E,M,w,r) _
dE ~ dE
Similarly we can prove the rest of the proposition.I
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Proof of Proposition 2.4 Let us focus on the positive part of the diagram in Figure 
2.3. Cases 3) and 4) refer respectively to weak and strong O-ideologies. Analysis 
will apply analogously to cases 1) and 2) (respectively strong and weak I-ideologies). 
Consider first a weakly O-ideological citizen. The value of information in such case 
is given by the probability information will induce a switch to a vote for I plus the 
probability it will induce a vote for 0, i.e.
A = / (P[Vi - V(a)] - C}dF(a} + / (P[V(a) - Vi] - C)dF(a) 
JAi JAo
Given two distributions F and G we want to prove that irp > KG => ^F > &G l - e -
I (P{V: - V(a}} - C)dF(a] - I (P[Vj - V(a)} - C)dG(a) + 
JAr JA;
I (P[V(a) - Vj] - C)dF(a) - f (P(V(a) - Vf ] - C}dG(a) (2A.3)
JAn JAo
> 0
Define s(a) = [V(a) - Vf}. Assumption 2.4 implies
Ps(a)[f(a) - g(a)]da - / C(f(a) - g(a}}da 
A, JA,
Ps(a}{f(a)-g(a)}da- f C(f(a] - g(a)}da
JAn
> 0
Ps(a)dF(a) - f CdF(a)
+ f Ps(a)dG(a] '+ f CdG(a) -\ 
JAI -'A,
I Ps(a}dF(a] - I CdF(a) 
JAo JAo
- I Ps(a)dG(a) + I CdG(a)
JAn JAn
> 0
2A3.
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Now consider a strongly O-ideological citizen. The value of information is in this case 
given by:
A = f 2P[V; - V(a)\dF(a) + I (P[Vf - V(a}\ + C)dF(a) 
JA, JAA
i.e. the value due to a potential shift to a change in favour of / plus the value due to a 
shift in favour of abstention. Now we want to prove that -KF > ^G =^ &-F < &G i- e -
2P[Vf - V(a}}dF(a) + f (P[Vi - V(a}} + C)dF(a) - 
JAA
2P[VI -V(a)\)dG(a}- I (P[V> - V(a}} + C)dG(a) (2A.4) 
, JAA
< 0 
It will be useful to adopt the following notation:
A! = [a, a]
A A = [a, a]
AO = [a, a]
Integrating the 2 A. 4 by parts we get:
2P[Vj - V(a)}F(a) - 2P[Vf - V(a)]F(a) -f / 2PV' (a)F(a)da
JA,
S) ~ (P{Vi - V(a)} + C)F(a] + PV' (a)F(a)da •JAA
-2P[Vi - V(a)]G(a) + 2P[Vf - V(a)}G(a) - f 2PV' (a)G(a}da -
JA,
-(P[Vf - V(§)] + C)G(a) + (P(Vi - V(a)} + C}G(a) - PV' (a)G(a)daJAA
Now notice that
2P[Vj - V(a)]F(a) = 2P[Vj - ^ (a)]G(a) = 0 
P(V! - V(a}} = C 
P[Vi - y(S)] - ~C.
We are left with
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2CF(a) + I IPV'(a)F(a)da 
JA,
-(C + C}F(a} + I PV'(a}F(a)da- 
JAA
-2CG(a)- f 2PV'(a)G(a)da - 
JA,
C}G(a)- f PV'(a)G(a}da 
JAA
Therefore
AF -AG = / 2PV'(a)[F(a}-G(a)}da 
JA,
PV'(a}(F(a)-G(a)\da 
AA
But F(a) < G(a)Va which implies Af < AG .H
Proof of Proposition 2.5 The proof in the case of weakly-ideological citizens proceeds 
along the lines of the proof of proposition 2.2.
When agents are strongly-ideological we have, for uninformed citizens
Pr(T = 1|<7 = 0) = 1 
while for an (ex post) informed citizen, the probability (ex ante) to vote is
1 > Pr(T= l\q = 1) = Pr(a a £ A! (J Ao) =
= / dF(a) > 0 
JA[L)Ao
Note that the probability to vote conditional on being informed is the same both for 
strongly and weakly ideological citizens.
The probability to vote is then given by the probability to be informed multiplied by
the probability to vote when informed, i.e.
Pr(T =
= l-Q(l-Pr(T=l|g = l))
Proposition 2.5 follows from the fact that Pr(T = l\q = 1) < l.B
Proof of Proposition 2.6 The probability of voting under the distribution function F 
is:
Pr(T = 1|F) = QFPr(T = l\q= !) + (!- QF}Pr(T = l\q = 0))
Consider two weakly O-ideological distributions F and G s.t. TTF > -KQ. Then 
A F > A G and QF > QG- Thus
Pr(T = 1|F) = QFPr(T = l\q = 1) > QGPr(T = l\q = 1) = Pr(T = 1|G) 
If instead F, G   FQ then 
Pr(T =
Now TT F > TT G => QF < QG- Since 1 - Pr(T = l\q = 1) > 0 we get that Pr(T = 
l\F}>Pr(T =
The same applies to / ideological agents. Now notice that if \V(a)   V/| is symmetric 
around zero, then we can compare /-ideological with O-ideological agents and derive 
that \TTF \ > \TTG \ => Pr(T = 1|F) > Pr(T = l\G}M
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2.10 Appendix 2B: description of variables and regression 
results
2.10.1 Information derived from the British General Election Study 
1997
  INFO.
The variable INFO has been constructed by using the following two questions:
1. Do you happen to remember the names of any candidates who stood in your 
constituency in the general election this year?
Please write in all the names of candidates that you can remember (6 spaces provided) 
or tick box: I can't remember any of the candidates' names.
Note: the names of candidates written in by respondents were checked against official 
lists of candidates.
2. Political knowledge quiz (answers: true/false/don't know): 
a: Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative Prime Minister; 
b: The number of MP is about 100;
c: The longest time allowed between general elections is four years; 
d: Britain's electoral system is based on proportional representation; 
e: MPs from different parties are on parliamentary committees; 
f: Britain has separate elections for the European parliament and the British parlia- 
ment;
g: No-one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit.
Let us define with names the number of candidates correctly reported and with quiz 
the number of correct answers in question 2. INFO is then given by
INFO = names + 0.66 x quiz
The reason quiz has been downweighted is due to the fact that being true /false 
questions, it was possible for respondents to guess the answer without really knowing it,
while this is not possible for names. Therefore, using Bayes' rule we have
0/7 i j.\ PT(correct\know] I PT(know\correct) = —-————-————•———-—————— = ———— = 0.66 
Pi(correct\know] + Pi(correct\don't) 1 + 0.5
• TNT. (official turnout or declared turnout for those whose register was unavailable) 
1 = voted.
• income, total household income from all sources before tax. Categorical variable
from 1 to 16.
• age. respondent's age (>18).
• age2. = age"2x0.01.
• sex. 1 — male.
• education, respondent's education level. Categorical variable from 1 to 7.
• married. l=yes (= 1 also if "living as married").
• ethnicity. "To which of these groups do you consider you belong?", asian = 1 if 
answer is one of "Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian", black = 1 if 
answer is one of "Black African, Black Caribbean, Other Black".
• churchgoer. Categorical variable. "Apart from such special occasions as weddings, 
funerals and baptisms and son on, how often do you attend services or meetings connected 
with your religion?"
0. No religion or never or practically never attends;
1. varies too much to say;
2. less often than once a year;
3. at least once a year;
4. at least twice a year;
5. at least once a month;
6. at least once in two weeks;
7. once a week or more.
• length of residence. "How long have you lived in this neighbourhood?" (range 
0-97).
• farmer. 1 if yes.
• hours. "How many hours (do/will/did) you normally work a week in your main 
job, including any paid or unpaid overtime?".
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• houseowner. "Does your household own or rent this accommodation?". =1 if 
owns (leasehold etc.)
• canvasser. "Did a canvasser from any party call at your home to talk to you during 
the electoral campaign?". l=yes.
• phoned. "Were you contacted by anyone on the telephone during the electoral 
campaign asking how you might vote?". l=yes.
• voted92. =1 if voted in 1992 general election (self reported).
• broadsheet-reader. =1 if the answer is "yes" to
a: "do you regularly read one or more daily morning newspapers?"
and the answer to the question
b: "which daily morning newspaper do you read most often?" is one of the following:
• The Daily Telegraph;
• The Financial Times;
• The Guardian;
• The Independent;
• The Times.
• economic activity. Categorical variable:
1. "in paid work for at least 10 hours in week" or "waiting to take up paid work 
already accepted";
2. "in full time education (not paid for by employer, including on vacation)";
3. "on government training/employment programme";
4. "unemployed";
5."permanently sick or disabled";
6. "wholly retired from work";
7. "looking after the home";
8. "other"
• union.
Respondent or his/her partner is or has been member of a union. 1 if yes.
• reg-i.
General Standard Regions: i=l..ll.
• party effort in constituency. Let us indicate with K the number of respondents 
in constituency j. For each respondent we know if she has been contacted by parties
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(information in "canvasser" (c) and "phoned" (p)). Then for agent i in constituency j we 
have QJ 6 {0, 1} and pij € {0, 1} . We define party effort pe in constituency j as
• Left-Right 1. Derived from answers to the following question:
"In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"
Left-Right 1 = 0 if answer is 5, Left-Right 1 = 1 if answer is 4 or 6, Left-Rightl = 2 if
answer is 3 or 7 etc. Respondents who answered "can't choose" are excluded.
• Left-Right2. Same as Left-Rightl, but now respondents who answered "can't 
choose" are included with Left-Right2 = 0.
• Party-identification. Based on three questions.
1. "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the 
others? If yes, which party?". Outcome: a) no; b) yes — > [party named].
2. "Would you call yourself [party named] very strong, fairly strong or not very strong?
3. "Which one of the reasons on this card comes closest to the main reason you voted 
for the party you chose?"
Party = 1 if answer to question 1 is "no" or "don't know" .
Party = 2 if answer to question 2 is "not very strong" or "don't know".
Party = 3 if answer to question 2 is "fairly strong" .
Party = 4 if answer to question 2 is "very strong" .
Party = 5 if answer to question 3 is "I always vote that way" , independently of answers 
to questions 1 and 2.
2.10.2 Information about districts from Census 1991
• higher education. % of population with education qualification above university
degree.
• degree. % of population with a degree but not higher education qualifications.
• unemployed. % unemployed.
• population density. Persons per hectare.
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2.10.3 Information from Boothroyd (2002)
• aggregate turnout. Percentage turnout at the constituency level.
• marginality. Define with W and R the percentage of votes reported respectively 
by the winning candidate and the runner up. Then
W -R 
margmahty = -
2.10.4 Information from "The Guardian"
• salience. = 1 if an article specifically focused on a constituency electoral campaign 
appears on the Guardian between 1st and 30th April 1997.
2.10.5 Other
• bbclOO. = 1 if constituency classified by the BBC among the 100 decisive constituencies 
(the battleground).
• big shot. — I if a current or former member of cabinet, a current member of 
shadow-cabinet or Paddy Ashdown is candidate in the constituency.
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Figure 4-4: The distribution of INFO
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Win Max
I urnout
INFO
age
education
income
married
sex
asian
black
churchgoer
union
ength of residence
farmer
hours
house
canvasser
phoned
voted92
marginahty
aggregate turnout
party effort in constituency
Higher Education %
Degree %
Unemployment ratio
Density/1000
bbdOO
salience
broadsheet-reader
big-shot
left-rightl
left-rightZ
party-identification
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2769
2036
2408
2724
.794
4.306
48.5
3.597
7.048
0.59
0.466
0.018
0.009
1.99
0.601
19.733
0.006
38.219
0.684
0.241
0.075
0.803
0.303
71.306
0.156
.917
6.025
.093
133.909
.133
.094
0.118
.068
2.632
2.225
3.159
.4CT4
1.8
17.494
2.161
4.576
0.492
0.499
0.132
0.095
2.61
0.49
17.952
0.076
15.837
0.465
0.428
0.263
0.398
0.194
5.115
0.124
.791
2.706
.039
166.972
.339
.292
0.323
.252
1.569
1.728
1.249
0
0
18
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
51.4
0
.112
1.494
.029
0.219
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
10.62
94
7
16
1
1
1
1
7
1
94
1
95
1
1
1
1
0.814
80
1
7.376
17.976
.225
1110.492
1
1
1
1
6
6
5
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Table 2.2: Categorical Variables
Variable Freq. Percent Cumulative
income
less than 3999 £
4000-5999
6000-7999
8000-9999
10000-11999
12000-14999
15000-17999
18000-19999
20000-22999
23000-25999
26000-28999
29000-31999
32000-34999
35000-37999
38000-40999
41000 or more
education
no qualification
foreign or other
CSE or equivalent
0 level or equivalent
A level or equivalent
higher education below degree
degree
churchgoer
no religion or never attends
varies too much to say
less often than once a year
at least once a year
at least twice a year
at least once a month
at least once in two weeks
once a week or more
217
347
244
190
214
238
194
137
177
163
129
95
79
52
65
228
937
16
291
489
354
381
301
1595
33
122
169
291
140
70
349
7.84
12.53
8.81
6.86
7.73
8.6
7.01
4.95
6.39
5.89
4.66
3.43
2.85
1.88
2.35
8.23
33.84
0.58
10.51
17.66
12.78
13.76
10.87
57.6
1.19
4.41
6.1
10.51
5.06
2.53
12.6
7.84
20.37
29.18
36.04
43.77
52.37
59.37
64.32
70.71
76.6
81.26
84.69
87.54
89.42
91.77
100
33.84
34.42
44.93
62.59
75.37
89.13
100
57.6
58.79
63.2
69.3
79.81
84.87
87.4
100
Continues on the next page
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Table 2.2: Categorical Variables (continued)
economic activity
paid work
full time education
overnment training
unemployed
lermanently sick or disabled
retired
looking after the home
icing something else
region
North
North-West
Yorkshire & Humberside
West Midlands
East Midland
East Anglia
South West
South East
Greater London
Wales
Scotland
Ieft-right1
Ieft-nght1_1
Ieft-right1_2
Ieft-right1_3
Ieft-right1_4
Ieft-right1_5
left-rightl 6
Ieft-right2
Ieft-right2_i
Ieft-right2_2
Ieft-right2_3
Ieft-right2_4
Ieft-right2_5
Ieft-right2 6
party
partyl
party2
partyS
party4
partyS
1468
8
64
123
130
640
313
18
151
202
206
241
174
108
193
455
228
132
679
672
396
410
297
89
172
1044
396
410
297
89
172
162
812
826
280
644
53.02
0.29
2.31
4.44
4.69
23.11
11.48
0.65
5.45
7.3
7.44
8.7
6.28
3.9
6.97
16.43
8.23
4.77
24.52
33.01
19.45
20.14
14.59
4.37
8.45
43.36
16.45
17.03
12.33
3.7
7.14
5.95
29.81
30.32
10.28
23.64
53.02
53.3
55.62
60.06
64.75
87.87
99.35
100
5.45
12.75
20.19
28.89
35.18
39.08
46.05
62.48
70.71
75.48
100
33.01
52.46
72.59
87.18
91.55
100
43.36
59.8
76.83
89.16
92.86
100
5.95
35.76
66.08
76.36
100
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Table 2.3: Turnout: logit coefficient estimates
(coefficients and marginal effects at the mean)
Dependent Variable: Turnout
coeii marg.err. z coerr marg. err. z | coen (narg. err. z
information on individuals
age
age2
education
income
married
sex
asian
black
churchgoer
union
length of residence
farmer
hours
houseowner
canvasser
phoned
voted 92
constant 
information on districts
marginality
aggregate turnout
higher education %
degree %
unemployed %
population density
party effort
categorical variables (p-values
education
income
churchgoer
economic activity
region
Observations:
Log-L 
Pseudo R2
-.0038 -.0005 (0.16)
.0071 .0010 (0.28)
.0693 .0098 (1.93)
.0383 .0054 (1.96)
.3590 .0530 (2.68)
.0108 .0015 (0.08)
.7808 .0857 (1.39)
.0206 .0029 (0.03)
.0595 .0084 (2.28)
.0950 .0135 (0.74)
.0076 .0011 (1.89)
.9381 .0963 (1.18)
-.0125 -.0018 (2.72)
.2278 .0333 (1.61)
.4117 .0545 (2.57)
.2780 .0363 (0.89)
1.4564 .2614 (9.87)
-2.8488 (1.72) 
-.3521 -.0497 (0.78)
.0317 .0045 (1.69)
-.0754 -.0106 (0.35)
.0328 .0046 (0.55)
2.2872 .3231 (0.63)
.0482 .0068 (0.54)
-.1521 -.0215 (0.24)
of chi-test) 
No
No
No
0.4862
0.9481
2769
-1221.68 
0.1213
.0008 .00002 (0.03)
.0019 .00039 (0.08)
.3034 .04597 (2.16)
-.0094 -.00252 (0.07)
.7114 .07002 (1.33)
-.1495 -.02559 (0.21)
.0567 .00711 (0.44)
.0083 .00119 (2.04)
.9677 .09704 (1.22)
-.0130 -.00175 (2.82)
.2702 .04257 (1.78)
.4361 .05583 (2.65)
.3145 .04256 (1.08)
1.4818 .26896 (9.92)
-3.5138 (2.05) 
-.2822 -.03272 (0.64)
.0349 .00492 (1.81)
-.0844 -.00935 (0.39)
.0420 .00452 (0.70)
2.7343 .29733 (0.74)
.0485 .00756 (0.65)
-.2152   -.03096 (0.34)
0 1553
0.0035
0.0751
0.4209
0.9196
2769
-1193.0C 
0.1419
.0472 .0068 (2.03)
-.0324 -.0047 (1.33)
.3665 .0554 (2.68)
-.2009 -.0290 (1,55)
.5001 .0617 (0.94)
.1120 -.0156 (0.15)
.1170 .0170 (0.92)
.0097 .0014 (2.40)
1.1164 .1106 (1-42)
.3234 .0490 (2.29)
.4264 .0576 (2.67)
.2733 .0366 (094)
-4.6168 (2.68) 
-.0310 -.0045 (0.07)
.0381 .0055 (2.11)
.0068 -0009 (0.04)
.0221 .0032 (0.41)
2.7899 .4030 (0.80)
.0194 .0028 (0.26)
-.3628 -.0524 (0.61)
0.1493
00137
0.0104
0.5855
0.9862
2769
-1268.01 
00880
Note: z-satistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 2.4: Turnout and information: logit coefficient estimates
(coefficients and marginal effects)
Dependent Variable: Turnout
info
1 st stage fitted info
1st stage residuals
age
age2
education
income
married
sex
asian
black
churchgoer
union
length of residence
farmer
hours
houseowner
canvasser
phoned
voted 92 
district level
marginality
aggregate turnout
higher education "/
degree "/
unemployed "/
population density
party effort
constan
cateaorical variables
education
income
churchgoer
economic activity
region
Observations: 
Log-L 
Pseudo R2
Logit Logit 2-step Logit 2-step Logit
coeff marg eff z coeff marq eff z | coeff marg eff z coeff marg eff z
.2719 .0371 (6.19)
-.0344 -.0047 (-1.37
.0307 .0042 (1.18)
.0083 .0011 (0.22)
.0196 .0027 (0.95)
.3750 .0537 (2.75)
-.1683 -.0230 (-1.15
.8905 .0908 (1.53)
.0042 .0006 (0.01)
.0524 .0072 (1.98)
.0518 .0071 (0.40)
.0066 .0009 (1.60)
.8974 .0899 (1.13)
-.0114 -.0016 (2.48)
.1955 .0275 (1.35)
.4185 .0534 (2.58)
.2569 .0326 (0.84)
1.3673 .2365 (9.13) 
-.1307 -.0178 (0.28)
.0308 .0042 (1.63)
-.1150 -.0157 (0.50)
.0374 .0051 (0.60
.7857 .1073 (0.21
.0744 .0102 (0.99
-.3075 -.0419 (-0.49
-5.59355 (-316
(p-values of chi-test) 
No
No
No
0.8190
0.8241
2769 
-1192.74 
0.1421
.2696 .0356 (6.11)
-.0305 -.0040 (1.22)
.0266 .0035 (1.03)
.3139 .0432 (2.19)
-.1832 -.0242 (1.23)
.8139 .0821 (1.49)
-.1241 -.0171 (0.17)
.0212 .0028 (0.16)
.0070 .0009 (1.68)
.8541 .0838 (1.10)
-.0118 -.0016 (2.55)
.2247 .0308 (1.47)
.4404 .0542 (2.64)
.2737 .0339 (0.97)
1.4001 .2376 (9.25) 
-.0521 -.0069 (0.12
.0343 .0045 (1.79
-.1254 -.0166 (0.55
.0472 .0062 (0.76
1.2695 .1679 (0.34
.0789 .0104 (1.06
-.3373 -.0446 (0.53
 
-3.0322 (1.77
0.6553
0.0119
0.1235
0.7576
0.7669
2769 
-1165.70 
0.1816
.6557 .0865 '(2.01)
-.3965 -.0523 '(1.12)
-.0752 -.0099 (2.03)
.0625 .0082 (1.88)
.3123 .0429 (2.18)
-.4291 -.0566 (1.90)
1.1206 .1019 (1.80)
-.1074 -.0147 (0.15)
-.0559 -.0073 (0.39)
.0045 .0006 (1.00)
.8045 .0801 (1.01)
-.0096 -.0013 (1.98)
.1543 .0208 (094)
.4193 .0516 (2.48)
.1855 .0232 (0.64)
1.2253 .2021 (6.18) 
.2663 .0351 (0.53)
.0302 .0040 (1.56)
-.1939 -.0256 (0.86
.0615 .0081 (0.99
-0.7076 -.0933 (0.18
.1140 .0151 (1.45
-.5418 -.0715 (0.81
-2.1940 (1.23
0.5893
0.0195
0.2289
0.8728
0.5776
2769 
-1164.28 
0.1626
.6625 .0900 "(2.14)
-.0763 -0104 (2.04)
.0637 .0087 (1.91)
.3022 .0427 (2.15)
-.4363 -.0593 (1.92)
12240 .1113 (1.97)
-.1210 -.0171 (0.17)
-.0722 -.0098 (0.50)
.0041 .0005 (0.92)
.8796 .0881 (1.07)
-.0093 -.0012 (1.93)
.1507 .0210 (0.93)
.3976 .0506 (2.38)
.1609 .0209 (0.54)
1.1836 .1986 (6.05) 
.2626 .0357 (0.53)
.0279 .0040 (1.45)
-.1980 -.0269 (0.91)
0658 .0089 (1.08)
-.7152 -.0972 (0.18)
.1110 .0150 (1.42)
-.5782 -.0786 (0.86)
-2,0628 (1 16)
06080
0.0209
0.2297
0.8068
0.6336
2769 
-1188.78 
0.1450
Note: z-statistics from robust standard errors in parenthesis. Z-statistics marked with are calculated by bootstrap
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Table 2.5: First stage regression: OLS coefficients
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Information
| coeff
age
age2
married
sex
asian
black
union
ength of residence
farmer
lours
houseowner
canvasser
phoned
voted 92
marginality
aggregate turnout
lighed education %
degree %
unemployed %
Dopulation density
Party Effort
constant
Instrumental variables
bbclOO
salience
quality-paper reader
big shot 
cateaorical variables (o-values of F-tesN
education
income
churchgoer
economic activity
region
Observations: 
R2
.1121
-.0907
.0069
.6155
-.7722
-.0170
.2380
.0072
.1027
-.0051
.1914
.0902
.1839
.4578
-.7047
.0064
.1429
-.0339
4.2717
-.0774
.2371
-1.7663
.2945
.1853
.7163
.2425
t
(8.16)
(6.53)
(0.08)
(7.44)
(3.65)
(0.05)
(3.32)
(3.22)
(0.26)
(-1 91)
(2.26)
(1.07)
(1.23)
(4.89)
(2.84)
(0.65)
(1.77)
(1.20)
(2.13)
(1.79)
(0.67)
(2.00)
(2.55)
(1.60)
(6.79)
(1.62) 
0
0.0464
0.5801
0.0005
0.0019
2769 
0.3161
Note: Robust standard errors
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Table 2.6: Testing the over-identification restrictions
(Likelihood-ratio test) 
Dependent Variable: Turnout
info
bbdOO
salience
quality-paper reader
big-shot
other control variables
Observations: 
Log-L
Pseudo R2
L-Ratio statistics
coeff z
.37268 (1.64)
.13742 (0.62)
.39284 (1.68)
.19252 (0.73)
Yes
2769 
-118828
0.1453
coeff z
.28024 (5.77)
.31473 (1.38)
.07651 (0.34)
.1843 (0.78)
.17411 (0.64)
Yes
2769 
-1163.61
0.1631
1.00 4.18
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Table 2.7: Information and Ideology: OLS coefficients
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Information
coeTf       t    |-
age
age2
married
sex
asian
black
union
length of residence
armer
lours
houseowner
canvasser
jhoned
voted 92
margmality
aggregate turnout
nighed education %
degree %
unemployed %
population density
party effort
bbclOO
salience
quality-paper reader
jig shot
 left-rightx_2
*left-rightx_3
"left-nghtx_4
"left-nghtx_5
"left-rightx_6
sarty attachment 2
Darty attachment 3
party attachment 4
party attachment 5
constant
cateaorical variables
education
income
churchgoer
economic activity
region
Observations:
.0776 (4.73)
-0590 (3.51)
-.0071 (0.08)
.5103 (5.51)
-.7933 (2.86)
.4382 (1.09)
.3037 (3.78)
.0090 (3.59)
-.0369 (0.10)
-.0054 (1.79)
.3049 (3.04)
.1283 (1.38)
.2346 (1.43)
.3342 (3.13)
-.6349 (2.25)
.0061 (0.57)
.0773 (0.93)
-.0150 (0.49)
2.7366 (1.21)
-.0538 (1.08)
.3064 (0.74)
.2582 (2.01)
.1999 (1.60)
.6434 (5.78)
.3557 (2.16)
.1455 (1.40)
.2297 (2.21)
.1236 (1.04)
.0203 (0.10)
-.1401 (0.89)
-.3197 (0.32)
(p-values of F-test)
0
0.0577
0.2433
0.1318
0.0001
0.2963
coerr t coert t
.0888 (6.01)
-.0679 (4.51)
.0076 (0.09)
.5666 (6.48)
-.7556 (3.20)
-.3342 (0.85)
.2513 (3.37)
.0096 (4.06)
.0161 (0.04)
-.0049 (1.75)
.2000 (2.20)
.1814 (2.07)
.2657 (1.78)
.3470 (3.62)
-.7579 (2.89)
.0090 (0.90)
.1110 (1.40)
-.0290 (1.02)
3.8615 (1.87)
-.0648 (1.41)
.3771 (0.99)
.2057 (1.70)
.1789 (1.55)
.6743 (6.17)
.3110 (2.03)
.4031 (4.13)
.5005 (5.10)
.3899 (3.42)
3200 (1.62)
.1451 (0.94)
-1.1936 (-1.30)
0
0.1089
0.4622
0.1496
0.0006
03250
.1141 (8.30)
-.0930 (6,68)
.0077 (0.09)
.6170 (7.44)
-.7904 (3.69)
.0110 (0.03)
.2099 (2.92)
.0076 (3.40)
.0754 (0.19)
-.0049 (1.82)
.1883 (2.22)
.0987 (1.17)
.1730 (1.14)
.4503 (4.46)
-.6752 (2.71)
.0035 (0.35)
.1390 (1.70)
-.0293 (1.04)
4.0696 (2.05)
-.0838 (1.96)
.2798 (0.79)
.3076 (2.64)
.1620 (1.40)
.7224 (6.80)
.2201 (1.47)
.0788 (0.55)
.2336 (1.54)
.4095 (2.28)
.0443 (0.28)
-1.7029 (1.93)
0
0.0612
0.5037
0.0012
0.0011
0.3239
Note. Robust standard errors
 Lett-Right! reported in column 1 and Left-Right2 reported in column 2
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Table 2.8: Turnout, ideology, and information: logit estimates
(coefficients and marginal effects)
Dependent Variable: Turnout
info
age
age2
married
sex
asian
black
union
length of residence
farmer
hours
houseowner
canvasser
phoned
voted 92
"ideology
"infoXideology 
district level
margmality
aggregate turnout
higher education %
degree %
unemployed (ratio)
population density
party effort
constan 
cateaorical variables
education
income
churchgoer
economic activity
region
Observations: 
Log-L 
Pseudo R2
coeff marg eff z coeff marg eff z coeff marg erf z
.3704 .0426 (3.79)
.0166 .0019 (0.54)
-.0262 .0030 (0.84)
.2588 .0310 (1.49)
.0257 .0030 (0.14)
-.1625 -.0198 (0.27)
-.9725 -.1545 (1.05)
-.0533 -.0061 (0.33)
.0066 .0008 (1.30)
1.9989 .1135 (2.36)
-.0150 -.0017 (2.53)
.2115 .0253 (1.09)
.5304 .0555 (2.52)
.2416 .0257 (0.71)
1.0821 .1596 (5.39)
.3484 .0400 (2.09)
-.0440 -.0051 (1.15) 
-.1859 -.0214 (0.33)
.0355 .0041 (1.50)
-.2672 -.0307 (1.14)
.0824 .0095 (1.18)
1.9007 .2186 (0.41)
.0548 .0630 (0.59
-.0043 -.0005 (0.01
-5.0932 (2.35 
(p-values of chi-test) 
0.9004
0.077
0.0570
0.7973
0.3464
.29430 .03666 (4.41)
.01030 .00128 (0.38)
-.01690 -.00211 (0.60)
.29494 .03834 (1.90)
-.04516 -.00562 (0.28)
.43806 .04691 (0.67)
-.36386 -.05128 (0.40)
-.03917 -.00486 (0.27)
.00796 .00099 (1.75)
1.86067 .12103 (2.06)
-.01480 -.00184 (2.93)
.19304 .02483 (1.15)
.41328 .04791 (2.25)
.30110 .03424 (0.96)
1.23010 .19642 (7.21)
.21102 .02629 (1.77)
-.02368 -.00295 (0.80) 
-.26154 -.03258 (0.52)
.02502 .00312 (1.15)
-.17599 -.02192 (0.72)
.06800 .00847 (1.00
1.48528 .18502 (0.35
.04230 .05270 (0.52
-.25340 -.03157 (0.36
-3.52188 (1.80 
O.C333
0.061
0.1735
0.7302
0.2691
.60914 .07547 (5.89)
-.00742 -.00092 (0.29)
.00045 .00006 (0.02)
.32167 .04163 (2.15)
-.07790 -.00965 (0.50)
.64684 .06430 (1.16)
-.47081 -.06832 (0.54)
-.05890 -.00727 (0.43)
.00356 .00044 (0 81)
.88407 .07979 (1.10)
-.01371 -.00170 (2.76)
.32596 .04259 (2.02)
.36096 .04206 (2.07)
.25470 .02921 (0.84)
1.0232 .15562 (6.18)
1.06171 .13155 (7.19)
-.12880 -.01596 (3.68) 
-.15180 -.01881 (0.32)
.02499 .00310 (1.26)
-.13420 -.01663 (0.58)
.04454 .00552 (0.69)
-.82380 .10207 (0.21)
.06280 .07780 (0.80)
-.25543 -.03165 (0.38)
-5.20368 (2.90) 
0.4999
0.0115
0.1424
0.8441
0.6208
2036 2408 2724 
-798.87 
-980.022 
-1073.98 
0.1558 0.1652 0.2141
Note: z-statistics from robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Ideology is Left-Rightl in column 1, Left-Right2 in column 2. and Party Identification in column 3.
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Chapter 3
Rational Ignorance and the Public 
Choice of Redistribution
3.1 Introduction
Since the early stages of the economic theory of politics, Downs pointed out that in a 
sizeable electorate "the returns from voting are usually so low that even small costs may 
cause many voters to abstain". This carries implications not only for political partici­ 
pation but also for the desire to be informed about political issues. If there is a cost of 
acquiring information about the candidates and their platforms, then we should expect 
not only rational abstention but also "rational ignorance" on political issues.
This consideration implies a substantial lack of information by citizens about candi­ 
dates and their proposals. The fact that many people actually vote and that political 
information is still available in newspapers would be simply reduced to a matter of pref­ 
erences: political information may be enjoyable per se, not unlike sports news1 . This is 
equivalent to admitting that preferences for political information, like all preferences, are 
outside the domain of standard economic theory2 . If this was true then the chances of
'Analogously, Riker and Ordershook (1968) explain voters' turnout in general elections by including a 
sense of citizen's duty in individuals' preferences.
^In the words of Downs, "a rational man can become well informed for four reasons: 1) he may enjoy 
being well informed for its own sake, so that information as such provides him with utility; 2) he may 
believe the election is going to be so close that the probability of his casting the decisive vote is relatively 
high; 3) he may need information to influence the votes of others (...); 4) he may need information to 
influence the formation of government policy as a lobbyist. Nevertheless, since the odds are that no 
election will be close enough to render decisive the vote of any one person, or the votes of all those he 
can persuade to agree with him, the rational course of action for most citizens is to remain politically
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being informed or of showing up at the voting booth could be expected to be independent 
of most economic variables, which seems to be at odds with most empirical research3 .
From the previous chapter it should be clear that, apart from the obvious role of 
personal preferences, the demand for political information can be explained in terms of 
incentives. Here we will derive the consequences of this idea for redistributive policy- 
making.
We will argue that rational ignorance is the consequence of an artificial separation 
between politics and the economy. It seems instead intuitive that expectations on policies 
should be relevant to private decisions. This generates a demand for political information 
to be used for private purposes. Under quite mild assumptions, this demand is positively 
correlated with income: in other terms, we can expect the rich to be systematically 
better informed than the poor, independently of any demand for information purely as a 
consumption good.
From the study of the U.K. 1997 election of the previous chapter, we know already 
that political knowledge is increasing with income. Other research points clearly, and 
not surprisingly, in the same direction4 . This observation adds an important element in 
the political market and can help to explain the poor empirical support encountered by 
Downsian theories of redistribution.
According to voting models of redistribution based on the median voter theorem, in­ 
come inequality should increase redistribution as long as it increases the distance between 
average income and the income of the pivotal voter (Roberts,1977); this result has been 
applied to a variety of situations to explain the size of the public sector, low growth 
rates, increasing intergenerational transfers and so on. However, it is also fair to say that 
this theory does not receive good support from empirical research. Even though the re­ 
duced forms referring to specific situations are generally compatible with the data, when 
moving to structural-form analysis (linking inequality to some measure of redistributive 
transfers), support is generally weak and coefficients often show signs different from those 
expected5 . There are various possible explanations for this unsatisfactory empirical sup-
uninformed" (Downs, 1957).
3 See for example Matsusaka (1995) and the references given there.
4 See Belli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
5 For examples of reduced form analysis see Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994). Estimations of structural relationships between redistributive transfers and inequality are given 
in Perotti (1994) and Lindert (1996).
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port6 ; however, it seems clear that the theory, though representing a useful benchmark, 
provides a simplistic representation of how democratic systems work. Other institutional 
elements and country-specific features are likely to affect the policy outcomes.
It is worth remembering that this benchmark depends on some crucial assumptions 
that have been challenged on a variety of grounds. First of all, it requires unidimension- 
ality of the policy space. When public policy is considered in a multidimensional space, 
then an equilibrium may not exist or it may assume very different characteristics7 . In 
particular, political platforms proposed by candidates do not necessarily converge. Also, 
the median voter theorem requires that political parties be perfectly able to commit to 
their proposed policies. When candidates are unable to make credible commitments then 
the tendency to platform divergence in equilibrium is reinforced8 .
This study points in a different direction. The model unveils a possible relationship 
between incentives to gather political information and preferences over redistribution. 
Information acquisition might be non-neutral for voting outcomes: indeed, our model 
implies a substantial heterogeneity in awareness on policies, which could affect political 
competition and eventually policy choices. It will be shown how this may provide a 
possible explanation of the weak empirical support for the traditional benchmark.
We focus on the demand for political information. It is clear that in an economic 
theory of politics there is no simple explanation for any type of political participation, 
where participation must be taken in the broad sense of voting, taking part in political 
organizations, acquiring political information and so on.
One first possibility, as noted, is that political information is demanded as a con­ 
sumption good and not for decision-making: most people seem to enjoy being informed 
on many things, even when this does not enable them to make better decisions. In this 
case one should ask about the nature of this good and, in particular, whether it is a nor­ 
mal good. This is clearly an empirical matter; if, as we have seen, political information 
can be treated as a normal good, then the rich can be expected to be more informed 
than the poor and therefore more responsive to policy announcements: all the results we 
present in this work would be valid a fortiori.
6 Among other things, it is worth remembering that for some countries data are not completely reliable. 
7 See for example Besley and Coate (1997).
8 See Alesina (1987 and 1988) for partisan models of two-party electoral competition. Besley and Coate 
(1997) also consider policy-oriented citizen-candidates.
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In this chapter, however, we refer only to information as it is considered in decision 
theory, ignoring information as a consumption good and not relying on normality. In fact, 
the premise that political information is rarely relevant to useful decision-making relies 
on an artificial modelling separation between politics and the economy. Our working 
assumption, instead, is that political information may be acquired for private purposes 
and that this incentive is relevant.
Many pieces of information may be relevant when voting even though they were ac­ 
quired for some other purpose. For example, information on fiscal variables may be 
relevant to investment decisions and at the same time convey information on economic 
policy; information on the quality of some public service (for example health) may be use­ 
ful to know whether it is worthwhile using privately available alternatives and at the same 
time can reveal information on the effort of the current administration to provide good 
services. Moreover, at election time, political information may be acquired to form more 
accurate expectations on future policy: investment decisions today depend on expecta­ 
tions on future taxes; choosing a public or a private school today involves expectations 
over the condition of the educational system in a few years; and so on.
Sometimes the behaviour of political agents may reveal, apart from policies, something 
about the external world that is relevant to private decision making. Political parties have 
every incentive to collect information for their own action, so accurate observation of their 
choices can convey information on many variables that are unobservable (or too costly to 
observe) to the private citizen.
The analysis presented in the following builds on the theory of information acquisi­ 
tion presented in the previous chapter, although the role of ideology will be neglected. 
Information therefore will have some characteristics not often considered in the literature. 
First of all, information does not come effortlessly: agents must spend effort and time to 
gather and process information. Secondly, acquiring information is an activity with un­ 
certain returns: more time and effort makes it more likely to get better information, but 
there is no certainty about what and how much is going to be known. Third, information 
is considered as freely accessible to all: this makes our analysis particularly suited for 
information available in the mass media. In fact, the revenue of most newspapers and 
broadcasts comes from advertising: attracting a larger public raises the value of units to
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sell to advertisers9 . The consumer in this case does not pay information in cash; in any 
event, this cost is quite low compared with some other opportunity cost.
It is important to stress that defining the value of information and deriving a demand 
for it requires dealing with some problems posed by its special characteristics. First, 
information demand is a derived demand: information is valuable because it enables 
people to make better choices 10 . This means that information cannot be put in the 
commodity space when defining preferences. As a consequence, relevant nonconcavities 
may arise to complicate the analysis, leading to an unsatisfactory theory overall 11 . Second, 
to specify a model of information demand we need a clear definition of the information 
available, its costs and the decision making process. Information is valuable only when 
there is uncertainty on variables that are relevant to decision making. Third, there is no 
easy way to define the quantity of information. Given a space of possible states E, we can 
say that signal £ is more informative than signal £ when it induces a finer partition of 
the state space: but this does not provide a complete order of signals, as many partitions 
are simply not comparable with this criterion. Thus, a complete ordering of signals may 
be obtained only with reference to a score function, i.e. with reference to how the signals 
are valuable in terms of the decisions to be made: this means that there is no objective, 
permanently valid definition of the quantity of information in economics12 .
Most voting models with asymmetric information have typically considered either a 
representative voter imperfectly informed on candidates (e.g. Harrington 1993) or fixed 
political alternatives (e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985, Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). 
Ledyard (1984) presents a model of spatial electoral competition where each voter is un­ 
certain about other voters preferences and cost of voting, and where abstention is ad­ 
mitted. Voters play a Bayesian game for given candidates' positions; this gives positive 
turnout when candidates' positions are differentiated. Candidates, however, are lead to 
convergence by competition for votes and this drives the equilibrium turnout to zero. 
In McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984) some voters are uninformed about the candidates' 
positions but they know the preferences of the various subgroups in the population; un-
9 See the discussion of this point in Stromberg (2002).
10 We are referring to the notion of information in decision theory. All other information can clearly be 
included in the category of leisure.
11 See for example Radner and Stiglitz (1984).
12 The Shannon measure of the quantity of information, derived in a different context, has proved to be 
of little use in economic theory. See Shannon (1948).
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informed voters can make inferences using interest-group endorsement and opinion polls. 
Under certain assumptions about preferences and preference distribution, all voters choose 
as if they had perfect information. McKelvey and Ordeshook conclude that perfect in­ 
formation is not a necessary condition to apply the median voter theorem. Stromberg 
(2002) introduces mass media as information sources: since some voters are more valuable 
than others to advertisers they will get better coverage of the issues they are interested 
in. Electoral competition between office-seeking candidates will then translate the mass 
media bias into a policy bias.
There is no model, to my knowledge, that introduces the idea of increasing returns to 
information into the political market. This idea is clearly not new in other applications. 
Among those, Arrow (1986) is of particular relevance for our analysis. In Arrow, informa­ 
tion is demanded for portfolio decisions under uncertainty. The analysis is limited to this 
specific case and considers a given specification for the utility function (CES). Information 
is provided by a signal on returns, and the quality of the signal is given by its precision. 
Arrow concludes that different incentives to acquire information (the asymmetry between 
fixed costs and increasing returns) lead portfolio allocation choices to increase income 
inequality. Other studies on the demand for information include Kihlstrom (1974) and 
Verrecchia (1982). Kihlstrom (1974) provides a general theory of information demand 
about product quality, when consumers are interested not directly in commodities but in 
some desirable attributes they may have. The quantity of information is defined using, 
as in Blackwell (1951), the concept of sufficiency: if an observable random variable £ is 
sufficient for £ , then £ delivers more information than £ . In Verrecchia (1982) agents may 
acquire private signals about stocks' returns on top of what equilibrium prices already 
reveal, but there is no wealth effect. In these models the cost of a better signal is a 
monetary cost.
The model of information demand of this chapter will be rather simple, neglecting 
many of the complications of chapter 2. This is necessary to keep the analysis manageable 
as we will now develop a parallel model of electoral competition and policy formation. 
However, this simplified framework should be enough to show the relevance of political 
information for public choice and public policy.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple model of 
Downsian political competition in which both private and public decisions must be made
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by citizens. In Section 3.3 we derive the demand for political information and show that 
incentives to be informed on politics are increasing in agents' initial endowments. In 
Section 3.4 we solve the model and analyse the role of information on political equilib­ 
rium. Section 3.5 discusses the main implications of the model for the interaction between 
gross income inequality and redistribution. Section 3.6 briefly discusses the main norma­ 
tive issues at stake in this analysis and the role of coordination failures in information 
acquisition. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The framework of the model
In the following model political competition is limited to a Downsian two-party system 
with full commitment. Of course this implies that the model has all the limitations of the 
Downsian analysis, which we do not intend to focus on here. It is instead important to 
compare our results with a standard Downsian model. Even though the analysis is kept 
as simple as possible, this does not preclude the applicability of this framework to more 
sophisticated models of political competition.
Our economy consists of a continuum of agents. Each agent's preferences will be 
represented by a continuous utility function
u(x, e,a\m] = C/(x|a) + Z(a rri) — ve (3.1)
where x is a vector of private goods (with prices p), a € A = [a, a] is a public policy 
variable (e.g. a public good), m is the initial endowment, and e e £ is effort devoted 
to information gathering, with v = u + £ a parameter of effort disutility. We assume u 
to be a cost that is common to the whole population and distributed according to the 
function pLJ ('co,cr'^) with S^ = {w|pw (ro,cr5) > 0} C 3R+; e ~ pe (e,cr^) is an idiosyncratic 
shock with Se — {e|pe (e:, cr^) > 0} C 5R+. The function U (x a) is the utility associated 
with private commodities. This is assumed to be contingent on the value of the public 
policy variable: for example the utility of buying a car depends on the quality of roads. 
Thus, knowing the value of a is important for the choice of the bundle x. However, we 
also assume that people have direct preferences over a represented by a strictly concave 
function Z(a\m}. Since we want to focus on redistributive politics, we will assume that
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preferences on a depend on agents' initial endowment.
We assume people have an identical utility function over private commodities f/(x|a): 
hence the only ex ante source of heterogeneity is their initial endowment. An agent with 
endowment m has a choice set given by
;tm = {x|px<m(l-7re)} (3.2)
where ?r is a positive parameter, equal for all agents, reflecting the possible monetary costs 
induced by information gathering (for example, via a reduction in labour supply). Since 
the maximum amount that can be spended in information gathering is m we have e € 
8 = [0,^]. Interpreting the initial endowment as full income, we will summarize income 
distribution in the population by a continuous density function <p(rn).
Let us focus on the first component of the utility function, neglecting for the moment 
both Z(a\m) and the choice of e. Let us also assume that a is fixed and known with 
certainty. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1 [/(•) € 5R+ is quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree 1 in x.
Although Assumption 3.1 clearly restricts the behaviour pattern of our agents, it 
should be noted that the class of utility functions we consider is still fairly general, com­ 
prising some of the standard functions most widely used in economic models.
From the constrained maximization of the utility function we get the optimal private 
choice x*(a, m, p) and the indirect utility function V(a, m, p). Preferences over a are then 
defined by the function W(a,m,p) = V(a,m, p) + Z(a m). Each agent has therefore an 
ideal level of a defined by the function W(a,m,p) and, for given prices, this depends on 
m. We will also assume the following:
Assumption 3.2 W(a,m,p) satisfies the single crossing condition: Va > a, Vm' > 
m : W(a ,m ,p) > W(a,m',p) => W(a ,m,p) > W(a,m,p] and W(a ,m ,p) > 
W(a,m',p) => W(a ,m,p) > W(a,m,p).
Assumption 3.2 implies that richer agents prefer lower levels of a than the poorer ones. 
Given the continuity of the functions involved, we can represent the preferred policy of 
an agent with income m as a function a = z(m) with z < 0. We can think of a as any
110
policy issue; we only require preferences on a to be somehow related to income; thus, a 
could be some specific type of public good or a redistributive transfer in a second-best 
environment 13 . For the rest of this section we indicate the distribution of the ideal a (the 
argmax of the function W(a,m,p)) across the population with y(a).
So far, our agents act on the economy by their private decisions; however, they may 
also affect the public decision with their votes. From now on we also assume that a is 
unknown. In our environment there are two parties (L and R) competing for office. They 
are able to commit to their platforms and care only about maximizing votes. Thus they 
have no preference for any platforms: these are used only instrumentally to convince 
voters.
Parties' platforms are announced publicly but are observable only if some effort e is 
devoted to information gathering. More precisely, we will assume that the probability of 
observing the vector of announcements {a^, a/j} is given by q(e), where q(-) is an increas­ 
ing and concave function. One possible interpretation of this assumption is that parties' 
communications are very often transmitted to voters only indirectly, by the mass media. 
Also, political platforms are very complex and the ultimate effect on an agent's finances 
is never very clear. Researchers use quite sophisticated models to approximate the effects 
of simple policies, so there is no reason why a voter should completely and immediately 
understand political platforms and their consequences. Although this critique could be 
extended to many other models in economics, it seems particularly relevant when we come 
to public policies, because of their intrinsic complexity.
The timing of the model is represented in figure 3-1: first of all Nature selects u for the 
whole community and the idiosyncratic shocks e for each citizen. Citizens only learn their 
own v. Politicians, however, may observe the realization u>. Both citizens and politicians 
know the distribution of policy preferences. In period 1 the two parties simultaneously 
announce their platforms. Citizens spend their desired amount of effort in acquiring 
information and afterwards decisions are made, i.e. private choices are undertaken and
13 0ne possible situation leading to this framework is the choice of the tax rate in a proportional tax 
system with lump sum transfer and balanced budget. This is the situation analysed in Roberts (1977) 
and Meltzer and Richard (1981). It should be noted that in this case the desired level of a will depend on 
the ratio ™ , where fh is mean income. In other terms, the desirability of redistribution for an agent with 
income m is decreasing in each agent's own income and increasing in mean income. The policy preferred 
by the pivotal voter (usually with income below the mean) will depend on the distance of that voter's 
income from the mean. Therefore, in our electoral model m can always be replaced by ?J. For us this has 
no consequence since we will only compare distributions with the same mean income.
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Figure 3-1: Time Line
0: Nature selects realization of u for the whole population and e for each citizen.
Oa: Political parties learn u, citizens learn v.
1: Parties simultaneously and independently announce political platforms.
la: Citizens gather information on platforms.
Ib: Private decisions.
Ic: Voting decisions.
2: Winning platform is implemented. Payoffs realized.
people cast their votes on the basis of the information they have. Finally the an­ 
nounced policy of the winner party is implemented and payoffs are realized for all citizens.
Note that the model can easily accommodate a series of complications that would not 
change anything substantial. First of all, other sources of uncertainty could be added with 
no significant consequences. For example preference distribution y(a) could be uncertain. 
If there are two possible distributions y\(a) and 3/2(0) with respective probabilities p and 
(1 — p) then a state of the world would be defined by realizations of information costs 
and preference distribution. An agent could learn something by observing his or her own 
preferences but would still be substantially uncertain, making information valuable. This 
possibility will be considered in example 2.
Another possibility is to allow only for the observation of a signal £ on platforms, 
rather than the platforms themselves. In this case, assuming that the joint distribution 
of a and £ satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, knowing £ would reduce 
uncertainty and the set of possible political equilibria, still making information gathering 
an activity with positive returns. Note also that for our purposes the following analysis
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would be the same if the function [/(•) was represented as t/(x|i/>(a)) where tp(a) is any 
variable relevant to private decision-making and affected by public policies (for example, 
the interest rate) 14 .
We will now start with the presentation of the information demand given its central 
role in this model. Then we will proceed to solve the model backward.
3.3 Private decisions and the demand for information
Private decisions are of two types: the choice of a commodity bundle x and the choice of 
e. As will become clear, these two choices must be analysed separately, as the choice of 
e requires defining a notion of the value of information and this, in turn, can be defined 
only with respect to the maximum value function, when private choices have been made. 
Therefore, a two-step maximization process will be used. Solving the individual decision- 
making process backward, we start by considering e fixed and equal to e. Then we can 
temporarily ignore the role of e and TT.
As we said, the public policy variable a is relevant to private decision making. Since 
the decision has to be made before (or simultaneously to) the election, a is unknown. The 
motivation for information gathering is to make better private decisions. However, since 
private choices depend on policies, it is convenient to start with political decisions.
A platform announcement by parties L and R is defined as a pair {0^,0^} . Every 
announcement will induce a partition of the whole population: let us indicate with 
Ni,(aL,afi) and Afo(az,, a#) the size of the population that, if informed on the content of 
platforms, would vote respectively for party L and party R when {a£,a#} is received.
However, not all the people in A^a^a^) and -/V/j(a£,a/j) will be informed on the 
platforms. Since there are no priors on parties' location, L and R are just labels, and 
therefore uninformed citizens are not responsive to parties' proposals; we will interpret 
this non-responsiveness as abstention, by assuming that any indifferent voters simply do 
not vote. Actually, in our setting there is not much an uninformed voter can do apart 
from voting randomly or abstaining. We then indicate with nL(a^,a/j) and n^ai^ap] 
the size of the informed population voting for party L and party R respectively when 
[O-L^O-R] is received, and with £n/,(o/,,a/z) and EnR(aL,aR) their respective expected
4 This is straightforward if tf>(a) is a monotonic function.
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values when the size of the informed population is uncertain.
Let us indicate with Pw '(a, aj,Oj) the probability that the platform of party i wins 
given that the platforms announced are {a;, a,} . Then we have
litni (ai ,aj )>nj (ai ,aj) \
> (3.3)
\ if nj(a;,a,-) = nj (ai ,a.,) J
Information is used by our agents in the best possible way; we also assume that each 
citizen knows the distribution of public policy preferences y(a). Therefore agents are 
able to infer the population partitions induced by any platform announcements. Since 
information is acquired to forecast future policies we have the following assumption about 
the expected policy:
Assumption 3.3
ai if Eni(oi,aj} > Enj (al ,aj ), ij = L,R
a — E(a
\o.j if
In other words, each agent knows the population partitions induced by any pair of 
platform announcements, and, if informed about the platforms, can then forecast the 
future policy. This means that the optimal private decision x* can be made contingent 
on {aL ,aR }.
We will show later that the winning platform will depend on the realization of u. 
For the moment let us just assume that the winning platform can be represented as a 
continuous function a*(u] (this will be proved in Lemma 3.1).
Focusing for the moment only on the choice of commodities (i.e. on the first component 
of the utility function) , we have that the utility of an agent who observes the platform 
announcements is15
E7(x*(m,a»)|a») (3.4)
whereas if platforms have not been observed utility is
tf(x(m)|a*(u;)). (3.5) 
Note also that when v is learned by each agent at the beginning of the game, the prior
15 From now on we drop prices, as they do not vary in our analysis.
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probability of u can be updated by Bayes' rule to
Then we have the following definition:
Definition 3.1 The expected value of observing the platform announcement is given by 
the function
A(m|e) = A[/(x*(m,a*H)|a*
We do not need to consider Z(a\m) at this stage because the private value of infor­ 
mation on a is independent of agents' preferences over the public policy. Notice that for 
each given realization of u> we will have a different ex post value of making an informed 
private choice. But since the actual realization of u is ex ante unknown, the ex ante value 
of information must be expressed in expected terms over u.
It is then possible to prove the following:
Proposition 3.1 Assume U(.) G 5R+ is quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree I in
mi. <3A(.,e) . nx. Then ^ ' > 0. 
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that this result can be proved whether a*(u) is a continuous or a discrete function. 
The only reason we are working with a continuous framework is to stress the fact that 
each agent's probability of being pivotal is zero. However, all the results are still valid 
with a finite number of citizens (and therefore a discrete a*(u)} as long as we assume that 
the probability of being pivotal in the election is negligible (see Appendix) .
Having derived an expression for the value of information, we are now ready to turn 
to the effort allocation problem. Let us remove the assumption that e = e and write the
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problem of a generic agent as 16 :
r
max[g(e) / U(x*(m(l - •ne),a*(u)}\a*(u))pw (u v)du
+(l - q(e)} I £/(x(m(l - ire))\a*(Lj))pw (u\v]
*J
- ve
where q(e) is the probability of observing platforms. Using definition 3.1 the problem 
can be re-written as
/•
max[ / C/(x(m(l - •ne)}\a*(u}}pljj (u\v)duj + <?(e)A(m, e) - ve] (3.6)
e££ J
Note that, by Assumption 3.1, we have that
x*(rn(l-7re),a*H) = [m(l - 7re)]x*(a*(w)) 
x(m(l — yre)) = [m(l — 7re)]x
and therefore we get
C/(x*(m(l-7re),o*(w))|a*(cj)) = [m(l - 7
To simplify notation, let us also define the following quantities:
V* = [v*(u}PuJ (uj\v)duj
V = lv(u)pu (uv)du
A* = V - V
This means the value of information can be written as
A(m,e) = [m(l -7re)]A*
16 Note that in the effort allocation problem we neglect the fact that possible monetary costs of infor­ 
mation gathering change the endowment of voters and might therefore change their preferences over a. 
This is a second order effect and clearly a negligible one.
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Therefore, the maximization problem (3.6) can be re-written as
max[m(l - Tre)]V + q(e)(m(l - 7re)]A* - ve (3.7)
Solving this problem, we obtain the optimal effort function e*(m,v] (remember that 
agents are heterogeneous in m and v). This then gives the probability of being informed 
on political platforms Q(m,v\u>) = q(e*(m,v}), where conditioning on ui indicates that 
there is one such function for each realization of u. In particular, to link the probability 
of being informed to policy preferences, it is essential to understand how effort choice is 
dependent on the initial endowment of agents and therefore to calculate e j™'"' .
Proposition 3.2 If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied then e j™'v ' > 0 and therefore the prob­ 
ability of being informed on political platforms Q(m,v\aj} is such that Q'm > 0.
Proof.: see Appendix.
Before concluding this section, let us recall that we are dealing with the private value 
of information; however, since the number of citizens is very large (it is actually infinite) 
any incentive to acquire information for political purposes (i.e. for instrumental voting) is 
negligible, in the sense that the probability of being a pivotal voter is zero in a continuum 
of agents. Therefore Q(m,v u) fully represents the probability each citizen has of being 
informed on political platforms.
3.4 Voting decisions and political competition
In this section we analyse the political competition game and citizens' private and public 
decisions. We will solve the game backward, deriving agents' best responses and then the 
political equilibrium.
3.4.1 Consequences
As we have full commitment to platforms, the policy proposed by the winning party (a*) 
is implemented after the election; if the two parties get an equal share of votes then 
each policy is implemented with probability equal to ^. Note that the population of 
voters consists of those agents who actually vote, and is therefore a subset of the entire 
population.
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At the end of this period the realized utility for each agent will be given by
U(x*(m,a*)\a*} + Z(a*\m)-ve*(m;v) (3.8)
if informed and
U(x(m)\a*) + Z(a*\rn) -ve*(m;v) (3.9)
if uninformed.
3.4.2 Voting and private decisions
There are only two parties in the model, therefore strategic voting is equivalent to sincere 
voting. Voters always have a weakly dominant strategy and their optimal voting strategy 
z*(m, a£,Qfl) can have a simple representation:
L ifW(aL ,m) -W(aR ,m) >0
R if W(aL ,m) - W(aR ,m} < 0
abstain if W(a^, m) — W(aR , m) = 0
(3.10)
Voters who do not observe the platforms are indifferent between the two parties and we 
will assume they abstain. It is important to notice the crucial difference between the 
behaviour of the informed, who can make their choice contingent on {a^, a#}, and that of 
the uninformed, who cannot. Thus, uninformed voters cannot be responsive to different 
platform announcements. The assumption that the uninformed abstain is not essential, 
and it only helps in providing an empirical interpretation of our results. An alternative 
could be to assume that they vote randomly: this would not have any impact on our 
results.
Optimal private decisions will be
for informed agents and
fx = argmaxX£x I U(x. a*(u>))p(uj\v)da (3-12)
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for the uninformed. These private decisions are made before elections 17 . Hence, when 
making private choices citizens do not know the election outcome, although they can form 
rational expectations.
3.4.3 Information gathering
At this stage we have the process described in the previous section. Agents must decide 
how much effort to devote to information gathering. Solving the maximization problem 
(3.7) we derive the optimal effort of each citizen e*(m,v) and then the probability of 
being informed on platform announcement Q(m,vu). At the end of this period the 
total population will be divided into informed agents (those who observe the platforms) 
and uninformed. Note again that more effort only implies a higher probability of being 
informed.
3.4.4 Platforms' announcement and political equilibrium
Parties announce their platforms simultaneously. Remember that at the beginning of the 
game they both observed the realization of the random variable u and therefore they
know /•
Eu,(e\m) = I e*(m,v)p(vu}dv. (3.13)
It is impossible to know ex ante who is going to be informed and who is not, because this 
depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks and because q(e) represents only 
a probability of getting information18 . What the parties can do is to exploit the ex ante 
information on observables (m and u) and their relationship with the probability of being 
informed, e is an idiosyncratic shock with no systematic relation with policy preferences, 
so it is irrelevant for parties' strategies 19 . Therefore,, from the point of view of the parties
17 For our purposes they could also be simultaneous to elections.
18 It should be noted that the process of information gathering is considered ex ante. In other words, if a 
lucky agent observes the announcement immediately he will stop putting effort into information gathering, 
before reaching the ex ante optimal level e*. However, this interim process is not observable for the parties, 
which can look at the situation only from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, since luck does not depend 
on policy preferences, this consideration will be irrelevant when coming to political proposals. This is 
the same argument we use for e, which is both uncorrelated with policy preferences and unobservable for 
parties.
19 Moreover we assume that only u> is observed.
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we can consider /•
Qu>(™-) — Q(m,v u}p(v\uj)dv. (3-14) 
J
We assume parties are interested in maximizing expected plurality PE (a,i,aj} = 
E[ni(ai,aj) —nj(ai,aj}}. Therefore the problem of party i (i = L,R) is
/ /• Qu(z~ l (a))y(a}da- I Qw (z~ l (a})y(a}da (3.15) -Woi.a,-) ^,(a,,a,:)
where .^(a^o,) represents the set of policies preferred by citizens choosing party i, 
given that platforms are (a,,Oj). A Nash equilibrium in platforms (a*,a!p must therefore 
satisfy
Pf(alaj) > /f «,a;) > Jf (a^), z,j = L,fl (3.16)
Notice that from Assumption 3.2 the policy space admits a Condorcet winner20 . When 
we say that a policy space admits a Condorcet winner we basically assume that everybody 
in the population space is capable of choosing his or her preferred option in a pairwise 
comparison. This is clearly not possible if some agents do not know what the available 
options are. However, we can still find a Condorcet winner given that any subset of the 
population satisfies Assumption 3.2. Given our assumptions, the Condorcet winner is the 
platform preferred by the voter who is median in the set of the ex post informed voters 
Nj. Parties clearly do not know the identity of informed and uninformed citizens and 
therefore cannot say ex ante what is the relevant set of voters. Since the population is 
very large and since both the preferred policy and the probability of being informed are 
monotonically related to income, we can find a focal point for parties' strategies. The 
relevant set of voters is ex ante an unknown set; hence the parties maximize over the 
expected relevant set of voters. Thus, the likelihood of being informed may be taken into 
account in maximizing expected votes, and this is reflected in the payoff function in the 
(3.15).
°See Cans and Smart (1996).
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3.4.5 Characterization of equilibrium
In this section we derive some important properties of the equilibrium. An equilibrium 
in this game is given by a platform announcement for each party
a vector of decision strategies for informed citizens
{e*(m;v), i*(m,aL ,aR), -x*(m,aL ,aR)} 
and one for uninformed citizens
(e*(m;v), i*(m), x*(m)}
We are interested in the political equilibria, and so we leave in the background the equi­ 
librium in private choices, which will not affect our results.
The existence of a "weighted Condorcet winner" , and therefore competition among 
parties to reach it, ensures that political equilibrium will have some simple and intuitive 
properties.
Proposition 3.3 The unique political equilibrium is given by a* s.t.
Proof. See Appendix
Hence, parties will converge on the platform preferred by the expected median in­ 
formed voter. The argument for this convergence is identical to the standard Downsian 
one, the only difference being that the relevant population distribution is weighted by the 
probability each citizen has of being reactive to political proposals.
Given the continuity of the policy space and of the distribution function of the cost 
of information, we can also prove the following result, which was used (but not proved) 
in the previous section.
Lemma 3.1 The political equilibrium of this game can be expressed as a continuous
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function a*(u) : S^ —» A.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now turn back to the issue of the value of information. In Proposition 3.1 
we proved that the value of political information is increasing in each agent's income; in 
Lemma 3.2 we show that the value of information is positive, even if agents are able to 
understand they are in a political equilibrium: rational expectations rule out all policies 
that cannot be sustained in equilibrium, whatever the realization of random variables, 
but agents are still uncertain about which equilibrium they are in.
Lemma 3.2 In equilibrium the value of information on platforms is positive.
Proof. Since the distribution QUJ (z~ l (a)) depends on the realized value of w, voters, 
who have rational expectations but do not know u, will expect to have in equilibrium 
a*(u). Anyway, informed voters can fully deduce a* from platform convergence. Un­ 
informed voters rationally rule out any other possibility apart from a*(u) but are still 
uncertain about the actual a* . This fact gives a positive value to information about 
parties' platforms.•
3.5 Implications for income redistribution
We can now turn to redistributive policies. As we noted earlier, little empirical support 
has been found for positive models of income redistribution that are based on the median 
voter theorem: in general, redistributive policies do not appear to be very responsive to 
the median/mean income ratio.
It is clear that many issues are at stake in democracies and that there is no simple 
way to explain redistribution. However, in this section we want to ask if information on 
politics may give some insights even in a simple one-dimensional framework.
It is possible to characterize the equilibrium in terms of the policy outcome in a 
precise way and compare it with the outcome of a standard Downsian model with perfect 
information.
Proposition 3.4 Let us indicate with a*M the. political equilibrium when the entire pop­ 
ulation is informed on platform announcements. Then
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w > 0 => a*(w) < a*(0) < o^. 
Moreover, ^g^ < 0 =» a*' < 0. 
Proof. See Appendix.
Political equilibrium in our game involves a public policy that will be, in general, 
different from that preferred by the median voter over the entire population (see Figure 
3-2). The weight attached to agents by political parties is increasing in their income, 
and therefore the pivotal voter has an income higher than the median21 . As long as 
acquiring information has a cost, the public policy will be bounded above by a*(0), which 
is lower than the median voter outcome. This provides a microfoundation for the idea 
that richer agents have more power in the political process. This is not a new idea in 
political science and political economy: it is for example a crucial assumption in Bebabou 
(2000). Nevertheless, microfounded justifications for such hypothesis are still missing in 
the literature.
Abusing of this result and interpreting non-responsiveness to policies as abstention in 
general elections, we can link this idea to the stylized facts that abstention is more common 
among low income agents and that countries with higher turnout tend to have higher 
levels of social expenditure. Starting with the classical study of Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
(1980), a vast empirical literature consistently finds positive correlations between turnout 
and variables like income or education. Some theoretical research has linked information 
to participation. In decision-theory terms, being better informed allows better choices 
and therefore should increase the probability of voting (Matsusaka, 1995). When strategic 
interactions are considered, less informed citizens might abstain in order to increase the 
probability of the better informed being pivotal (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). This, 
however, is only true if citizens' preferences are not too heterogeneous (Caillaud and 
Tirole, 1997).
In terms of our model, if we introduce a cost of voting that is independent of policy 
preferences, then we can easily link our results on rational ignorance to actual voter 
turnout22 . This would deliver observable conclusions about electoral participation and 
social spending. Interestingly, Lindert (1996) finds evidence of this: "a stronger voter
21 Analogously, Stromberg (2002) finds that office-seeking candidates will bias their policy proposals in 
favour of citizens that are more likely to be targeted by the mass media. 
22 Provided we have that the probability to be pivotal is non-zero.
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Figure 3-2: The "weighted" median voter
turnout seems to have raised spending on every kind of social program, as one would 
expect if one assumed that the social programs cater to the lower income groups whose 
voter turnout differs most over time and across countries". Section 1.5 of this thesis 
discusses a number of other works presenting evidence in that sense23 .
Another important conclusion of the analysis of redistributive policies within the 
Downsian framework is that an increase in income inequality (measured as the ratio 
between the mean and the median income) should lead to more redistribution. In com­ 
paring two income distributions <^ 1 and </?2 with the same mean, a way to say that i/?2
23 However, on a study on US panel data, Besley and Case (2002) find that turnout has little effect on 
the party composition of legislature.
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induces more redistribution than (f l is
•mi
)dm>- (3.17)
A
where mi is the income of the pivotal voter under distribution tp^ . The reason that the 
change produces more redistribution is that the pivotal voter under (p2 is poorer (being 
mi > m?, with m2 s.t. f™2 <p^(m}dm = ^) and therefore his or her distance from the 
mean has increased.
In our model, however, the condition for more redistribution translates into
\m Q( -^—————— (3.18)
where m\ is the income of the pivotal voter in the distribution Q(m)(pi(m). It is clear 
that condition (3.17) does not imply condition (3.18) nor the vice versa. In general, the 
foregoing analysis leads to a result of indeterminacy. A mean-median ratio increase does 
not necessarily lead to more redistribution in a democratic system, as this will have two 
contrasting effects: more inequality increases the middle classes' desire for redistribution, 
but it also means greater dispersion in the probability of being informed, resulting in 
parties targeting higher-income groups. Unfortunately, it is not possible to characterize 
the effects of an increase in inequality better, if not in obscure and not very useful ways. 
However, this indeterminacy should at least counsel more prudent use of voting models 
for comparing the redistributive outcomes of different degrees of inequality. We can 
summarize this negative result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5 An increase in the mean-median income ratio is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for more redistribution.
In focusing on the formal aspects of electoral processes, the voting literature seems 
to have neglected the role of factors that certainly matter for the proper functioning of 
democracy: democratic decisions require not only that people go to the polls but also 
other institutional elements, such as those that foster informed public opinion. New 
elements come to play a role in our analysis. First of all the shape of the function Q(m) 
matters. Since the results are driven by the fact that Qm is positive, it can be argued that 
traditional results are likely to be reversed when Qm is large enough. That is, to be able to
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say anything about redistribution we must also be able to determine the impact of income 
on the decision to acquire information. Clearly, this may depend on many elements: a 
sufficiently high general level of education, for example, is an important condition for 
widespread access to information and certainly raises the capability to extract information 
from the new (we addressed this issue in chapter 2). Also, the importance of the supply of 
information should not be underestimated: sufficiently free press and competition in the 
information market can increase the availability of good quality information and hence 
increase political knowledge. Evidence from the previous chapter support this type of 
claims.
Another consideration is that focusing on median and mean incomes can be highly 
misleading. It would be more appropriate to consider the whole income distribution, 
since the identity of the expected pivotal voter can be modified by changes outside the 
median-mean range: changes in the distribution that leave both median and mean incomes 
unaltered may nevertheless influence policy choices by affecting citizens' responsiveness 
in other parts of the distribution, thus changing the identity of the pivotal voter.
This leads to another consideration, namely that not only relative but also absolute 
inequality matters. Two distributions with the same degree of relative inequality (as 
gauged for example by Lorenz curves) may produce different political outcomes, because 
the function Q(m) is not necessarily linear, and will therefore "weight" the two distributive
profiles differently. In section 3.3 we derived results on Qm (m), but nothing general can be
// 
said about Qm (rri). That is, a change in the difference between mean and median income,
leaving their ratio unaffected, would change the political equilibrium in our model even 
when it would not affect a standard Downsian model.
Furthermore the mean-median ratio (or distance) is not necessarily a good measure 
of inequality24 . Indeed, we can think of an increase in inequality (in terms of Lorenz 
dominance, for example) associated with a reduction of the distance between mean and 
median income. However, as political equilibria have been derived in the literature in 
terms of this measure, it has become standard to consider only mean and median income. 
Yet our analysis suggests the need to considering the entire distribution. Further analysis 
is necessary to derive results in this direction.
4 For example it does not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. See Lambert (1995).
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Since Proposition 3.5 is essentially a negative result, we now use two examples to 
illustrate the possible implications of the foregoing analysis.
Example 1 (A poor majority).
Let us consider a population divided into two groups, Poor and Rich, with respective 
income trip and W.R and m/j > mp; we also assume that Np > NR. The two sources 
of information cost u and e now assume a finite number of possible values; in particular 
Sw = {UL,UH} (with UL < UH) and S£ = {ZL,£M^H} with (eL < eM < e^} and the 
respective probabilities are pH , pL = 1 — pH , qH , qM< qL . We then have the following 
possible realizations for the cost of information v :
v = <
VMM =
VH =^n + SH w.p. pH x qH 
CM = uL +eH w.p. pH x qM + qH x 
SL=UL + SM w.p. pH x qL + qM x
VL =UJL + £L w.p. (1 -
- pH )
- pH )
Moreover, the probability of being informed assumes an extreme form:
q(e} =
1 if e > e
0 if e < e
We will also assume that the value of information and the income distribution are such 
that at a cost Vfj nobody is informed, at a cost VMH only the rich buy information, i.e.
e*(mR ,vMH ) = e 
e*(mp,VMH) = 0
and at cost VML and VL all agents value information on political party platforms at more 
than the cost of acquiring it, i.e.
e*(mP ,vML ) = e
It is immediately clear that with full information the Condorcet winner is the policy 
preferred by the poor a* = aP . Let us now analyse imperfect information. Using Bayes'
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rule, after observing his or her own private cost, each agent is able to deduce that
PT(UJH \VH) = 1
P^H\VMH) = p = ————P" * QM ———-
PH x <?M T qn x ( l - PH)
PH x IL) + qM x (1 - P#) 
Pr(wH|uL) = 0
Let us then consider the two possible realizations of u>.
Case 1: u = UH- Some agents will have a private cost VH and will have no incentive 
to gather information. The rich with costs VMH and VML will gather information. For 
a large population, each agent's probability of being informed can be translated into the 
fraction of the population that is informed. Therefore we have (qM + qi)NR informed. In 
the same way we have q^Np informed. If (qM + qi)NR > qiNp then a* = OR.
Case 2: u — U>L- The poor with v = VMH stay uninformed while those with v = VML 
have a value of information greater than its cost and therefore acquire it. The rich with 
VMH an<i VML will acquire information. Let us now assume that NR < qM^p. What 
happens to agents with cost VL? Notice that those agents would receive a positive value 
from acquiring information on party platforms. However, they also have degenerate beliefs 
on the realization of u. Knowing that u = ML they learn that a fraction qM of the poor 
are informed, and that is enough to establish that a* = aP . Therefore they do not need 
to gather information to be informed on the policy, independently of their income, and 
can free ride on the group with higher cost v = VML . Only a fraction qM of the poor and 
(gM -)_ qH } of the rich will be informed, which ensures a* = ap. Thus, we have proved the 
following proposition:
Proposition 3.6 Assume qMNP > NR and (qM + qi)NR > qLNP . Then a* = aR w.p. 
PH and a* = ap w.p. (1 -
It is therefore clear that, depending on the parameters, even a small minority of rich 
people may be able to obtain their preferred policy. This is likely to happen when the 
majority of the poor are not in a position to make relevant private decisions. If, for 
example, a majority of the population is at a subsistence level of income, they might 
have low incentives to be informed on public policies, thus leaving public decisions to the
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rich minority, in spite of the fact that collective decisions could significantly affect their 
welfare. When we compare this with the outcome under full information, it is evident 
that the probability of having outcome a* = ap has been reduced from 1 to (1
Example 2 (Constitutional restriction). Let us consider again a population 
divided into rich and poor, with the same assumptions on population distribution and the 
cost of information as in Example 1. We will now also see that other sources of uncertainty 
can be introduced and that something can be learned about them from parties' behaviour. 
Also, initial endowment does not need to be income.
Agents have identical utility functions U(d,l,g), where d is consumption, I is leisure 
and g is a public good. Gross income and net income are respectively generated by agent 
i according to
mi = Wi(l — I)
di = 7Tlj(l — T)
where Wi is the wage rate, (1 — 1) is labour supply (with total time normalized to 1) 
and r is a flat tax rate. The public good is produced with constant returns at unitary 
cost and, assuming balanced budget, we have
g =
Rich and poor are endowed with different wage rates wp < WR. That of the rich is 
assumed given and common knowledge, while that of the poor is a random variable that 
can assume two possible realizations: wp — wp w.p. p and iup — wp w.p. (1— p), with 
wp > WP . Notice that nothing would change if instead of uncertainty on the wage rate 
we considered any element of preferences, like intensity of preference for the public good 
by either of the two groups.
We consider two possible regimes: in regime (a) a linear tax is levied on the entire 
population and the revenue is used to produce the public good. In regime (b) a consti­ 
tutional restriction prevents taxation below a threshold level of gross income, so that if 
the poor have wage rate wp they are not taxed, whatever the tax rate. Indicating this
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threshold with fn, we have
m> Vr
Note that the public policy issue T is unidimensional, since there is a binary correspon­ 
dence between r and g.
Case (a): with full information T is known to everybody. Therefore each agent will 
perform an individual optimization over labour supply, taking into account his or her 
own wage rate and the tax. The indirect utility function after this process is given by 
V(w(l — r},g). Since preferences are assumed identical for all agents, when coming to the 
public policy issue we will typically have TP > TR (and gp > gR). Therefore the Condorcet 
winner is represented by T* = TP, and competing political parties will converge on T*. Let 
us now consider the case of imperfect information. This is very similar to that analysed 
in the previous example. Therefore, on the basis of Proposition 3.6, if we did not have 
uncertainty on the wage rate we could have concluded that r* = TR w.p. pn and T* = TP 
w.p. (1 — pn)- But now we have to take into account that the optimal tax rate for each 
agent depends on the realization of the uncertain wage rate of the poor. We will have
Tp(Wp) > Tp(wP ) > TR (wp) > TR (WP )
Therefore:
TR(WP ) w.p. pH x p
TR(WP) w.p. pH x (1 -p)
TP(WP ) w.p. (1 - pH ) x (1 - p)
TP(WP ) w.p. (1 -pH ) xp
The value of information for each rich agent is represented by
= V(wR(l-r*),g*)-[pH xpV(wR(l-TR (wP)),gR (wP )) 
+ PH x (1 - p)V(wR(l - TR (wP )),gR (wp)) 
+(1 -pH)pV(wR(l -Tp(wp)),gp(wp ))
- pH )(l - p)V(wR(l - Tp(wP)),gP (wp))}
T = <
The poor learn the realization of their own wage rate and therefore have one less source
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of uncertainty. Then the value of information for each poor agent is given by 
= V(wp(l-T*),g*)-[pHV(wp(l-TR(wp»,gR (wP))
We are making the following assumption on the value of information:
VH > wR > VMH > VML > VL 
VH > VMH > &(WP) > VML > VL
Note also that the value of information for the rich in this case is not limited to 
knowledge of policies but extends to knowledge of an exogenous element (the wage rate 
of the poor) that can be useful for some decisions and that is revealed by politicians' 
behaviour.
Case (b). Now we have a constitutional restriction that prevents the poor from being 
taxed if they are endowed with the low income. The preferred tax levels will change 
accordingly. Indicating with Tp(u;P ) the tax rate preferred by the poor when their wage 
rate is low, under the constitutional restriction we have Tp(wp] = 1 > Tp(wp). If the wage 
rate of the poor is high then their preferred tax rate is not affected by the constitutional 
restriction, so r^,(wp) = TP(WP).
The preferred tax rate of the rich also changes. If the poor's wage is high then again 
the constitutional restriction has no effect: T^(WP) = TR (WP). But if WP = wp then 
r^Wp) < TR (WP ) (assuming that the substitution effect dominates the income effect).
With full information the constitutional restriction is clearly favourable to the poor 
since the new Condorcet winner will simply follow the preferences of the poor. Therefore
*
the equilibrium policy becomes T* = 1 w.p. p and remains TP(WP] w.p. (l—p). When 
introducing imperfect information, notice that under the constitutional restriction if the 
wage rate realized for the poor is low, then they have no uncertainty over their own 
tax rate, which is going to be zero independently of public choice. The poor can then 
perform their preferred labour supply choice without information gathering: the value of 
information for them becomes zero and therefore lower than the lowest possible realization 
for the cost of information. If this is the case then the Condorcet winner is represented
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by r^(u>p). However, if the realization of the wage rate is high then the poor will still 
gather information and therefore the Condorcet winner is Tp(w;p) = TP(WP), i.e. exactly 
the tax rate that would prevail without constitutional restriction. As a consequence, the 
political equilibrium is T^(WP) w.p. p, TP (WP) w.p. (l-p)(l -p//), and TR (WP) w.p.
The situation considering asymmetric information has been reversed. Now we can 
have a deviation from TP(WP) with probability p + (1— p)p//; not , however, towards an 
increased tax but a reduced one. Moreover, the constitutional restriction could be harmful 
for the poor. Without the constitutional restriction the (ex ante) expected tax rate is
E(T*} = TR(W_P) PH x p + TR (WP) PH x (1 — p)
+TP(WP}(! - PH} x (1 - p) + Tp(wp}(l - pH } x p
while under the constitutional restriction we have
It is easy to verify that E(T*} > EC (T*}, and therefore a restriction which has been 
introduced in order to increase income redistribution might eventually reduce it.
It is clear that a restriction on targeted benefits instead of one on the tax would 
have delivered the same conclusion. The basic result is that to participate in public life 
people may need some "selective incentives", and an important aspect of public policies 
is whether or not they generate such incentives.
3.6 Extensions on coalitions and opinion leaders
The solution concept used in the model is Nash equilibrium: nobody wants to deviate 
unilaterally from his or her best response given the behaviour of other agents. It is 
well known that Nash equilibria do not need to be efficient, in the sense that Pareto 
improvements are sometimes possible when agents are able to coordinate.
It should first be noted that in the model presented here this is not the case. If side 
payments among citizens are not possible, then any agent would just prefer his or her
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ideal level of a to any other. Therefore, once an equilibrium has been reached, there is 
no way to improve the condition of one of the citizens without putting somebody else in 
a worse situation. It is useful to think of a as a public policy grounded in a second best 
environment. This creates the possibility that some public policy choices are less efficient 
than others, in the sense that they could be Kaldor-Pareto dominated if some form of 
compensation were possible. Anyway, since we limit our policy space to one dimension 
(a), then the conclusion must be that any outcome of the political process is Pareto 
efficient. This is a typical feature of all Downsian models. It is nevertheless interesting 
to note that in our model the political outcome is not preferred by the majority of the 
population, i.e. there are available alternatives that could potentially beat in pairwise 
comparison that selected.
Further progress could be made by recognizing that the political equilibrium of this 
game does not need to be coalition-proof. Nash equilibrium is concerned with the be­ 
haviour of single agents. We know that since the probability of being a pivotal voter is 
zero, nobody will put more effort into information gathering than what is optimal from 
a private perspective. However, if a large group of citizens with similar preferences can 
coordinate on acquiring more information, this would shift the political equilibrium to­ 
wards their preferred one. This shift in political outcome could be worth the extra-effort 
spent in information gathering; the problem is that information above the private needs 
is a public good, and individuals will fail to coordinate without some specific coordinating 
device.
However, in a world in which it is individually costly to gather information on polit­ 
ical platforms, it can also be too costly to coordinate people for acquiring information: 
moreover, there may be other reasons why people might not be willing to coordinate 
on information acquisition25 . The form of coordination one can imagine is directed to 
reducing the costs for some groups: this is typically done by many organizations with 
an interest in policy choices. Another way this coordination can, at least partially, take 
place, is by transmitting "cheap" information. In other words, it might not be neces­ 
sary to know and perfectly understand the public budget and its implications in order to 
make a "good" choice. If a pre-election stage is added to our model, in which people can
25 For example because it can seriously limit individual liberties.
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simply endorse parties and say "vote for R" or "vote for L", without any justification, 
this could change the political outcome, as long as the announcements come from people 
whose preferences are known26 . We can think that a cheap message (one that can be sent 
and received at low cost), rather uninformative per se, can nevertheless serve uninformed 
citizens as a good signal of where the preferred policy lies27 . The problem in this case is 
transferred to the "reliability" of the sources of such messages. Is it realistic to assume 
that people know the political preferences of other agents? It should be recognized that 
some agents are able to signal their preferences in some way and that many organizations 
are also able to establish a reputation in this sense. Trade unions, for example, are often 
able to coordinate people's voting decisions because of their reputation. However, the role 
of those organizations or opinion leaders is not necessarily to transmit information, which 
could well maintain the same cost, but to convey messages that can coordinate people's 
actions: we can think of this as a possible direction for further investigating the role of 
ideologies and leadership in the political process.
The fact that this coordination failure can be more pronounced among low-income 
citizens is consistent with good many stylized facts about voters' turnout in elections, 
participation in organizations, etc. Moreover, it may tell us something about the role of 
political organizations in democracies, and in particular about the historical differences 
in the way popular parties were organized compared with traditional liberal parties (i.e. 
parties that were formed before universal suffrage). Our analysis may provide a rationale 
for the strong organization and sense of the leadership typical of most popular parties: 
this is simply consistent with the necessity for more effective coordination.
3.7 Summary and conclusion
This chapter studies the role of citizens' demand for political information in elections and 
its link with redistributive policies; it provides a possible explanation for the low empirical 
support encountered by Downsian models of income redistribution. This is done by 
linking the demand for political information to voters' responsiveness to political platforms
26 The seminal cheap-talk game is by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They consider a sender and a decision- 
maker who receives the sender's message rather than a population of decision-makers. See also Lupia and 
McCubbins (1998).
27 See for example Grossman and Helpman (1999).
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and considering that incentives to gather information may derive from its relevance for 
private choices. This incentive is generally asymmetric across the population, which may 
generate a heterogeneous degree of awareness about policies. We consider a Downsian 
environment with vote-seeking parties and the possibility of full commitment to proposed 
platforms and show that, for a wide class of utility functions, the ex ante value of political 
information is increasing in income and therefore, in electoral periods, richer agents have 
higher probability of being informed on proposed platforms. Since parties tend to target 
the citizens who are expected to be more responsive to their proposed platforms, the 
political equilibrium involves policy convergence not to the median preferred policy but 
to the policy preferred by the expected median informed voter. Therefore redistribution 
can be expected to be, in general, less than that predicted by the median voter result. 
Moreover, an increase in inequality will have two contrasting effects: it will increase the 
desire of agents with income below the mean for redistribution, but it will also generate 
greater dispersion in the probability of being informed, resulting in parties targeting 
higher-income voters. The net effect depends on many variables and cannot be determined 
in a simple way, as in traditional Downsian models. This is a possible explanation for 
the fact that greater inequality in democratic countries does not very often lead to more 
social spending or redistributive taxation.
Another consequence of our analysis is that to understand redistribution we should 
not confine our attention to relative inequality; if a large majority of the population have 
only a subsistence income cannot be expected to obtain their preferred policies. At the 
same time, some restrictions on the policy space that are apparently beneficial for the 
poorest segments of the population may end up reducing their incentives to participate 
in public life and therefore actually working against redistribution. Those perverse effects 
cannot be captured in models that assume perfect information.
This analysis calls for a better understanding of mechanisms and institutions that, 
though not being part of a formal definition of democracy, are nevertheless quite impor­ 
tant for its functioning. If informed choices are generally better than uninformed ones, 
then having an informed public opinion is an important characteristic of a truly demo­ 
cratic system. This consideration seems to have been neglected in most of the public 
choice literature to date. What is done here is clearly only a partial step, and further 
investigation is necessary.
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From a theoretical point of view this approach can be extended to different and more 
sophisticated models of political competition, where the effect of multidimensional policy 
spaces and non-commitment on platforms can be examined taking the role of information 
into account. Also, the link between lack of information and abstention deserves further 
investigation, in particular when political platforms are endogenous. Empirical inves­ 
tigation could also help understanding whether parties actually target more responsive 
voters.
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3.8 Appendix: Proof of results
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (if a*(u) is a continuous function). 
We divide the proof in 3 steps.
1) Let us consider the objective function f^ {U "(x|a* (u))pw (ui v}(Lj. Note that pM ( 
is a continuous function and never changes its sign, and a*(u) and £/(•) are both continuous 
functions. Then we can apply the weighted mean value theorem for integrals to say that 
3 u> s.t.
= E/(x|a*(u3))
We do not know the actual value of a), which depends on the concavity of [/(•) and on d^,. 
But we know that the optimal decision function derived under uncertainty is the same as 
that derived under one of the possible deterministic functions. Then we can express the 
solution to the utility maximization problem as x*(m, p,a*(cD)).
2) Note that for a homogeneous of degree 1 utility function we have x*(m, p) = mx*(p) 
and therefore, V(m, p, a*) = mV(p, a*). Let us define by V(m, p, a*) the maximum utility 
attainable when platforms are not observed. Suppose we have a given realization a*(aj ). 
The indirect utility function (ex post, i.e. if a* is observed) is thus V(m, p,a*(a> )). From 
step 1, we can express the solution when a* is not observed as x*(m,p,a*(u/ )) for some 
a/' G 5^. Then the ex post value of information for the realization u is given by:
A(m|u/) = J7(x*(m,p,aL ,aH)]a*(u/)) +Z(a*(a/)|m)
Note that
V(p,a*(u')\a*(u')) - np,a*(^")|a*(J)) > 0
with strict inequality if u ^ LJ" (by the definition of value function), which implies that
gA(m) n dm > u -
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3) Finally /• 
A(m e) = /
and
5A(m)
9m 7 5m ^~ 
The stated proposition follows from the fact that d-gffl > O.B
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (if a*(u) is a discrete function)
As claimed in section 3.3, Proposition 3.1 does not actually require the continu­ 
ity of a*(it;). Let us then assume a finite but very large number of citizens N and the 
functions pw (u} and p£ (e) as discrete probability functions with mass respectively over 
Sui = {<^>%\Puj(^i) > 0} i = 1, ...k, and Se = {e;|p£ (e;) > 0} , I = 1,..., h. Then, maintaining 
all other assumptions holding, we can provide the following alternative proof.
Note that step 2 in the previous proof still applies with (indicating with Oj the true 
realization of u>)
L._/'
1=1
where Z(a\m} has been neglected since it obviously cancels out. 
By homogeneity of [/(.), we derive (as in step 2) that
This can be rewritten as
k
By the definition of maximum value function we have
Then we can write
A(m|o5j) =
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where
Finally we have
fc
A(m|e) =
1=1
from which the result is proved immediatelyB. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 The maximization problem is
max[m(l - ire)}V + q(e)(m(l — 7re)]A* - ve
The first order condition is
—vrmV" + [qe (e)m(l — TTC) — g(e)7rm)]A* — v = 0 
Note that the second order condition is always satisfied:
[q"e (e)m(l - TTB) - 2q'e (e}m-n}A* < 0 Ve
We can then apply the implicit function theorem to the FOG to say that 
de*(m,v) -TtV + [q'e (e*}(l - tre*) - g(e*)7r)]A*
dm ~ [q'e(e*)m(I - vre*) - 2^(e 
As we have seen, the denominator is always negative, so e 3" > 0 if and only if
-irV + [q'e (e*)(l - vre*) - g(e*)7r)]A* > 0 
which implies __
<,;(e')A-7T ' '
However, notice that to satisfy the FOC it must be that
which means that 3A.I is always satisfied. Therefore de'^ > 0 and dQ(™^} > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3 By assumption 3.2 we know that for any platform pair (a;, a,) 
there exists one type of agent a who is indifferent between the two and either
at < a => W(mk ,ai) > W(mk,aj)Vak < a
or
Define L(a') = ^ Qw (z~ l (a)}y(a]da and R(d) = ft QUJ (z' l (a})y(a)da. Now consider
a < a*. If party i chooses a then party j will maximize P?(., .) by setting a = a +/., for 
an infinitesimal L and getting expected votes R(a } . But then a is not a best response to 
a since, by continuity of the policy space, there exist a +L that increases Pf(., .). But this 
is true for any a < a*. The same argument applies for any a > a*. Therefore the unique 
Nash equilibrium is given by (a*, a*) which delivers payoffs P?(a*,a*) = P^(a*,a*} — OM
Proof of Lemma 3.1 Note that the distribution Q^(z~ l (a}) depends on the realized 
value of u>\ therefore parties will make platform announcements contingent on ui. 
From platform convergence on the expected Condorcet winner we have that the 
equilibrium can be expressed as a*(u>). We want to show that a*(u) is also a con­ 
tinuous function. Let us consider the implicit function
C(w,a*)= / Q(z~ l (a)\uj)y(a}da- I Q(z~ l (a}\uj}y(a)da = 0. (3A.2)
J± Ja*
where a* indicates the Condorcet winner in the distribution y(a)Q(z~ l (a)\uj}. (,(cu,a*) 
is clearly a continuous function (as Q^(m;i>), p(v;u>) and y(a) are continuous), 
strictly increasing in a* and
lira CKa*) < 0a*— »a
0
Thus, applying the implicit function theorem we can say that there exists a unique 
and continuous function a*(u) defined in Su and having values in A and such that
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Proof of Proposition 3.4 In equilibrium with full information we have
fCL i , fQ, 1 
I / J./ y(a)da = / y(a)da = -
Ja Ja', *
while instead when u> > 0 we have
Q(z- l (a))y(a}da > T Q(Z- l (a)}y(a)da
Ja.*,
since Q(z~ l (.)) is a monotonic decreasing function. This implies a"M cannot be 
an equilibrium since BL s.t. nr (a*M — i,a*M } > ni(a*M ,a*M ). Note that instead 
ni(a*M + t > aM) — ni(aM' aA"/)> and therefore, by single crossing in policy prefer­ 
ences, deviations above a*M are never profitable. By the same property, any subset 
of N will have a Condorcet winner represented by the policy a* preferred by the 
median voter in the considered subset.
Now remember that Qw (m; v} = q(e*(m; v}}. Therefore if u> = 0 then v = e. Thus we 
have E(e\m) = f e*(m\ s)p(e}de. Also, e*(m;e) and p(e] are continuous functions, 
which implies E(e\m) is continuous. Since m' > m =>• e*(m';e) > e*(m;e) Ve € SE 
then —dm > 0 and therefore Qo(Tn} is increasing in m which implies that a*(u>) 
has an upper bound in a*(0) which is strictly lower than a*M .
To prove the second part of the statement, let us reconsider £(cj,a*) from the 3A.2. 
From the implicit function theorem we know that
a,., = --
da'
The denominator is clearly positive, while the sign of the nominator is ambiguous. 
Therefore the sign of a,*,' is opposite to that of
y(a)da- / —— a y(a)da
First note that 8Q(z^Ja)r) < Q which implies that both integrals are negative. If
< 0 then any value of gj in the nrst integral is higher than any
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value of dQ(Z dJ°)H jn ^he second one. Since the derivative is calculated in a*(u) 
then each side has a total mass of half in terms of y(a). Therefore we must have
/•™ «o(z- (.)M r BQ^fsM
J°L duj Ja'M du 
which implies a^ < O.B
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Chapter 4
The Instrumental Voter Goes to 
the News-Agent: Information 
Acquisition, Election Closeness, 
and the Media
4.1 Introduction and related literature
The literature explaining voting and elections using the tools of rational choice theory is 
vast. Rational choice models assume that voting is a mean by which to achieve public 
policy ends: this behaviour is called instrumental voting. Citizens care about public 
policies and voting is the instrument to reach them, or at least to increase the probability 
to get what is preferred.
This theory poses some problems, including the fact that the probability to be pivotal 
in large elections is normally so low that it could be considered negligible in optimization 
processes. This criticism can be overcome if we are ready to compromise on what we 
intend by a rational act. In a weak sense, agents behave rationally according to their 
perception of the reality, that could be different from the "objective" state of facts. In 
the case of voting, the probability to be pivotal in a large election is clearly very low, 
but it is not zero. The subjective perception of the probability of casting a decisive 
vote does not necessarily coincide with the infinitesimal numbers that appropriate but
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cumbersome calculations would deliver (see for example Uhlaner and Grofman, 1986). 
Moreover, voting has been described as a "low cost-low benefit" activity (see Aldrich, 
1993): it is therefore possible that even small changes in this probability might have an 
effect on incentives to participate in elections.
If we accept this reasoning then turnout should be larger in closer elections, when the 
probability to cast the decisive vote is higher. Unfortunately empirical analysis does not 
deliver any firm conclusion. Foster (1984), after reviewing a number of studies on the 
closeness-turnout linkage in the US, concludes that "the perceived probability of a tied 
election at the state level is not a powerful or reliable factor in explaining across-state 
voter participation rates in presidential elections". Grofman, Collet and Griffin (1998) 
study on US Senate and House of Representatives elections find evidence of higher turnout 
among registered voters in closer contests. Other recent studies based either on aggregate 
data (Kunce, 2001) or on individual-level data (Matsusaka and Palda, 1999) show instead 
a poor relationship between closeness and turnout. Using poll data, Kunce (2001) also 
shows how "the extent to which pre-election perceptions matter depends directly on how 
one measures the likelihood of a close contest". It seems fair to say that evidence is, at 
best, mixed.
In this chapter we will consider another implication of instrumental theories of vot­ 
ing: when elections are closer then information on candidates and platforms should be 
more valuable as the probability for a vote to matter is higher. Although Downs (1957) 
himself hints at both the "paradox of voting" (low incentives to vote) and "rational ig­ 
norance" (low incentives to gather political information) as closely related consequences 
of instrumental voting, the second of the two paradoxes has received less attention, in 
particular for what concerns the predictive implications of comparative static analysis. 
Thus, information acquisition should be related to .the probability for a voter to be piv­ 
otal. If the suppliers of political information (mass media) are aware of this, then we 
should expect their behaviour to be influenced by marginality. In this sense, mass media 
behaviour under different circumstances will give us the possibility to provide a different 
kind of test of theories of instrumental voting and of the role of marginality as an incentive 
for participation. This clearly allows us to exploit information not used so far for this 
purpose.
Indeed, most people seem to believe that mass media have a vast impact on citizens'
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electoral choices. Politicians appear to struggle for media attention and tend to complain 
when they do not receive enough space on newspapers or television. Some politicians 
blame the media for bad electoral performances. In some countries access to television and 
electoral advertising during electoral campaigns are publicly regulated and even publicly 
funded. All this must be based on the presumption that media are effective in influencing 
voters' behaviour.
Studies in this sense have not delivered any conclusive evidence, both because of an 
objective lack of data and because of the difficulty to identify the media effects in reality. 
In particular, the effects of the media could potentially be of several different types. At 
the very minimum, the media can be seen as informing the citizens about the different 
available options on the political market. Some theories, however, give to mass media 
more power than this and see them as capable of persuading the people by shaping their 
policy preferences 1 . On the other side of the spectrum, it is conceivable that even the 
general values and principles of a community can be affected by media choices about what 
is worth to report, which aspects to highlight and the way news are delivered2 .
Rational choice theory, at least as long as the assumption of given preferences is 
maintained, seems clearly better compatible with the first hypothesis, that can be dated 
back to the so-called theory of "uses and gratifications" (see Blunder and McQuail (1968)). 
After a period of intense studies about "the media effects", this theory called for a change 
of perspective by asking rather what the people do with the media. According to this 
theory, citizens can be seen as active users of media, with preferences, expectations and 
demands. Following this approach a number of studies have tried to understand why and 
how agents acquire and process political information, and what is the role of personal 
characteristics (education, prior knowledge of political matters, interest etc.) in this 
process (Lau and Sears (1986), Ferejohn and Kuklinski (1990), Zaller (1992)).
From an economist's standpoint this calls for a formal analysis of the political informa­ 
tion market, with a demand for information that comes from individual preferences and
way to "shape" policy preferences is, for example, by agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972): 
the media can manipulate the salience of electoral issues, thus modifying the ranking of political priorities. 
2 Early studies in the first half of last century were based on the presumption that media were extremely 
powerful in conditioning people's attitudes and behaviour. After a period of "minimal effects" dominance 
(see Chapter 1), more recent studies have stressed the priming effect of the media (lyengar and Kinder, 
1987), i.e. the fact that the media, apart from informing or setting the agenda, can actually deliver a 
criterion of choice: this can potentially be completely independent of issues and platforms.
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a supply of information provided, among others, by media firms. Some research has been 
conducted in this direction. Matsusaka (1995) provides a Bayesian decision-theoretical 
model of political information demand. Chapter 2 of this thesis models information ac­ 
quisition as an individual production function, considering the role of ideological beliefs 
and providing evidence on the linkage between information and turnout during the 1997 
general election in Britain. Specific characteristics of the media industry (like economies 
of scale and concentration) can also be expected to matter for the way people are informed 
about politics. Works in this direction are Spence and Owen (1977) and Noam (1987).
As we discussed several times in this thesis, the degree of citizens' awareness of political 
matters may in turn be expected to affect public policy making, both on efficiency and 
redistributive grounds. Examples of works in this sense are Grossman and Helpman 
(1999) and Lohmann (1998). Chapter 3 in this thesis models the impact of incentives 
to acquire information on redistribution. Media's impact in elections and implications 
for public policies have been studied by Stromberg (2001 and 2002), Besley and Burgess 
(2002), and Besley and Prat (2001) 3 .
The theoretical model presented in this paper builds on Stromberg's (2002) model of 
mass media competition. Stromberg argues that "the increasing-return-to-scale technol­ 
ogy and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large 
groups, such as tax payers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable 
to advertisers". Eventually, this information bias will be taken into account by politicians 
when proposing electoral platforms and will therefore translate into a policy bias.
In what follows we will use again a version of the information acquisition model pre­ 
sented in chapter 2. Our units of analysis (called "groups" in Stromberg's model) are 
represented by electoral constituencies: in this way we will be able to implement a test 
of our predictions, as well as of some of Stromberg.'s results.
One of such results concerns the effect of group size on news supply. Larger groups 
should receive more media attention as they provide more readership and therefore more 
revenue. The same can be said of groups that are more valuable to advertisers (for example 
wealthier groups). However, in the context of our model a countervailing effect can be 
identified: in larger groups we should expect a more severe collective action problem.
3 Further details on these works are given in Chapter 1.
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Thus, in larger constituencies the probability to cast a decisive vote is smaller and such 
will be the demand for information. This "collective action effect" can potentially offset 
the "group size effect"; only empirical investigation can shed further light and allow us 
to accept or reject any theoretical result in this sense.
Information supply also depends on the newspapers' production function. Fixed costs 
are normally very high but it will be clear that delivery costs could also play an important 
role in information supply: more densely populated areas will receive more news coverage 
(other things equal) simply because the cost of the marginal reader is lower in such areas.
This chapter can be summarized as follows. In the next section we will present the 
theoretical model of information demand and supply. Political information can be de­ 
manded for a number of reasons, including instrumental voting. Thus, it will be higher 
in marginal constituencies. This higher demand will induce a larger supply by profit- 
maximizing media firms. Media's revenue per reader is represented by the price paid for 
the newspaper plus the amount paid by advertisers per reader. This amount is not the 
same for all customers and can be expected to be higher for customers that are more 
valuable to advertisers. The cost of producing newspapers is fixed but there is a variable 
delivery cost. Thus, in equilibrium, information supply is higher in marginal constituen­ 
cies as well as in constituencies with richer and more concentrated electorate. About the 
size of the electorate we identify two effects working in opposite directions, the "group size 
effect" and the "collective action effect". In section 4.3 these predictions are tested for the 
1997 British general election. The test consists of two parts. The first uses aggregate data 
and focuses on mass media behaviour. We will use data collected from a major national 
newspaper during the electoral campaign, as well as electoral data and the 1991 Census. 
The second part will focus instead on individual behaviour and use survey data from the 
1997 British General Election Study. The results .suggest a high degree of compatibility 
between our theory and the data. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The model
We start by considering a polity divided into two electoral constituencies fj, and o. Each 
constituency elects a member of parliament (MP). There are two competing parties L and 
R each presenting one candidate in all constituencies. MPs are elected in a first past the
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post system. With obvious notation we will indicate the candidates in each constituency 
with L^,Rfj,,L0 ,R0 .
Suppose the two candidates in each constituency are chosen independently by parties 
through a process that is unknown to citizens. This process can be represented for both 
parties by respective distribution functions FR(a) and FL (a) (with densities /L (a) and 
/fl(a)) over the support A C 0J+ of candidates' types.
For simplicity we will assume that the policy space is the same as the candidates' 
space and, abusing notation, that utility from policy a is a. Policies are formed at the 
central level by the parliament of the two MPs and affect both constituencies. If a^ is the 
candidate elected in constituency p. and a0 is elected in constituency o, then the central 
policy will be a* = \a^ + \a0 .
The net benefit to citizen in constituency \JL from electing the preferred of the two 
candidates a^\ and a^ is given by
) = \(^a0 + -a^} - (-a0 + -
Analogously
ao2 .
We also assume that ^i is marginal and this is common knowledge; i.e., if we indicate 
with Pt (i = /^, o] the (common) prior probability that a vote will result decisive, each 
agent believes that P^ > P0 . We can think of this probabilities as coming from different 
prior beliefs about the candidates in the two constituencies. For example in constituency 
H the distribution functions FR(a] and FL(O) are "more similar" than in o. However, 
also the population size in each constituency will clearly play a role as a larger electorate, 
with given priors, will reduce the probability of each single vote to be pivotal. With 
only two constituencies and given electorate this effect cannot be fully appreciated in the 
model. However, this "collective action effect" can be expected to play a role and will be 
considered in the empirical investigation. A trivial way to consider this effect is to write 
pi — Pi(Ni) where Ni is the size (in terms of electorate) of constituency i.
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4.2.1 Information demand
To avoid cumbersome notation we will focus on a generic constituency. Citizens util­ 
ity from voting when types are known is then W(aL ,aR ) = PlB(aL,aR). However, the 
expected utility from an informed voting choice before candidates are selected is given by
= P, / / B(aL ,aR}dFL (a)dFR(a), i = /*,«
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, here we will assume that there is no cost of 
voting.
We assume voters are ex ante uninformed about candidates. We will indicate the 
expected utility from uninformed voting as W. We can then define the ex post utility of 
an informed vote versus an uninformed one as
Before gathering information, however, the candidate types are unknown. Thus, the 
ex ante utility of gathering information is
A = J I [W(aL ,aR ) - W]dFL (a}dFR (a)
Lemma 4.1 A = W* - W > 0.
Proof.
Let us consider a generic constituency and introduce the following notation:
A\ = \aL ,aR s.t. P I I (aL - aR}dFL (a}dFR (a) > 0 j
\^ J J )
( f f aL ,aR s.t. P / I (aL - aR )dFL (a)dFR (a) <0
Suppose now that FL (a) and FR(a) are s.t. candidate L is preferred, i.e.
I l(aL ~ aR)dFL (a}dFR (a) > 0
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An uninformed voter in this case votes for candidate L. Her ex ante utility is
W = \Pi I f (aL - aR}dFL (a}dFR (a) - 
z J J A\
\Pi I I (aR -aL}dFL (a)dFR (a} 
2 J JAI
The ex ante (i.e. before knowing the realization of candidates) utility of an informed 
vote is instead
W* = \P> j J 2 (a^ ~ aR}dFL (a)dFR(a) +
Pi I I (aR -aL }dFL (a)dFR(a). 
J JAI
The second term in the right-hand side is positive by definition, therefore W* — W > 
O.I
Political information can be demanded for a number of different purposes. Instru­ 
mental voting is just one possibility. A sense of civic duty might also play a role as this 
can be seen as part of being a "good citizen". As we argued in the previous chapter, 
political information can also be demanded to understand or forecast public policies and 
this in turn can be useful for better private decision-making. Finally, information can be 
enjoyed as a consumption good and therefore be directly included in the utility function. 
We represent all this "exogenous" utility from information with A and say that total 
utility from information is
$ = A + AA (4.1)
Here A is a parameter we introduce for our convenience. Instrumental voting therefore 
implies that A > 0. Otherwise we should expect A = 0, i.e. no demand for political 
information arising from voting decision-making. Thanks to the following result, we will 
be able to test A > 0 versus an alternative of A = 0.
Proposition 4.1 If A > 0 then $ is higher in constituency /x.
Proof. Straightforward from the (4.1), as A = A(P) with ^jp- > 0 and P is inversely 
related to expected margins of victory.
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4.2.2 Information supply and mass media
We consider two newspapers F and Q. They supply political news about both constituen­ 
cies. We assume they have a fixed space s to devote to these news and indicate with 
SM € [0,s ] the space devoted by newspaper F to news about n; analogously we can de­ 
fine So> s®i s®- Each citizen buy one newspaper. The probability for a citizen that buys 
newspaper j to get informed about constituency i is g(s^'), with q > 0 and q" < 0. We 
will assume each citizen will only care about her own constituency, thus simply ignoring 
news about the other constituency.
We then have s^ +sJ0 = s (j = F, 0) and define a newspaper news profile as < s^, s30 > . 
A citizen living in constituency IJL gets from newspaper F a utility from news equal to
Newspapers also report about other things apart from politics. Culture, sport, and 
other events are also covered as well as enjoyed by readers. Each paper has its own mix 
over these different forms of entertainment and also its own way of dealing with them. 
Also, the way politics in itself can be reported is not unique. The depth and the focus of 
news, as well as possible partizanship, all matter for the reader. We will therefore indicate 
the expected utility from newspaper F (Q) to citizen k in constituency fj, with \&(s^) +7^ 
(vp(s®) + Ok), where jk (Ok) is a fixed characteristic of newspaper F (6) that makes it 
different from 0 (F). Analogously for the other constituency. We are then assuming that 
editorial choices, entertainment content, partizanship etc. are fixed characteristics of each 
newspaper: this is not an unrealistic assumption in the short run and certainly within 
the space of an electoral campaign.
Then we say that citizen k in constituency fj. b.uys newspaper F if
*(*£)+ 7* >*(*?) + 0* (4.2)
and buys newspaper 0 otherwise. Let us indicate with ^ the difference \I/(s£) — ^(s®) 
and with rj k the difference Ok — 7jt-
Newspapers are uncertain about individual preferences, in particular preferences about 
the entertainment component. We assume r]k is distributed according to a distribution
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function Hi (i = fj.,o), which is common knowledge. The corresponding density function 
is hi. Thus, the probability that citizen k in constituency fj, buys newspaper F is given 
by Pr[rjk < ^^} = Hi(^/^}.
We then introduce the following assumption, that will ensure that the pay-off functions 
of the newspapers are concave. This is an adaptation of condition Cl in Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1987).
' ~ " i 
Assumption 4.1 'V"' < — 9i / s'/' z = u o- 7 = F 0
^ (,./iTi.\ —— A.^_'/.J\\9 ' f*) "I J -1 ) 1-'
Newspapers maximize expected profits. Each reader provides the newspaper with a 
revenue p which is the sum of the price directly paid by readers to buy the paper and the 
amount paid by advertisers per reader. Therefore total profits in the industry are given 
by H = np — 2C, where n is the total number of citizens in the polity and C the fixed cost 
to produce each newspaper. For the moment, we only consider fixed costs and assume 
marginal costs are zero. Of course there are marginal costs represented by the printing 
and delivery costs but the "cost of the first copy" is normally by far the biggest cost.
Since we are interested in the share of the market newspapers have in each constituency 
we will rewrite the expected profit equation for newspaper F as
where n\ is the number of readers newspaper j has in constituency i. For newspaper 9 
we have H9 = II — Hr . Since costs are sunk, newspapers are only interested in maximizing 
revenue: in our model this implies that newspapers will maximize the expected number 
of readers n. Indicating with Ni the total number of voters in constituency i, we will have
A strategy for newspaper j is given by sj' = [s^ , si,} . We will indicate the set of feasible 
strategies for newspaper j with Sj = {s^, s30 s^ + si = s}.
This is a zero-sum game. Therefore a Nash equilibrium of the maximizing readership 
game is given by a feasible strategy profile {sp,Sg} s.t.
152
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that Assumption 4.! is satisfied, A > 0, and N^ = N0 . Then 
an equilibrium strategy profile {s^, SQ} must satisfy s^ = s® > s^ — sf.
Proof. The best reply function for newspaper j is defined implicitly by the first order 
conditions
N0h0 (yo)$0q'(s>0 ) = 0,
j = r,e
where $ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem. This implies that
and therefore
sr - se•V — V
r _ e
Now remember that
= A + AA(P0 ) 
> 0, i = fji,o.
Being $M > $0 from the first order conditions we get that s^ > s30 , j = T, Q.
Assumption 4.1 guarantees that the second order conditions are satisfied (see Lindbeck 
and Weibull, 1987).•
So far we only focused on the implications of marginality on information demand and 
supply. There are a number of other factors that can have an influence on information 
demand and supply and therefore should be used as control variables when trying to assess 
the effects of election closeness. On the media revenue side it is quite realistic to assume
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that not everyone has the same value to advertisers and that newspapers are capable 
of discriminating among different readers. The extent of this discrimination depends 
on the knowledge newspapers and advertisers have of market conditions and people's 
characteristics. Thus, we should expect this type of discrimination to become more and 
more relevant as new technologies improve the amount and quality of information on 
customers. Stromberg (2002) relates the value to advertisers to an interest in specific 
aspects of public policy: for example, being interested in a particular public service rather 
than others reveals something about people's income, and readers' income is important for 
advertisers. At the same time in practice we do not observe any price discrimination across 
different readers. This means that discrimination will mainly occur through information 
supply.
Another consideration concerns costs. So far we assumed that the marginal cost of 
producing and delivering papers was zero. Although, as we said, marginal costs have only 
a minor part in the production of newspapers, for our purposes delivery costs could be 
important. We are considering possible spatial discrimination by newspapers and in this 
sense delivery costs could show substantial variation. In particular, in areas which are 
densely populated, marginal delivery costs are probably negligible while they could be 
sizeable if our newspapers wanted to reach readers in remote parts of the country.
By modifying our assumptions and introducing differentiated constituencies we will 
therefore obtain a rationale for control variables that will make our test more reliable. At 
the same time in this way we will also be able to implement a direct test of some of the 
main Stromberg's results.
Heterogeneity here enters at the constituency level. In other terms newspapers are not 
able to discriminate readers according to any other individual characteristics apart from 
the constituency they come from, and we now assume constituencies are statistically 
different. This is actually the strategy that will be used to implement the empirical 
analysis .
Assumption 4.2 p^ ^ p0 .
Advertisers will induce from the constituency a number of other characteristics of 
interest and therefore will be willing to pay differently for marginal readers coming from 
different constituencies. Also the cost function is now different.
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Assumption 4.3 The newspaper cost function is TC =
where v^ and v0 are the cost of the marginal reader.
For empirical purposes we will mainly identify v ^  and v0 with delivery costs. 
Now we can define the net marginal revenue per-reader as
Pz = Pi-Vi, i = H,° 
The profit equation for newspaper j can be re-written as
E(W) = PM£(n£) + p0E(nr0 ) -C,j = T,Q
To ensure that every citizen buys one newspaper and newspapers have an interest in 
reaching all citizens we assume the following:
Assumption 4.4 ~pi > 0 Vi.
Now the problem will not simply be to maximize expected readership, as each reader 
must be weighted by her "net value" . The next proposition provides the Nash equilibrium 
condition in this case.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose Assumptions 4-1-4-4 are- satisfied and A > 0. Then an equilib­ 
rium strategy profile {S^,SQ} must satisfy s£ = s®,s^ = sf and V,3^. = N °~ v $" •
Proof. The profit equation for newspaper j can be expressed as
= -p^Hr) + ~p0N0H0 (>0 } -C,j = r, 9. 
The result follows from the first order conditions 
P^M*/J$/*g'(4) = #
p0N0h0 ($0)$0q( s>0 ) = #, j = r,e.
where •d is the Lagrange multiplier associated with this problem. Assumption 4.1 
guarantees that the second order conditions are satisfied (see Lindbeck and Weibull, 
1987).B
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Proposition 4.3 tells us that now newspapers can discriminate across constituencies 
also on the basis of further information they may have. Other things equal, information 
supply will be higher in the constituency with larger ~pi (-) — p^-} - Vi(-). On the revenue 
side we can relate the readers' value for advertisers to factors as income, age, education 
etc. The net value of readers for newspapers will then take into account their location 
and be higher where readers are on average more valuable and lower where delivery costs 
are higher; we will use population density to capture this last element.
Finally, also the total size of constituencies, N^ and N0 , (in terms of absolute pop­ 
ulation, or absolute electorate) should play a role. However, as we noticed at the start 
of this section, we can have both a "groups size effect" (like in Stromberg) as well as a 
"collective action effect" and we will approach empirical investigation with no prior about 
the sign of this variable.
We can therefore summarize our findings in the following testable proposition:
Theoretical Results Other things equal, information supply is higher in constituencies 
with a closer electoral race, more densely populated, and where citizens are on av­ 
erage more valuable to advertisers. The effect of the size of electorate is uncertain.
4.3 Evidence
We will proceed now to verify the compatibility of our theoretical results with data. 
Empirical investigation will concern the 1997 general election in the United Kingdom. For 
the purpose of this analysis we will use data on England, Scotland, and Wales only. As 
already noted in Chapter 2, Northern Ireland has been excluded as the political cleavages 
there are substantially different from the rest of the country. For a brief description of 
the UK political landscape and the 1997 election see section 5 in chapter 2.
4.3.1 The Data
Evidence provided is of two types. First, we will focus on information supply, using 
the electoral constituency as unit of observation. There were 641 such constituencies in 
England, Scotland, and Wales in 1997.
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Three main sources of data will be used. First of all we need data about information 
supply by newspapers. For this purpose we will use a major national newspaper, "The 
Guardian". We will define information supply for each constituency as the number of 
articles that mention such constituency or one of its candidates during the last 30 days 
of the electoral campaign. This variable is indicated as News.
We will then use information about electoral results4 . In particular, we will use this 
information to measure the marginality of a constituency. A first possibility is to focus 
on percentage differences and therefore use the following formula:
(4-3,W + R
where W is the percentage of votes for the winning candidate and R the percentage 
for the runner up. The larger such indicator the lower the degree of marginality of the 
constituency. However, to capture the idea of marginality as the probability of casting 
a decisive vote, the absolute difference in votes between candidates might be a more 
appropriate indicator. We will consider both possibilities.
One problem with such indicators is that they measure election closeness ex post. A 
rational expectations assumption would work in favour of using such measures: in general, 
when using aggregate data, there is no reason to expect a systematic bias in expectations 
within a constituency. Nevertheless, voters' swings are not always well predicted by 
opinion polls, and this could generate non-random biases in voters' expectations5 .
One alternative possibility is to use past election results. Unfortunately this would 
also be quite problematic in our case. The main obstacle is that in between 1992 (year 
of the previous general election) and 1997 most constituency borders were changed, mak­ 
ing therefore hard any comparison, even where the denominations were left unchanged. 
Moreover, in 1997 there were expectations of a large swing from the ruling party (Con­ 
servatives) to opposition parties (mainly the Labour): thus, previous election closeness 
could not represent a good measure of expected election closeness as this would crucially 
depend on who held the constituency.
For these reasons, to capture expected closeness we will use the BBC's "100 contested
"Boothroyd (2002).
5 See Cox (1988) or Kunce (2001) for some problematic aspects of ex post indicators.
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constituencies", the variable bbclOO already described and used in chapter 2. This should 
capture information from polls and the general feeling about election closeness of BBC 
journalists.
We will also use information about the total number of electors in each constituency 
and the turnout percentage. With the first variable we try to test if the "group size effect" 
can actually prevail on the "collective action effect". The percentage of turnout indicates 
the extent of political participation (at least in the form of voting) and therefore can be 
broadly intended as a measure of interest in politics by the citizens of a given area.
Information about other possibly relevant characteristics of the constituency will be 
derived from the 1991 Census6 . We include the population density, one of the key variables 
in our theoretical analysis, entering into the newspapers' cost function. Then we consider 
variables that can possibly give a representation of the social and economic conditions of 
the districts. Information on income is not available but proxies have been used, namely 
the unemployment rate and the percentage of citizenship with high qualifications (degree 
and higher). Age can have an influence on propensity to consume and consumption 
patterns (thus affecting how valuable a reader is to advertisers) and therefore has been 
included. Also, the percentage of inactive population (mainly retired, but also including 
students and permanently sick) is used. There are reasons (as well as anecdotic evidence7 ) 
to think that inactive population, in particular old or sick individuals, should be less 
valuable to advertisers, as they tend to consume less than average, or are less responsive 
to advertising.
One possible concern might derive from the fact that The Guardian, like most national 
newspapers in the U.K., is London based. This could bias the news in favour of London 
constituencies both because of a lower cost of news collection and, more generally, because 
of a larger sensitivity to a nearer environment. This could be particularly relevant for 
our results about population density, given that this variable is clearly higher in London 
than elsewhere. For this reason we include a Greater London control dummy, equal to 1
B The data we used were recorded at the level of districts, local administration entities with no direct 
link with electoral constituencies. Most constituencies are contained within the borders of a single district 
and these posed no problems. Others (around 25% of them) span over parts of different districts and in 
such cases data referred to districts have been weighted in order to get approximated constituency data. 
The weighting factors have been reconstructed by using the detailed description of constituencies (and 
their relations with districts and wards) contained in Railings and Thrasher (1995).
7 See Stromberg (2002).
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for the Greater London constituencies.
Finally we also include a "big-shot" control. As some candidates have naturally a 
prominent position and bigger visibility during the electoral campaign, it seems necessary 
to be able to single out this effect from what we want to test. Therefore we introduce 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for constituencies where "big-shots" are candidates. By 
big-shot we intend all the candidates who have been ministers in any past government, 
the members of the current "shadow-cabinet", and the current leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party8 .
We also provide evidence on citizens' use of newspapers across different constituencies. 
This helps us isolating the hypothesis that differentiated supply is actually a consequence 
of differentiated demand from the competing possibility that all citizens are interested in 
marginal constituencies. For this purpose we will use the 1997 British General Election 
Study, a post-election survey consisting of 3625 individual observations about people that 
were interviewed a short time after the election. Our sample will consists of 2807 observa­ 
tions. Among other questions, respondents were asked whether and how frequently they 
used to read newspapers during the electoral campaign, and which paper. In the U.K. the 
distinction between high quality and low quality (tabloid) papers is quite straightforward 
and commonly accepted. We can therefore separate regular users of quality papers during 
the electoral campaign (QP) from the rest of the population and try to assess the impact 
of marginality on the demand for political information. We also have information on the 
usage of local papers and this information can also be exploited to make our conclusions 
more robust. Data include a number of demographic and economic characteristics of the 
interviewed individuals, as well as a measure of ideological motivation.
All variables are described in more detail in the Appendix to this chapter and summary 
statistics are reported in table 4.1.
4.3.2 Empirical Specification
Using the dataset described above we intend to test the theoretical results reported at 
the end of section 4.2. Preliminary data analysis seems to suggest that a very limited 
number of constituencies get a disproportionate attention from media (see Tab. 4.2). For
For further details see section 5 in chapter 2.
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example almost 90% of constituencies have News < 5 while only 3 constituencies have 
News > 100. This suggests that the relationship we want to estimate could be highly 
non- linear. A linear regression would indeed deliver quite poor results. We will instead 
present estimates for the following equation:
i A + a'2Xl + a'3 Zi +m, i = 1, ..., 641 (4.4)
where:
D is a measure of the distance between candidates (winner and runner up) or a 
dummy for expected contested constituencies (66clOO), X is a three-dimensional vector of 
population density, size of the electorate, and turnout (therefore a2 = [0:21, 0:22, 0^3]), and 
Z represents a set of control variables from the 1991 Census, plus the "big-shot" dummy 
(a3 = [0:31, 0:32, ...aafc]). As usual Ui represents independent disturbance terms that have 
zero mean and are uncorrelated with the exogenous variables of the model. Estimation 
will be by OLS and will take into account potential heteroskedasticity. Specification tests 
will also be conducted, in particular a Box-Cox test to assess the log-linear functional 
form.
Almost all the parameters have an expected sign in terms of our model. However, 
our main parameter of interest is a\. In general, we want to assess if a\ is significantly 
different from zero. As discussed previously, we will consider several possible measures of 
constituencies' marginality.
The other variables serve as controls with respect to this aim; at the same time they 
are of interest for their own sake as we can use their estimates to assess the reliability of 
our model of the information market.
We will accomplish our task also by estimating newspaper readership at the individual 
level. The equation to be estimated in this case is given by
QPl = (3Q + /?! Di + f3'2Wt + Ui , i = 1, ...,2807 (4.5)
where QP is a binary variable equal to 1 for a quality paper or a local paper reader, 
W is a vector of individual control variables including, among other covariates, income, 
education, sex and age.
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4.3.3 Results
OLS estimates of equation 4.4 are reported in Table 4.3. We start by considering the role 
of election closeness. In column 1 and 2 we use ex post indicators of election closeness 
(based on percentage distance in column 1 and absolute distance in column 2). In both 
cases ex post distance has the expected sign and is significant at 5% level in column 
1 and very close to it in column 2. When we use expected closeness (as captured by 
the dummy bbclOO in column 3) the significance level increases substantially, reaching 
a nil p-value for the hypothesis of ai being zero. As discussed previously, the 1997 
general election witnessed a large generalized shift of votes away from the Conservative 
party. This was to some extent expected and therefore the most interesting constituencies 
were the previously Conservative-held ones. In a sense, the final outcome was mainly 
decided in such constituencies and this should have increased the demand for information9 . 
Thus, it is not surprising that when we focus on contested Conservative constituencies 
results get sharper. Actually, some constituencies may have been ex post very close 
just because the swing of votes has probably been larger than expected, making the 
Labour candidates winning (marginally) also in constituencies that never were marginal 
or Labour-held before. Therefore, ex post marginality could be an imperfect measure of 
expected salience.
In column 4 we also get rid of another ex post indicator, turnout, but results remain 
substantially unchanged. Thus, from this analysis we can safely conclude that expected 
marginality matters for information supply.
Other variables also show a high compatibility of our model with facts. Population 
density has the expected sign and is always significant at the 5% level, except in column 
3, where it is significant at the 7.5% level.
The sign of other control variables also show good support for some of the Stromberg- 
type conclusions. In particular, and differently from Stromberg, we saw that the effect of 
group's magnitude is not necessarily uncontroversial. However, empirical evidence seems 
to suggest that the effect of the group size should overcome the potential collective ac­ 
tion problem that size generates. In particular, in column 2 we use the absolute distance 
between candidates and therefore we isolate the potential "group size effect". However,
9 In terms of our model, in general elections citizens care mainly about final policies: thus, marginality 
in one constituency is more relevant when it matters for the whole outcome of the election.
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there are no noticeable differences between this and the other cases. Although the mag­ 
nitude and significance of the electorate size are larger in column 2, these remain always 
positive and comfortably significant at the 5% or 1% level.
The same is not true for Turnout, that also should serve as a signal to newspapers 
about the degree of attention to political matters. The sign is always negative, although 
t-ratios are never satisfactory.
Good support also comes from the unemployment rate, that we use as a proxy for the 
level of well-being in a given constituency. On the other hand there is little evidence in 
favour of the relevance of other factors that the literature seems to have identified as deter­ 
mining information supply. Anecdotic evidence is reported of television programmes that 
have been suspended because watched mainly by the elderly, who where judged not valu­ 
able by advertisers. We find that constituencies with larger inactive population (mainly 
represented by retired) receive more attention from newspapers. It is clear that inactive 
people might have more time to devote to information gathering and when we come to 
election times retired people might also have all the incentives to put a disproportionate 
attention to political platforms.
Finally, average age and the percentage of people with high degrees do not seem to 
have significant effects, while there is some evidence of a "Greater London effect". A 
pure control variable is big-shot. Both the magnitude and the significance of big-shot are 
relevant but this does not come as a surprise nor is the consequence of any theoretical 
advance made in this paper.
In table 4.4 we turn to micro-level analysis and report probit estimates of equation 
4.5. Most parameters show the expected sign, with education and income being overall 
the best explanatory variables. Sex, church attendance and length of residence in the area 
also show sizeable and significant effects. Our main variables of interest, however, are the 
measures of the size of the electorate and marginality. While for the significance of most 
other variables several explanations are possible, the electorate size and marginality have 
a strong relationship with voters' instrumental behaviour. Both come with the expected 
sign, quite independently of the marginality index used and the significance levels are 
rather reassuring. We can see this as further evidence that mass media behaviour during 
that electoral campaign was actually driven, at least partially, by instrumental demand 
for information rather than a broad and non-instrumental interest in the election.
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4.4 Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to study the implications of instrumental voting 
behaviour for the political information market. This allows us to test instrumental voting 
theories by using data that have not been exploited so far for this purpose, namely data 
on information acquisition and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns.
One central implication of instrumental voting is the positive linkage between elec­ 
tion closeness and political participation. Both theoretical and empirical literature have 
mainly identified participation with electoral turnout. We focus instead on information 
acquisition and make more precise the idea that it should be higher when elections are ex­ 
pected to be closer. On the other side of the information market, profit maximizing mass 
media should therefore discriminate between different electoral constituencies according 
to their expected marginality. We do not observe newspapers' price discrimination in 
reality. However our research shows, both theoretically and empirically, that the media 
can have a different way to discriminate, namely targeting their attention (in terms of 
reported news) to marginal constituencies.
Moreover, research in communication studies and recent formal models, in particular 
Stromberg (2002), have pointed out that the media can be expected to target customers 
who are more valuable to advertisers, i.e. wealthier, better educated, younger. Our 
model gives an explicit empirical content to those predictions and, by using the electoral 
constituencies in the 1997 British election as units of observation, we can perform a 
formal empirical test of these conclusions. Evidence on Stromberg's conclusions is overall 
satisfactory: although not all our estimates are compatible with such results, we can safely 
conclude that there is enough evidence of newspapers targeting their news according to 
the electorate characteristics. We also provide empirical support for the idea that larger 
groups should receive more attention from the media, although we have shown that this 
conclusion does not necessarily follow from the theory.
Information supply can also be linked with the newspapers' cost function. We do not 
enter into the details of fixed costs, that represent a large part of the cost of producing a 
newspaper. However, we find that delivery costs could be relevant for the purpose of our 
analysis: in particular, information supply should be higher in more densely populated 
areas. This proposition too finds confirmation in our empirical investigation.
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Our main purpose, however, was to show that information acquisition and news sup­ 
ply is, at least partially, driven by instrumental voting. We show that mass media, other 
things equal, tend to target marginal constituencies during electoral campaigns. This 
could be due to a genuine higher information demand arising in marginal constituencies 
as well as to a number of other reasons, like a general interest of the public in mar­ 
ginal constituencies, or the effort of party leaders to target marginal constituencies. To 
discriminate between these hypotheses we also provide evidence on voters' usage of news­ 
papers and find that quality and local papers tend to be more demanded in marginal 
constituencies. Thus, our analysis seems to suggest a comfortable compatibility between 
instrumental voting behaviour and observed facts in the information market.
If we think that the media introduce a bias in the way people are informed about 
politics, something that has been left aside in the present work, and if this bias is in turn 
exploited by politicians, then we can speak of a "media-driven-bias" in public policy- 
making. In the context of our model this bias is combined with an "attention-bias" that 
should substantially drive politicians to target marginal constituencies.
This analysis is by no means conclusive and there are several margins for improvements 
and questions that further research should try to address.
On the theoretical side, the model of media competition is still quite simple. New 
insights could come from explicitly considering the advertising market and the possibility 
for newspapers to select the combination of political information, advertising and other 
news in the paper. Also, considering the possibility of entry and, more in general, different 
industry structures, could deliver interesting results as well as normative implications for 
regulating the media market 10 . Further research could help us understanding redistribu- 
tive implications. In particular, and depending on the rules that regulate the relationship 
between central governments and local administration, we should expect marginal con­ 
stituencies to benefit disproportionately of targetable benefits. This possibility deserves 
closer scrutiny in future research.
On the empirical side, improvements on our current knowledge are also possible. For 
what concerns our estimates, the relationship between news and closeness (as well as news 
and other variables) is clearly non-linear. We have chosen a log-linear specification and
10 An analysis of this type with respect to politicians' accountability can be found in Besley and Prat 
(2002).
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shown that it fits our data quite well. It would clearly be useful however to resort to 
non-parametric estimation. Above all there is the need for further data collection about 
both individuals and the media. More data about different newspapers (or other media), 
different elections and, possibly, different countries, could help us understand what is the 
robustness and the generality of our results and maybe to isolate the relevant institutional 
characteristics that induce differentiated behaviour.
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4.5 Appendix: Description of Variables and Regression Re­ 
sults
Constituency level
• News. It is the number of articles appeared on the newspaper "The Guardian" 
during the last 30 days before the poll date and containing either a reference to the 
electoral constituency or the name of one of its candidates.
• Dist_P = percentage distance between the winning candidate and the runner-up 
in the 1997 election, given by the formula (W-R)/(W+R), where W = percentage 
of votes for the winning candidate, R = percentage of votes for the runner up.
• Dist_N = absolute distance between the winning candidate and the runner-up in 
the 1997 election, divided by 1000.
• 66clOO = dummy variable equal to 1 if the constituency has been included by the 
BBC among the "100 contested constituencies".
• Density = population density expressed as the number of residents per hectare 
divided by 1000.
• Electorate = total electorate in the constituency divided by 1000.
• big — shot = dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the candidates in the constituency 
has been classified as a "big-shot". This means when one of the candidates is either 
a current or former minister, or a current member of the "shadow cabinet", or the 
leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
• Unemployment% = unemployment rate, expressed as total unemployed over active 
population, multiplied by 100.
• Inactive%— percentage of inactive population. This is the total of retired, students, 
permanently sick and other inactive over total residents multiplied by 100.
• Age = average age.
• HighD = percentage of residents with high qualifications, defined as the number of 
residents with degree or higher title over the total residents, multiplied by 100;
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• GLondon = dummy variable equal to 1 for the greater London constituencies.
Individual level
• QP = dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a regular reader of The Times, 
The Guardian, The Independent, The Financial Times, The Daily Telegraph, or any 
local newspaper.
• Education : respondent's education level. Categorical variable from 1 to 7.
• Income: total household income from all sources before tax. Categorical variable 
from 1 to 16.
• Age : respondent's age (>18).
• Sex: l=male
• Married: I—yes (=1 also if "living as married")
• Asian: =1 if Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian.
• Black: —I if Black African, Black Caribbean, Other Black.
• Churchgoer: "Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and bap­ 
tisms and so on, how often do you attend services or meeting connected with your 
religion?". Categorical variable from 1 (never or practically never) to 8 (once a week 
or more).
• Lenght of Residence : Answer to the question: "How long have you lived in this 
neighbourhood?".
• Ideology: derived from individual placement on a left (0) to right (10) scale. Ideol- 
ogy=0 if left-right=5, Ideology=l if left-right=4 or 6 etc.
• Registered: l=yes.
• Voted92: =1 if voted in 1992 general election (self reported).
• Economic Activity. Categorical variable:
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1. "in paid work for at least 10 hours in week" or "waiting to take up paid work 
already accepted"; 1498 obs.;
2. "in full time education (not paid for by the employer, including on vacation". 9 
obs.;
3. "on government training/employment programme". 64 obs.;
4. "unemployed". 127 obs.;
5. "permanently sick or disabled". 131 obs.;
6. "wholly retired from work". 642 obs.;
7. "looking after the home". 324 obs.;
8. "other". 18 obs.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
News
Log(News)
Dist_P
Dist_N
BBC100
Density
Electorate/1000
Turnout%
BS
Age
lnactive%
Unemployment%
HighD%
GLondon
QP
Education
Income
Age
Sex
Married
Asian
Black
Churchgoer
Length of Residence
Ideology
Registered
Voted92
Obs
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
641
641
641
641
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
2807
Mean
3.8658
-1.3847
0.2972
10859
0.156
1.6524
66.5437
71.3165
0.078
37.8866
51.32
9.45
7.0963
0.1154
0.1778
3.6021
7.0495
48.3035
0.4653
0.5885
0.0185
0.0089
1.9882
19.5248
1.9291
0.9865
0.7973
Std. Dev.
18.4735
2.8319
0.2006
6906
0.3631
1.9092
8.0574
5.6359
0.2684
1.881
3.2413
3.8
3.743
0.3198
0.3824
2.1637
4.587
17.517
0.4989
0.4922
0.1349
0.094
2.6079
17.9378
1.7758
0.1156
0.4021
Vlin
0(app. toO.01)
-4.6052
0.0012
53
0
0.0088
22.983
51.4
0
32.8793
38.858
2.868
1.4891
0
0
1
1
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Max
388
5.961
0.8219
33759
1
11.6298
101.68
82.2
1
46.533
61.0908
22.4896
25.084
1
1
7
16
94
1
1
1
1
7
94
6
1
1
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Table 4.2: The variable "News'
Mews
i
3
4
5
6-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-100
>100
Frequency
265
165
74
28
18
24
25
19
10
3
3^
4
3
Percent
41.34
25.74
11.54
4.37
2.81
3.74
3.9
2.96
1.56
047
047
0.62
0.47
Cumulate
41,34
67.08
78.63
83
85.80
89.55
93.45
96.41
97.97
98.44
98.91
99.53
100
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Table 4.3: Information Supply (OLS)
Dependent Variable = Log(News)
1234
Dist_P
Dist_Nx1000
BBC100
Density
Electorate/1000
Turnout
Big shot
Age
nactive
Unemployment
HighD
GLondon
Constant
Obs
R-squared
1.4808 
-1.960)
0.2448 
2.076)
0.0321 
2.311)
0.04 
-1.406)
3.4017 
(8.815)
-0.1074 
(-1.268)
0.1449 
(2.022)
-0.1789 
(-2.544)
0.0327 
(0.857)
0.7046 
(1.589)
-2.8828 
(-0.764)
641
0.1662
0.0366 
-1.924)
.2521 
2.153)
0.3891 
2.884)
0.0305 
-1.138)
3.3891 
8.726)
-0.1071 
(-1.264)
0.1423 
(1.989)
-0.179 
(-2.555)
0.0284 
(0.742)
0.7094 
(1.605)
-3.919 
(-1.082)
641
0.166
.1889 
4.306)
.2081 
1.783)
.0334 
2.463)
0.0472 
-1.801)
3.4925 
8.955)
0.0701 
-0.83)
0.1257 
(1.753)
-0.1985 
(-2.847)
0.039 
(1.036)
0.8574 
(1.971)
-3.3395
(-0.948)
641
0.1818
.0415 
3.84)
.2535 
2.227)
.336 
2.46)
3.4918 
8.899)
0.07 
-0.836)
0.1209 
(1.704)
-0.1625 
(-2.414)
0.0322 
(0.862)
0.8016 
(1.855)
-6.8138 
(-2.368)
641
0.1779
Note: robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis
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Table 4.4: Information Demand 
(Probit marginal effects)
Dependent Variable = QP
1 2 3
Education
ncome
Age
Age2
Sex
Married
Asian
Black
Churchgoer
_ength of Residence
Registered
Voted92
Ideology
GLondon
Electorate
Dist_P
BBC100
Big shot
Economic Activity
Obs.
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo-R2
0.0368 
(10.20)
0.0178 
(9.12)
0.0041 
(1.67)
0.0002 
(0.07)
0.0584 
(4.14)
-0.0037 
(0.24)
0.0669 
(1.12)
0.1124 
(1.36)
0.0107 
(4.36)
'-0.0009 
(2.20)
-0.0969 
(1.45)
-0.0104 
(0.58)
0.0199 
(5.41)
0.0404 
(1.64)
-0.0029 
(3.98)
-0.1785 
(4.87)
yes
2807
-1053.1073
0.1983
0.0368 
(10.03)
0.0184 
(9.30)
0.0045 
(1.80)
-0.00002 
(0.01)
0.0605 
(4.23)
-0.0045 
(0.29)
0.0545 
(0.93)
0.0734 
(0.95)
0.0114 
(4.60)
-0.0011 
(2.46)
-0.3821 
(1.50)
-0.0112 
(0.61)
0.0196 
(5.28)
0.0450 
(1.78)
-0.0021 
(2.92)
0.0474 
(2.24)
yes
2807
-1061.8214
0.1917
0.0367 
(9.99)
0.0185 
(9.31)
0.0045 
(1.80)
-0.00004 
(0.02)
0.0604 
(4.22)
-0.0045 
(0.30)
0.0538 
(0.92)
0.0717 
(0.93)
0.0115 
(4.62)
-0.0011 
(2.47)
-0.3955 
(1.55)
-0.0111 
(0.60)
0.0196 
(5.28)
0.0437 
(1.74)
-0.002 
(2.85)
0.0453 
(2.14)
-0.0225 
(0.85)
yes
2807
-1061.4073
0.192
Note: robust standard errors. I -statistics in parenthesis
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Information plays a key role in decision-making. This consideration has delivered a com­ 
pletely new perspective in economic theory, where the elegance of the Arrow-Debreu 
general equilibrium model has often been replaced by partial equilibrium analysis dealing 
with specific aspects of the economy. Decisions taken in the political market of democratic 
systems make no exception, and crucially rely on information availability and its quality. 
For a number of different reasons, good information is important for policy-makers, for 
candidates, for lobbies, and for the common citizen.
This work tries to contribute to a better understanding of the role of information in 
elections, its impact on voting behaviour and, ultimately, on public policy. It is argued 
that to learn about the consequences of information we need to start from its determi­ 
nants. Not all actors in the political arena have the same incentives to be informed. 
While professional politicians have sufficient motivations to gather information on polit­ 
ical and economic matters, the same is not true for common citizens, whose impact on 
public decision-making is often extremely limited. Thus, political information acquisition 
by simple voters, as many other social phenomena involving collective action problems, 
remains largely unexplained and constitutes a still puzzling phenomenon to social scien­ 
tists.
From this apparent empasse, it is possible to make substantial progresses when we 
recognize that the economic method consists not much in explaining behaviour in a strict 
sense as instead in linking changes in observed behaviour to changes in observable con­ 
straints. This is the approach taken in this thesis, where the consideration of individual
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motivations has been coupled with a focus on opportunity and ability to learn: although 
the motivation to be informed could well derive mainly from individual unobservable 
tastes, the opportunity and the ability to learn will eventually leave their mark on the 
amount and the type of political knowledge that citizens possess. If information has an 
impact on public policy-making, then this positive analysis can also deliver a number 
of normative implications. Thus, finding causal relationships between heterogeneity in 
political knowledge and observable constraints permits to evaluate different institutional 
and market arrangements and opens the possibility of actual policy recommendations.
The central idea developed in this thesis is that exogenously including imperfect in­ 
formation in electoral models is not enough. Individual incentives to be informed are 
correlated with other incentives to participate in public life: this makes the effects of 
information hardly identifiable in empirical research. A theory of information acquisi­ 
tion is therefore needed to isolate the variables that affect political knowledge from those 
determining political participation in general. By modelling information acquisition as 
an individual production we can identify the impact of political knowledge on electoral 
turnout and conclude that being informed on political matters significantly increases the 
likelihood of voting. It is important, however, to distinguish the flow of information re­ 
ceived during an electoral campaign from the prior stock of political knowledge. Such 
knowledge is the outcome of each individual's history, from parents' influence to direct 
personal experiences: thus, prior perception of political matters is generally very diverse 
across the population. We show that such diversity also plays an important role when 
coming to information acquisition and the impact of political knowledge on turnout.
This study shows that availability of news on mass media and individual resources to 
acquire, process, and retain information are good explanatory variables of voters' political 
knowledge. As a growing research literature stresses the importance of information for 
agents' (in this case public officials) accountability, we can conclude that mass media and 
voters' personal resources play a crucial role in democratic decision-making. Formally 
democratic institutions are emptied of their substantial content if political information is 
unavailable or beyond most voters' reach.
Moreover, resources and costs that affect information acquisition are asymmetrically 
distributed across the population: this introduces the possibility that political entrepre­ 
neurs, mass media and possibly other actors in the electoral game will influence the final
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outcome by discriminating among voters. Politicians can target more responsive segments 
of the population, thus favouring those who have larger opportunity to be informed. In 
this work we show that this asymmetry could result in an higher political weight given 
to the rich and in public policy systematically biased in their favour. Considering this 
asymmetry casts serious doubts on the ability of the standard Downsian framework to 
predict redistributive policy. In particular we show the weakness of the link between 
inequality and redistribution that can be derived as a corollary of the median voter theo­ 
rem. Inequality may well increase the median voter' desire for redistribution; however, at 
the same time it also increases inequality in political awareness, thus rendering the poor 
less capable of pursuing their interest on the political market.
Coming to information supply, we provide evidence of mass media targeting voters 
who demand more information or are more valuable to advertisers: this introduces a 
further bias in the distribution of information. Various groups and organizations may 
actually have similar incentives and can therefore be expected to exploit any informa­ 
tional advantage they might have for their own purposes. If such information biases are 
transferred into a policy bias, as we argued in this thesis, then mass media can leave their 
own mark on public policy by simply maximizing their profits, i.e. excluding any possible 
bias introduced for ideological or "capture" reasons. We also provide new evidence of 
voters' instrumental behaviour by showing that election closeness matters for information 
acquisition, as one would expect if political information is, among other reasons, acquired 
to make better electoral choices.
Thus, summarizing, this thesis provides theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
of the importance of information for voting behaviour, the role of personal and environ­ 
mental constraints in determining political knowledge, and the active role of mass media 
in determining political awareness. We also provide theoretical reasoning unveiling the 
potential impact of political information on democratically determined public policy.
The findings of this study do not pretend to be conclusive and further research is 
necessary in order to evaluate the robustness of our results when different institutional 
arrangements are considered. A number of questions deserve further investigation. How 
electoral rules affect information acquisition and information transmission during elec­ 
toral campaigns? What should we expect under proportional representation? What is 
the impact of state-owned media on the information market? Such questions are not just
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a theoretical curiosity: they are somehow central in many countries' current debates on 
electoral reform and mass media regulation. Also, we only partially addressed the link 
between information and public policy. Evidence on policy-makers targeting of informed 
groups would make us more sanguine about the practical relevance of many of the find­ 
ings of this thesis, from the unbalanced representation of different income groups to the 
information bias introduced by mass media. It would certainly be useful, for example, 
to test whether marginal constituencies are actually targeted by policy-makers and if 
information has a role in this targeting.
Certainly the possibility to answer these and many more questions depends on ad­ 
vances in a number of other grounds. Theoretical research is slowly incorporating im­ 
perfect information in electoral models, unveiling a number of previously ignored effects 
of electoral competition. These can be particularly interesting when coupled with the 
insights offered by new models of electoral competition that consider a multidimensional 
policy space. At the same time, this trend in theoretical literature is only beginning to 
affect empirical research. A large number of questions is still waiting to receive the at­ 
tention it deserves. This will hopefully stimulate new data collection on information and 
elections. It seems fair to say that at the moment our knowledge of some phenomena is 
severely constrained by limited availability of appropriate data. One of the main tasks of 
future research should be to close this gap.
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